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Abstract 
The overall aim of this study is to establish the implications, effectiveness and limitations of 
making Aristotelian virtue theory a meta-theory of business. The study intends to test what 
the business world would be like with the virtue framework as its meta-theory, i.e. if virtue 
theory provided the fundamental principles that underlie the formation and operation of 
business enterprises, thus making virtue the philosophy of business. Since virtue is concerned 
with moral character rather than moral principles – it is community-based rather than 
individualistic – the application of the virtue framework to business implies that we will have 
to deal with the reality that individualistic capitalism is corrosive to virtue. The virtue 
framework is only compatible with collective forms of capitalism, not individualistic forms. 
Thus, in order to nurture virtues, it is necessary to build an economic system, a type of 
capitalism that is compatible with the virtue framework. Such a project is morally plausible 
because it is congruent with human nature, which is rational and social. 
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Opsomming 
Die algehele doel van hierdie studie is om die implikasies, effektiwiteit en beperkings van die 
toepassing van die Aristoteliaanse teorie van deug as metateorie vir besigheid vas te stel.  Die 
studie beoog om te toets hoe die besigheidswêreld sou lyk met deugdeteorie as metateorie, dit 
wil sê as deugdeteorie die fundamentele beginsels wat die formasie en bedryf van 
besigheidsondernemings onderlê voorsien en dus deug die filosofie van bedryf maak.  
Deugde is bemoei met morele karakter eerder as morele beginsels omdat dit 
gemeenskapsgegrond eerder as individualisties is.  Die toepassing van ŉ deugde-raamwerk 
op die sakewêreld impliseer dus dat ons moet afreken met die realiteit dat individualistiese 
kapitalisme korrosief is vir deugde. Die deugde-raamwerk is slegs verenigbaar met 
kollektiewe vorme van kapitalisme, eerder as individualistiese vorme.  Om die deugde te 
koester is dit dus nodig om ’n ekonomiese sisteem te bou in die vorm van ’n kapitalistiese 
stelsel wat verenigbaar is met die raamwerk. Só ŉ projek is moreel aanneemlik omdat dit 
ooreenstem met die menslike natuur, wat rasioneel en sosiaal is. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Setting the context   
Attempts have been made to apply normative theories to business ethics. For instance, in his 
work entitled A Kantian approach to business ethics, Bowie (1999) demonstrates how we can 
approach business ethics from a Kantian perspective; in their article “Utilitarianism and 
business ethics”, Snoeyenbos and Hummer (2003), enumerate the advantages and also 
discuss the problems of employing utilitarianism as an ethical theory in a business context; 
furthermore, Solomon (1991), in his article “Business ethics and virtue” and other works 
(1992-3), demonstrates the importance of virtues in business practice. These authors are 
preoccupied with showing the relevance of these normative theories to business practice. 
However, the central interest of this study is to examine the plausibility of making the 
Aristotelian virtue framework the meta-theory of business; i.e. making virtue a philosophy of 
business. The aim of the study is thus to establish the scope and limits of virtue theory’s 
applicability in business ethics.  
This thesis looks into the field of business ethics. Business ethics is a sub-discipline of 
applied ethics and is concerned with moral issues in business practice (Childress 1986). In 
seeking solutions to moral problems in business practice, business ethics, since it is an 
applied field, draws on many disciplines, some of whose methods are normative and 
modelled on diverse ethical/moral theories (Beauchamp 2003:3). As a result, business ethics 
includes a wide range of competing normative approaches.  
Having started between the 1970s and 1980s prompted by a series of corporate scandals 
involving bribery by American firms abroad, business ethics is a relatively young discipline 
in applied ethics (De George 2012). As a young discipline, business ethics does not yet have 
tools and principles that are specifically designed for it. It draws its working tools, such as the 
case study method, institutional analysis and the code of law, from other disciplines, 
including normative ethics. However, the most prominent normative approaches to business 
ethics are modelled on Kantian ethics, Utilitarianism and Aristotelian virtue ethics. This study 
contributes to efforts in the field of business ethics to seek a meta-theory or philosophy of 
business on which we can build solid business ethics. 
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Both Kantian and utilitarian ethics are action-focused. Kantian ethics argues that a right 
moral action is one performed out of duty, while utilitarian ethics holds that an action is 
morally right only if it produces the greatest happiness or benefit for the greatest number of 
people (Rachels 2007: 97). This implies that “when we act out of feelings, inclinations, or 
self-interest, our actions although they may be otherwise identified with ones that spring from 
the sense of duty have no fine moral worth” (Shaw 2008:57). 
Since the Enlightenment period, Kantian and utilitarian ethics have become more popular 
than the Aristotelian virtue theory. However, Kantian and Utilitarian ethics have been 
criticised for placing too much emphasis on reason as the sole basis of morality. For instance, 
in her paper entitled “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Anscombe (1958) argues that Kantian 
deontology and utilitarianism have weak psychology. The Kantian assumption is that moral 
rules and principles or moral values are universal, which means that there is only one way to 
resolve moral problems. This implies that context and personal interests should not be taken 
into consideration when making moral decisions or judgements.   
Furthermore, Anscombe disputes the claim that morality involves following principles and 
rules that are universally applicable to any moral situation. She argues that this would give 
birth to a rigid morality that is meaningless and out of place in a secular modern society as 
this type of morality assumes the existence of a law-giver who has no place in a secular 
society.  
Having pointed out these weaknesses, Anscombe suggests a return to the Aristotelian way of 
doing ethics, which uses concepts such as character, virtue and flourishing and also 
emphasises the importance of emotions, family and friendship (Anscombe 1958). 
Some philosophers have responded to this by focusing on how virtue ethics differs from and 
avoids weaknesses in Kantian and Utilitarian ethics. For instance, Williams (1981:39) points 
out that, by claiming that morally right actions are motivated by duty and not feelings, 
desires, piety or luck, Kantian ethics assumes that human beings are always in control of their 
situations and context. And yet, this is not always the case. Morality is also a matter of luck 
rather than a result of fixed rules and duties because human beings are not always in control 
of everything in their life.  
In his book After Virtue, MacIntyre (2007:32) points out that, the Enlightenment project was 
based on the importance of reason in human nature. It attempted to understand the natural 
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world and humankind on the basis of reason alone. For example, Kant (1724-1804) claims 
that reason instead of emotions, habits and self-interest is the only valid source of moral 
judgement, implying that human beings can be moral through reason alone. He assumes that 
being rational is all that is required to be moral. He also assumes that morality does not 
necessarily require a social context and social content. This of course has many implications. 
Firstly, it implies that morality requires training/education/knowledge. Secondly, it implies 
that the purpose of education is to equip the individual with reasoning skills rather than to 
form his or her character. Thirdly, it implies that morality too has become a matter of reason, 
which means that morality can find no basis in our desires, religious beliefs, God’s 
commandments or love. In this way, the Enlightenment project undermined the role of 
beliefs, customs, habits, emotions and religions.  
Furthermore, MacIntyre points out that Enlightenment ethics has a very damaging 
sociological effect and it is therefore responsible for the moral mess in which the world finds 
itself. While Enlightenment ethics puts great emphasis on the use of reason, MacIntyre 
observes that there were disagreements among the Enlightenment philosophers as regards the 
role of reason in morality. While Kierkegaard emphasises the importance of choice, Hume’s 
theory is rooted in passion and Kant’s in reason. This implies that the Enlightenment morality 
lacks a shared public rationale. Such disagreements among the prominent Enlightenment 
philosophers are indicative of the problems faced by the Enlightenment project of attempting 
to find a rational justification for morality. As a result, it ended up producing many 
incompatible moral theories.  
Hence, MacIntyre concludes that the Enlightenment project to provide a rational vindication 
of morality had decisively failed. This, according to MacIntyre (2007:50), had serious 
implications for the role of philosophy and religions in human societies. Philosophy lost its 
central role in culture and became marginal and was only given attention as an academic 
subject. Moral philosophers found themselves marginalised and isolated from the public. 
Religion was displaced by secular rationality, thus losing its role of providing a shared 
background and foundation for moral discourse and actions. 
According to MacIntyre, morality is not just about following rules. One of the goals of 
morality is to assist individuals in realising their capacities and to put them on the path to 
becoming good people. The Enlightenment project, which aimed to justify morality through 
reason, failed because it rejected the Aristotelian teleological view of human nature. A 
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teleological view of human nature presents man as having an essence that defines his or her 
true end. Such ethics, according to MacIntyre, does not assist human beings in realising their 
essence.  
Therefore, Solomon (1992) argues that, when applied to business, these theories do not help 
the corporate world as they do not provide balanced business ethics. Despite their dominance, 
these theories have not succeeded in stopping corporate scandals that have become rampant 
in the corporate world. They are incomplete, oblivious to the concrete business context and 
indifferent to the very particular role that people play in business. Their inaccessibility and 
inapplicability to a manager in the office or to the supervisor on the shop floor is not just a 
pragmatic problem but, in essence, also signifies the theory’s failure. Solomon states: “At any 
rate, that is what I would like to argue here. Business ethicists (like country folk singers) have 
been looking for a theory in the wrong place and consequently, they have been finding and 
developing the wrong theories”. (1992:319).  
Furthermore, Solomon argues that the virtue framework offers a better, more solid and 
balanced and firm foundation for developing a business ethics than Kantian and utilitarian 
ethics. According to him, we should actually replace models of business ethics based on 
Kantian and utilitarian ethics with ones based on the Aristotelian virtue theory. This call 
assumes that the Aristotelian tradition is the correct one (Fuller 1998:14). Thus, the challenge 
of any business ethicist who is a proponent of virtue theory is to demonstrate that the 
Aristotelian tradition of moral inquiry is the correct one.  
While many writers have already responded to MacIntyre’s scathing critique of the 
Enlightenment project, one crucial admission of MacIntyre is that the Aristotelian virtue 
theory is not without fault and is in need of improvement. As Solomon also observes, 
“[b]usiness ethics is a child of ethics, and business ethics, like its parents, is vulnerable to the 
same threats and challenges visited on its elders” (Solomon 2003:43). 
The following question subsequently arises: What are the implications of modelling a 
business ethics on the Aristotelian virtue framework, knowing very well that it is not without 
faults? One wonders if a virtue framework is comprehensive enough to solve all business 
moral problems.  
Nonetheless, this dissertation focuses on the Aristotelian virtue theory. Its main objective is 
to fully investigate the merits of a virtue business philosophy, establish its limits and then 
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assess whether it provides a solid foundation for building a business ethics that will respond 
satisfactorily to the moral problems in business.  
MacIntyre is Aristotelian, which means that he subscribes to the philosophy of Aristotle. 
However, he is not a blind follower of Aristotle’s philosophical ideas. In fact, he is rather 
critical of some of Aristotle’s assertions. His main motivation for studying Aristotle is to 
improve and develop the Aristotelian virtue theory by correcting its shortfalls. This implies 
that grounding this study only on the works of MacIntyre risks losing out on Aristotle’s basic 
insights. The benefit of basing this study on the works of Aristotle is that we can also benefit 
from MacIntyre’s criticism of Aristotle.  
1.2 Aim of the Study 
The overall aim of this study is to establish the implications, effectiveness and limitations of 
making Aristotelian virtue theory a meta-theory of business. The study intends to test what 
the business world would be like with the virtue framework as its meta-theory; i.e. if virtue 
theory provided the fundamental principles that underlie the formation and operation of 
business enterprises, thus making virtue the philosophy of business (Albuquerque2010:60).  
To achieve the above-mentioned aim, Chapter 2 exposes and discusses the principle elements 
of the Aristotelian virtue theory. This exercise is necessary because the application of virtue 
theory to business demands a thorough comprehension of the basic assumptions and 
implications of virtue ethics.   
Chapter 3 examines the implications of applying virtue theory to business. One of the 
implications is that, since liberal individualism or individualistic capitalism is corrosive to 
virtue, it is necessary to build an economic system, for instance, a type of capitalism that is 
compatible with the virtue framework.  
Chapter 4 discusses the advantages, disadvantages and limitations of a virtue-based capitalist 
economic system or business. It also examines how the basic features of capitalism, i.e. a 
profit motive, competition and private property, impact virtues and how virtues affect them in 
turn. This exercise is necessary because it enables us to gauge the limitations, benefits and 
weaknesses of the virtue framework. We discover that the virtue framework is compatible 
with collective rather than individualistic forms of capitalism.  
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Chapter 5, the conclusion, presents a summary of the implications, advantages and 
disadvantages of running capitalism based on a virtue value system. The final conclusion is 
that, virtue-based markets are not free markets that are self-regulated. Virtue-based economic 
systems must be regulated so that they serve their purpose, which is to provide goods and 
services to facilitate human flourishing.  
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Chapter 2: The Principle Elements of Virtue Theory 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to establish the implications, limits, advantages and 
disadvantages of applying Aristotelian virtue ethics to business. Virtue ethics is concerned 
with what kind of person an individual should be. A moral theory belongs to the virtue 
tradition if it focuses on an individual’s character. Evidently, Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.) is 
the most prominent philosopher in virtue ethics. His ideas were expanded and applied to 
theological problems by Thomas Aquinas, a mediaeval virtue theorist (Summa Theologiae, 1, 
94, 4). Alastair MacIntyre (2007), an Aristotelian virtue theorist, has further developed the 
contemporary debate on virtue. Using Aristotle’s work as a foundation, this study intends to 
test what the business world would be like if the virtue framework was its meta-theory, i.e. if 
the fundamental principles that underlie the formation and operation of business enterprises 
were based on virtue theory. To fully appreciate the implications of applying virtue ethics to 
business, it is necessary to have a good comprehension of virtue theory’s fundamental 
constituents. Therefore, this chapter exposes and discusses the basic elements of virtue 
theory. The exposition focuses on the following areas: Section 2 exposes Aristotle’s1 notion 
of Eudemonia or the goal of human life; Section 3 looks at the types of virtues; and Section 4 
examines Aristotle’s assertion that human life has only one ultimate goal.  
2.2 Eudemonia 
In his book Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter, NE.), Aristotle claims that human life is 
purposive. He draws insights from nature. He observes that everything in nature has a 
specific function; even feet and hands have different functions. From this observation, he 
presumes that, similarly, human life too must have a function, a purpose, a goal (NE. 
                                                 
1 Aristotle is a prominent virtue theorist and this study primarily draws on his book “Ethics” translated by Prof 
J.A. Thomson, published by Penguin Classics 1976. 
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1097b22-1098a8). According to Aristotle, the purpose2 or goal of human life is 
eudemonia/flourishing3/happiness/well-being.  
Ross (1977:190) points out that eudemonia, in ordinary Greek, means “good fortune”. He 
argues that Thomson’s (1976) translation of eudemonia as “happiness” does not capture the 
full meaning of the word because happiness is unstable as it is associated with a state of 
pleasurable feelings. He suggests that “well-being” is a better translation of eudemonia. 
While well-being implies happiness, happiness does not imply well-being because even 
individuals who are not flourishing have moments of happiness, but do not necessarily 
experience prolonged bliss (Norman 1998: 29). Human flourishing consists in having good 
health, being free from poverty and having prospects of achieving full human maturity. 
Moreover, an individual who is flourishing must find his or her life pleasurable. This paper 
uses the terms flourishing and well-being interchangeably. 
According to Aristotle, human flourishing consists in “living well and doing well” 
(NE.1098a16-28). He argues that living well involves exercising virtues and doing well 
involves performing whatever one does based on true knowledge. Understood in this way, a 
person who is living well and doing well must be both virtuous and knowledgeable. Such an 
individual must have both intellectual as well as moral excellences/virtues. Moral virtues 
enable such a person to live well by him or herself and with other people, while the 
intellectual virtues will enable a person to know when and what actions to perform. Thus, 
such a person must have specific attributes that are congruent with such an understanding of 
human nature.  
Aristotle asserts that a flourishing life is one of virtuous activity and is in accordance with 
reason (NE. 1097b22-1098a20). He holds that human beings are rational animals because 
rationality distinguishes humans from other animals. Human flourishing is therefore a 
rational activity because reason is the paramount element or trait in human beings. Full 
human flourishing thus requires exercising rational capacities. While human beings are 
                                                 
2 The idea that things have a purpose is articulated in his theory of causation. With this theory, Aristotle attempts 
to explain the being of things as due to material, formal, efficient and final causes. The material cause involves 
what a thing is made of, the formal cause involves its structure/shape and pattern, the efficient cause is the agent 
that brought it into being and the final cause is the purpose of its existence (Ross1977:71; Vela 2008:76).             
  
3 Aristotle is not the only ethicist who has linked virtue with human flourishing. The Stoics’ moral theory also 
links virtue with well-being. The difference between Aristotle and the Stoics is that, while Aristotle admits that 
external goods are important for human flourishing, the Stoics deny that they are necessary for human 
flourishing. For the Stoics, virtue is not only necessary but sufficient for human flourishing.  
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indeed rational animals, Aristotle does not imply that rationality is normative or that we 
humans ought to live in accordance with our nature. However, we incur a cost if we decide to 
go against nature because we can only flourish if we fulfil and realise our natural potential 
(Trig1999:33).  
Furthermore, Aristotle insists that human flourishing is an activity of the soul and is in 
accordance with virtue or, if there is more than one kind of virtue, in accordance with the best 
and most perfect kind. This activity covers a whole lifetime and consists in the perfect 
habitual practice of virtue: “One swallow does not make a summer; neither does one day. 
Similarly, can neither one day, nor a brief space of time, make a man blessed and happy” 
(NE. 1098a22-27; Eudemian Ethics 1219a38-39; Aristotle Politics 132a37-38).  
Additionally, Aristotle argues that, while everything in life has a goal or purpose, some things 
serve other ends while others are ends in themselves (NE.1098a22-27). This means that 
certain things have instrumental value while others have intrinsic value. According to 
Aristotle, human flourishing is the ultimate goal of human life. It is not a means but an end in 
itself. It is a chief and final good desirable for its own sake and not for the sake of something 
else (NE.1097a33-35).  
Of course, this has implications for the value of a wide range of human activities. Understood 
in this way, human flourishing cannot consist in a life purely dedicated to either the pursuit of 
pleasure or wealth, since pleasure and wealth are not self-sufficient. According to Aristotle, 
wealth (i.e. funds) has no intrinsic value because it serves only as a means to achieve human 
well-being (NE.1096a5-12). In the same manner, pleasure is not self-sufficient because it is 
dependent on other things. Thus, a business activity would not qualify as a goal of human life 
either because business is also instrumental; one does business in order to make money and to 
provide services and products.  
The claim that flourishing is self-sufficient implies that human flourishing is not a good 
designed to secure other goods. However, by this, Aristotle does not necessary imply that, 
apart from human flourishing, there are no other goods that human beings can pursue for their 
own sake. People can pursue, for instance, intelligence, pleasure, happiness, education and 
virtue for their own sake or for that of others. Virtue, although it has intrinsic value, is also 
exercised for the benefit of other people. For instance, while charity is a virtue and a good in 
its own right, the virtue of charity is a good deed in its own right; exercising it also benefits 
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other people. In this way, the person who exercises virtue also contributes to the well-being 
of other people.  
However, while Aristotle claims that virtue is crucial for human flourishing, this does not 
necessarily mean that virtue is sufficient for human flourishing. On this point, Aristotle quite 
explicitly states that:  
A person is incapable of flourishing if he is absolutely ugly in appearance, or low 
born, or solitary and childless and perhaps still more so, if he has exceedingly bad 
children or friends, or has had  good children or friends and has lost them by death 
(NE. 1099b3-6). 
Additionally, although Aristotle emphasises the importance of rationality, he regards other 
aspects, such as friendship, wealth and power, as equally important in a flourishing life. In 
the Aristotelian virtue framework, one is unlikely to flourish if one lacks virtues and other 
goods, for instance, food, shelter and friends.   
Briefly stated, according to Aristotle, human flourishing is, firstly, that which is good for 
human beings, the ultimate end, the purpose of human life, the most desirable of all things, 
the end to which our actions are directed and therefore something final and self-sufficient 
(NE.1097b21). It consists in the perfect practice of virtuous activities (Politics 1328a37-38). 
Secondly, it is an activity aimed at achieving a perfect life or, in other words, it is an activity 
to achieve a perfect life in accordance with perfect virtue (E.E.1219a38-39). Thirdly, it 
consists in the actualisation of human capacities. A person who is flourishing is also realising 
his or her potential. Fourthly, it is something final and self-sufficient. Fifthly, human 
flourishing is a speculative activity (N.E.1178b7-8) that is contemplative of life. According to 
Aristotle, contemplative life is the best form of life because it is pursued for its own sake. In 
Section 3.4, this study argues that the Aristotelian notion that human flourishing is monistic 
as it focuses on only one value, namely contemplation, is rather narrow and insufficient 
compared to other aspects of human nature.  
2.3 Indicators of Human Flourishing 
The indicators of a flourishing life are that individuals do well in whatever they do, live well 
and exercise their virtues. Furthermore, such individuals are self-sufficient, independent and 
need less external help. The contrary is equally true for individuals who are not flourishing. 
Their work is of poor quality, they do not live well by themselves or with other people, and 
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they are dependent and need constant external assistance. This means that inactivity 
(passivity) does not contribute to human flourishing. On this point, Aristotle argues: 
Just as at the Olympic Games it is not the best-looking or the strongest men present 
that are crowned with wreaths, but the competitors (because it is from them that the 
winners come), so it is those who act that rightly win the honours and rewards in life. 
(Aristotle 1099a2-5)  
Another important indicator of persons who are on a path to flourishing is that they are active 
and participate in activities that lead to the realisation of their capacities. This implies that 
human flourishing is not an activity or state of being that you would employ other people to 
do for you. Furthermore, it also implies that “the good life is something that we make for 
ourselves; it is not something merely given to us through fortune, inheritance or luck” (Vella 
2008: 130). 
The good life that is achieved through human flourishing is within our power and not 
dependent on divine intervention, but requires self-determination and good judgement. This 
means that human flourishing is voluntary and purely a human affair. Nobody can force 
anyone else to flourish. You can give people an opportunity to take part in activities that are 
vital to human flourishing but the choice is theirs. As the saying goes, “You can lead a horse 
to water but you cannot make it drink”. Conversely, if the horse desires water but there is 
none, it cannot drink.4 
Furthermore, putting eudemonia at the top of the hierarchy of goods, as Aristotle has 
proposed, implies that all other human activities must be subordinate to it.5 Hence, according 
to the Aristotelian virtue framework, human activities, for example trade, education, sports 
and economics, are subordinate to flourishing (NE. 1097a15-b2-1098a27).6  Thus, in the 
                                                 
4 Affirmative action in South Africa is a good example of how some people have been given opportunities while 
others have been denied opportunities to flourish. The affirmative action policy is intended to benefit the poor 
black South Africans only. It is premised on the assumption that all white people in South Africa are materially 
well off due to the apartheid policies that distributed goods in their favour. It discriminates against poor white 
South Africans.  It assumes that all white South Africans have enough material resources necessary for human 
flourishing. Under such policies, the poor blacks have a chance to flourish while poor whites are denied an 
opportunity to flourish.  
 
5 Policies, businesses, systems and structures can be assessed as to their effectiveness in providing space and 
opportunity for people to realise their potential and achieve well-being.  This would be an evaluative tool for 
business and other human activities to establish how much they help or hinder people’s well-being 
 
6 This has serious implications for business. The implication would be that businesses driven by virtue would 
have multiple goals but that all of them would be subordinate to human flourishing.  
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virtue framework, business interests must be congruent with the goal of human life. In this 
way, business activities should support rather than undermine human life.  
According to Aristotle, human flourishing requires a moderate amount of external goods 
(Aristotle 1099a31-1099b7; Ross 1977: 192). We need to pay fees to go to school to obtain 
an education and we need to pay hospital bills if we are admitted. This implies that those who 
lack a moderate (or basic)7 amount of external goods due to misfortune cannot flourish. Thus, 
it is clear that individuals living below the poverty line due to misfortune or because they 
were born in a poor area, for example in the Cape Flats or Khayelitsha, would have a 
challenging time to achieve human flourishing.8 A man who is bedridden will not flourish 
because suffering and infirmity will hinder him from actions that are necessary for human 
flourishing (Aristotle 1099a5; Vela 2008: 130).  
Briefly stated, according to Aristotle, human flourishing is a rational activity that requires or 
involves the exercise of virtues, community, and moderate material goods. Aristotle has put 
emphasis on the importance of virtue in human flourishing. It is therefore necessary to 
examine Aristotle’s views on virtue.  
2.4 The Nature of Virtue 
This section examines the Aristotelian assertion that “virtue” is actually a character trait, 
disposition or habit cultivated through practice. Once this trait is cultivated, it is manifested in 
an individual’s habitual actions (Rachels 2007: 175).  
According to Aristotle, there are two types of virtuous or human traits: moral and 
intellectual.9 Moral virtues are dispositions of character acquired through practice and 
habituation; while intellectual virtues are capacities/excellences of intellect acquired through 
learning and experience (N.E.1103a3).10  
                                                 
7 The Aristotelian  insight that human beings need a moderate amount of external goods in order to flourish  has 
been applies in psychology, development studies and economics, with Abraham Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of 
needs theory being the most prominent (Maslow, Abraham. 1954, Motivation and personality, Harper and Raw: 
New York). 
 
8 Business therefore provides opportunities and resources for people to flourish. We need business to provide 
services and goods that people need in their activities of flourishing.  
 
 
10 By this, Aristotle assumes that human beings who cultivate virtue have capacities or natural aptitude to 
acquire virtues (Ross 1977: 176; Jacobs 2004:66).  
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2.4.1 Intellectual virtues 
Intellectual virtues are quite central in the Aristotelian virtue framework because they are 
excellences concerned with the well-functioning of both the rational as well as the irrational 
elements of the human soul (NE. 1102a26). To understand the nature of intellectual virtues 
and how they operate, we also need to understand Aristotle’s definition of human nature. 
Aristotle holds that human beings are rational animals and that reason distinguishes us from 
other animals (Trigg 1999: 25).11 Rationality is a function of the soul. The human soul 
consists of rational and irrational elements. Since, a human being is a rational animal; 
rationality should assume centre stage in human actions (MacIntyre 1998:62). However, 
Aristotle does not imply that our irrational elements for example: desires and emotions, 
should not influence, inform, and form our judgements and actions. If this were the case, we 
would not be fully human because being human requires having both rational and irrational 
capacities.  The challenge, as Aristotle points out, is that the irrational capacities have the 
ability to comply with or defy the dictates of reason (N.E.1102b20-35). Hence, the best way 
to deal with irrational elements is to habituate them to obeying reason. However, in order to 
function well – i.e. to be able to do its job, which is to grasp things, deliberate on practical 
issues, as well as manage the irrational elements – the faculty of reason needs to have 
intellectual virtues.  
Aristotle asserts that people acquire intellectual virtues through teaching, training and 
experience. This implies that virtues are not present in us at birth or, put differently, virtue is 
not implanted in us by nature (N.E.1103a19). While virtue is not natural to us, reason is. We 
are not born with virtues but we are born with the capacity to learn and acquire them. 
Additionally, if virtues were innate, our world would be crime-free, with no wars, no violence 
and no need for prisons.12 Conversely, if vices were innate in human nature, societies would 
have no basis for condemning corruption, child abuse and broken promises, because 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 However, he also believed that, naturally, slaves and animals had no power of free, rational choice. 
Consequently, slaves and animals were naturally incapable of forming a state (Aristotle Politics 1252b; Trig 
199:26).  
 
12 Firstly, reformatory institutions, such as prisons and rehabilitation centres are founded on the assumption that 
people are responsible for their character and behaviour. Secondly, these institutions also subscribe to the 
Aristotelian claim that substances have the capacity to change their mode of being (metaphysics 1067a6-7-
1069b16). Substances have the capacity to change place, appearance colour, and size and also cease to be. 
Likewise, individuals can change jobs, acquire new skills and knowledge, change character from being agents of 
vices to agents of virtues (NE. 1114a7).  
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individuals would not be responsible for their conduct. Society holds individuals responsible 
for their actions because it assumes that individuals are also responsible for their moral status.  
Aristotle asserts that there are three intellectual virtues: theoretical wisdom, productive 
wisdom and practical wisdom. Theoretical wisdom (in Greek ‘theoria’) is concerned with 
theoretical matters like sciences, mathematics, philosophy, and empirical knowledge in 
general. It covers all disciplines and fields of study that can be learnt theoretically and 
through demonstration. On the other hand, productive wisdom or technical skill (in Greek 
‘techne’) is the excellence or virtue concerned with the production of objects and artefacts, 
for instance, cars, bridges, aircraft and cooking. It covers all the skills required to bring things 
into being. Practical wisdom (in Greek ‘phronesis’) is concerned with human action or human 
conduct, which originates from our desires and emotions (N.E. 1140a24-b12; (N.E.1140a1-
23; Vella 2008: 150).  
Practical wisdom is very crucial in the virtue framework. The function of practical wisdom is 
deliberative and calculative. Its major role is to deliberate about what is good and beneficial 
for oneself and what is good in one’s life. However, deliberation is only possible on matters 
that are practical and for which there are alternatives. Consequently, practical wisdom is 
concerned with human goods that can be deliberated upon. It deliberates on the 
appropriateness of desires and of the means to satisfy those desires by taking into account the 
nature of the desires, the context, time, and resources available (Norman 1998: 68).   
For instance, taking all their responsibilities into account, people realise that they need money 
to pay their children’s school fees and meet other urgent expenses, but that they do not have 
enough money in their bank account. In such a situation, a procurement officer of an 
organisation, for example, has two possible alternatives for raising funds: he or she may 
obtain money through kickbacks from the company’s clients, or could take out a loan from a 
bank. If the procurement officer opts for kickbacks, he or she risks being exposed and finally 
being fired with prospects of imprisonment; however, if the procurement officer takes out a 
loan, he or she will have less money to spend in the coming few months as part of his or her 
monthly income will be committed to loan repayment. 
In such a case, the role of practical wisdom is to deliberate on the appropriateness of one’s 
desire as well as the means to satisfy the desire. Thus, in a temperate person, i.e. a person 
with self-control, the desires are supposed to obey the commands of reason. However, an 
intemperate person’s desires will not abide by the commands of reason. Such a person will 
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therefore go ahead and act on his or her inappropriate desires and, in this case, opt for 
kickbacks.  
In this way, practical wisdom is suitable for solving moral problems and assisting in the 
acquisition of moral virtues because it is through the exercise of practical reason that one 
strengthens one’s habits. Thus, practical wisdom is the link between intellect/reason and 
emotions/desires.  
Of course, practical wisdom is central to virtue theory. It advocates the idea that people don’t 
or should not get around issues in life with preconceived moral solutions to moral problems. 
Furthermore, it assumes that human beings have the capacity to figure out the right moral 
solutions for themselves and for others by taking all the relevant factors into account. It also 
assumes that individuals have the capacity to think for themselves, which suggests that only 
those who can think for themselves can be virtuous.  
To appreciate the role of practical reason in moral virtue, it is necessary to have a clear 
understanding of what constitutes moral virtue. This will be addressed in the section below.  
2.4.2 Moral virtue  
This section exposes and examines Aristotle’s conception of moral virtue. In his work on 
moral virtue, Aristotle achieves two main objectives: Firstly, he refutes the Socratic claim 
that “virtue is knowledge”, which implies that virtue can be taught (The Republic 351a&c, 
Laws862ff, Protagoras 345). He argues that, while intellectual virtues constitute knowledge, 
moral virtue cannot be taught.  
Socrates asserts that “if you know, you cannot err” (Republic 351). Responding to this claim, 
Aristotle argues that Socrates was partially right in the sense that theoretical knowledge of 
moral virtue is necessary because it informs and instructs us on what we need to do 
practically. However, having such knowledge does not make us morally virtuous. Completing 
a master’s degree in ethics, for instance, does not necessarily make one morally upright. This 
is for the simple reason that passions can overcome knowledge. A person is not necessarily 
capable of performing courageous actions just because he or she knows what constitutes 
courage. In this sense, Socrates was mistaken. On this point, Aristotle remarks:  
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But we must go a little further than this, because virtue is not merely a state in 
conformity with the right principle13, but one that implies the right principle; and the 
right principle in moral conduct is prudence (NE. 1144b10-33).  
However, according to Aristotle, Socrates was partially right in asserting that moral virtue 
implies practical wisdom, but he was wrong in thinking that moral virtues can be acquired in 
the same way that practical wisdom can be acquired. Although it is concerned with human 
conduct, the ordering of desires, passions and feelings, practical wisdom is an intellectual 
virtue; as such, it can only be acquired through instruction. This is not the case for moral 
virtue. 
Moral virtue is concerned with the habituation of the irrational elements in human nature. 
Moral virtue is a habit, or disposition of character cultivated through practice. According to 
Aristotle, human actions are purposive and originate from desire. Mere reason without desire 
does not have the power to generate action (NE. 1139a35-36). Desire is the seed of human 
action. Thus, without desire, human beings cannot go about seeking understanding and 
working to attain moral goodness. Because desire is the seed of human action, it is important 
that desire is educated or habituated to obey reason. 
Additionally, Aristotle argues that moral virtue is voluntary, i.e. that it involves choice. Thus, 
if the choice has to be good, the reasoning must be true and the desire too must be right. 
Since many desires are against reason, an object is desirable in the right way because reason 
asserts it to be so (NE. 1139a16-b2). Thus, one of the functions of practical wisdom, inter 
alia, is to seek and attain truths that correspond to the right desires.  
As regards desire, practical wisdom has two major functions. The first is to deliberate on the 
appropriateness of desires; the second is to seek the correct means to satisfy desire (N.E. 
1145a5-8). For instance, if you are poor and you need money, practical wisdom will help you 
think through and find means of satisfying your needs. You can, for instance, beg, seek 
employment, steal, sell your property or resort to other alternatives to obtain money. 
                                                 
13 Here, Aristotle already indicates that virtue ethics is contextual. Virtue ethic is guided by a principle, but it is 
not driven by a universal principle or rule.  
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Additionally, by using its creative abilities, practical wisdom can formulate/generate an idea 
or a proposal that could be desirable.14 
This of course has two implications: Firstly, it implies that, to understand people and their 
actions, we also need to know what motivates their actions. Secondly, since desires motivate 
human actions, actions can be considered expressive of human motives. Additionally, we can 
derive two basic insights from this discussion: The basic insight we can derive from Aristotle 
is that, to comprehend human actions, it is important to understand the motive of such 
actions. People act in pursuit of desires. The fundamental motives of human actions are 
desires. Behind each action, there is a desire. Desires are therefore indicative of the good and 
direct us towards the good. However, according to Aristotle, positive actions are only 
possible if desires obey the commands of reason.   
The second insight derived from the above discussion concerns the origin of moral blunders. 
Whether the consequences of human actions are desirable or not depends on whether the 
desire is good (appropriate) or bad (inappropriate) and on whether appropriate or 
inappropriate means are chosen to fulfil an appropriate desire. Good moral action requires 
matching good desires with appropriate means. In this sense, virtuous action is rooted in good 
desire and satisfied by appropriate means. Moreover, through the doctrine of the mean, 
Aristotle provides a principle that can guide an individual in distinguishing between virtuous 
and vicious action.  
2.4.2.1 Virtue is a mean 
According to Aristotle, in performing moral actions, we should be guided by the doctrine of 
the mean because virtue is a mean between excess and deficiency (Aristotle 1106a20-
1107a1). One of the functions of practical wisdom is to work out the mean. A mean lies 
between two extremes: one of excess and the other of deficiency. The mean does not function 
like a mathematical mean. It is relative to the needs and context of the moral agent. It is not a 
moral principle, which can be applied universally and be expected to yield the same results 
all the time and in all situations.  
                                                 
14 This brings light to business activities and implies that desire is at the centre of such activities. Thus, in order 
to understand what drives business, one needs to understand the desires of the shareholders and stockholders. If 
these are incompatible, there could be value incongruence. Furthermore, if the desires are not right, the moral 
action meant to satisfy such a desire would also not be right. Hence both virtuous and vicious actions can be 
explained by their respective mother desires. 
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For instance, courage is a mean between cowardice and rashness. It consists in having the 
right attitude or disposition towards things that should be genuinely feared and those that 
should be tackled. As Aristotle points out: 
It is possible for example, to feel fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, pleasure and 
pain generally too much or too little. Both of these are wrong. However, to have these 
feelings at the right time on the right grounds, towards the right people, for the right 
motive and in the right way is to feel them to an intermediate that is to the best 
degree, and this is the mark of virtue (NE. 1106b9-1106b18). 
Understood in this way, a mean is a gauge for both emotions, feelings and actions for only 
these can be excessive or deficient. This indicates that moral blunders have two main sources: 
One can err through one’s actions; or by having excessive emotions, i.e. by having too much 
or too little anger, love, fear, etc.  
Evidently, the doctrine of the mean does not cover/guide use in all moral situations and 
Aristotle is aware of this shortfall. There are certain actions that are inherently evil. We 
cannot, for instance, gauge the mean of the moral wickedness of theft, fraud, murder, 
adultery, rape or child abuse in terms of excess or deficiency. Such actions, as Aristotle 
admits, are outright evil. Thus, the doctrine of the mean does not cover and help us in all 
moral situations. It has a limited application. As Barnes (1976:43) rightly suggests, the 
doctrine of the mean is not a moral principle but assumes the status of moral advice.  In moral 
action, the mean advises us to avoid excess and deficiency by being moderate in our actions 
and feelings.  
Briefly stated, moral virtue does not prescribe universal moral rules or principles. The 
community determines the moral virtues. Moral virtue is concerned with the character traits, 
habits and disposition of the individual moral agent in the community. In this way, virtue 
theory promotes a notion of being a good person, rather than constructing universal moral 
principles. Subsequently, virtue theory is agent-focused rather than action-focused. 
Moreover, the modus operandi in virtue theory does not consist in teaching people what 
moral rules and principles to follow but rather what character traits (habits and dispositions) 
they should cultivate. Aristotle argues the following:  
But the virtues we do acquire by first exercising them, just as happens in the arts. 
Anything that we have to learn to do, we learn by the actual doing of it: people 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
19 
 
become builders by building and instrumentalists by playing instruments. Similarly, 
we become just by performing just acts, temperate by performing temperate ones, 
brave by performing brave ones. (N.E.1103b1-2).  
 
Thus practice is the only way in which individuals can cultivate moral virtues.   
 
2.4.3 Virtue and practice 
As implied by the above discussion, practice is an important aspect of moral virtue. Aristotle 
argues that we become what we practice. Our behaviour towards other people determines 
what type of persons we become. We become what we do and what we do determines what 
we become. For example, if we always face danger bravely and cautiously, we become 
courageous. In this way, individuals can cultivate temperance, justice, and honesty virtues, 
depending on how they react and choose to behave in various situations they face during their 
lives. This implies that our daily actions are not only manifest in our character but also 
determine it. Practice15 is therefore a crucial aspect of virtue. Without getting involved in 
virtuous actions, we cannot become virtuous (N.E. 1103b25). 
While practice is crucial in the acquisition of virtue, it is not unique to virtue. Both virtue and 
vice are character traits and both are acquired through practice. This means that the methods 
we use to acquire virtues are the same methods we would use to acquire vices and other traits. 
For instance, to become a smoker, one would start smoking cigarettes until it becomes a 
habit. In the same way, one learns to become a footballer by playing football, not by simply 
watching others play football. In a similar way, if you want to become rich, you also need to 
begin cultivating dispositions related to wealth creation.16 
                                                 
15 Practice is essential to virtue theory. In action-focused moral theories, for instance Kantian and Utilitarianism 
ethics, practice is not necessary because such moral theories are not concerned with the character of the moral 
agent. They are more concerned with the rightness of moral actions.  
 
16 This gives us an idea of how, for instance, poverty can be reduced or eliminated. It also explains the negative 
side of aid. Aid can create the habit of dependence, which is not a virtue. People who give aid are active because 
they have to work to accumulate resources before they can give them to other people. People who live on aid are 
not exercising their capacities to create wealth/resource/innovation/creativity.  Thus, people who are flourishing 
are those who give aid to others rather than those who only receive it.  How many people in the world have 
become rich because they are dependent on charity? 
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The assertion that virtue is acquired through practice of course has implications as regards the 
role of theory and moral philosophy in our society. This also raises the question of methods 
in moral education and the role of moral philosophers. At a theory level, the role of a moral 
philosopher is to investigate matters of moral goodness, and develop and compose moral 
theories, which is exactly what Aristotle did. However, according to Aristotle, theoretical 
knowledge does not make people moral. Thus, moral philosophy, apart from composing 
theories, should also figure out ways/methods of making people moral. Morality, being a 
practical affair, demands that philosophers not only develop moral theories but that they 
should also suggest appropriate methods for linking theory with praxis.  
This implies that moral education should instruct us on how to do good, but also on how we 
can become good persons. Thus, having moral codes in the workplace is not adequate. As 
Aristotle suggests, we need to find a way of motivating people not only to take note of the 
codes but to live according to the codes. A moral theory should therefore be comprehensive 
and answer the following question: What is morality, how can we be moral and why should 
we be moral?  
According to Aristotle (N.E. 1104a5-7), moral problems are different from scientific 
problems. Science demands precision as the solution has to be the right one. There is not a 
wide range of available alternative solutions in science. For instance, if we mix oxygen and 
hydrogen we get water. The results of the process of mixing oxygen with hydrogen are 
predictable and demonstrable. This is not the case in the field of ethics or virtue. There is no 
one predictable universal solution to moral problems. Thus, methods that may be appropriate 
in resolving scientific problems may not always be appropriate in matters related to moral 
goodness. Therefore, applying moral principles modelled on scientific principles would not 
deliver comprehensive solutions to moral problems.17 
Here, Aristotle raises a very crucial issue regarding the difference between the methods that 
are applicable to ethics and those that are applicable to science. He argues that moral 
problems are complex and cannot be resolved through scientific methods alone. His 
observation is that both theoretical and productive science operates on principles and methods 
                                                 
17 IMF and World Bank programmes designed for developing countries operated on a universal principle, which 
assumes that one solution fits all. As a result, instead of solving world economic problems, these organisations 
have caused a lot of economic hardship to developing countries. For instance, IMF/World Bank Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAP) was implemented on the misleading assumption that one solution can resolve all 
developing countries’ economic problems. Unfortunately, SAP simply aggravated the economic situation of the 
developing countries   
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
21 
 
that are reductive, clear, and exact. The expected results cannot be different. This is contrary 
to practical subjects, like ethics, in which matters are not considered right or wrong. 
Employing scientific methods to solve ethical problems will inevitably result in a value loss. 
The value loss will be due to scientific methods not being reductive and hence not being able 
to cover all the aspects and considerations necessary for a balanced ethical solution. Thus, 
phronesis/practical wisdom is better suited to deal with moral problems.  
For instance, a universal moral principle would recommend promoting truth telling as a virtue 
in all moral situations and telling lies should generally be considered morally undesirable. 
Nevertheless, under certain conditions and in certain contexts, concealing the truth may be 
the right thing to do. This indicates that ethics that are based on universal principles promote 
an ethical worldview that is narrow and closed to other richer perspectives. As DesJardins 
points out:  
Unlike technical or scientific problems, moral problems have no answers or solutions 
just waiting to be discovered (DesJardins 1995: 54).  
A virtuous action takes many factors into consideration. It is dependent inter alia on the 
agent, situation, context, the interests of the beneficiary of the action and the resources 
available.  Thus, what is considered moral in one situation may not be considered as such in 
another situation? 
Certainly, cultivating virtues is not always easy. As Aristotle suggests, it is much easier to 
begin cultivating virtues at a young age than when you are an adult for it is much easier to 
straighten up a young tree than an old one. The cultivation of virtues requires a social 
environment where children have the right role models. Thus, the type of community in 
which you grow up could have an impact on the type of character and person you become. If 
a person grew up in the Cape Flats, for instance, it is very likely that his or her role models 
will be the undesirable elements of society, i.e. gang leaders, drug lords and armed robbers. 
By the time such persons reach the age of reason, they might realise that they were born on 
the wrong side of the city.  
Thus, if South Africa is to develop into a peaceful, crime-free society in which there is no 
racial discrimination, we need to raise our children on values that promote racial tolerance. 
Additionally, if the poor countries of the world are to pull out of poverty, their youths should 
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also be raised on values that would foster a hard working spirit, entrepreneurship and 
frugality. In this way, Aristotle’s philosophical ideas are quite relevant to the needs and 
aspirations of contemporary society.  
2.4.4 Virtue, community and friendship 
According to Aristotle, human beings are not only social and rational but also political 
animals. As a result, to flourish, people need friendship and companionship with others. 
Human beings need community. As Aristotle puts it: 
He who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for 
himself, must be either a beast or a god (Aristotle 1280b10).18 
Thus, our relationship with other people is important for a good life. This also implies that 
emotions play a role in morality as it is necessary for human flourishing.19 It is therefore 
important that we develop good relationships with the people around us. In the following 
excerpt, Aristotle underlines the importance of having friends:  
How can we make prosperity secure without their aid; and how can we enjoy it 
without them to share it with? When young, we need their advice, when old their care; 
when we are in our prime they give us opportunity of noble actions and aid us in 
effective thought (Aristotle 1161b28, 1166b32; Ross 1977:231). 
While community is a natural phenomenon and important for virtue and human flourishing, 
this, according to Aristotle, does not imply that the state is independent of human volition. To 
the contrary, the state is rooted in and founded, formed and maintained by human volition. 
This means that the state can be changed, altered and moulded according to human 
aspirations, needs and desires. The concept of human flourishing therefore raises issues of 
social justice for political, economic and social structures and systems in the state should be 
                                                 
18 In Aristotle’s time, the views prevalent in Greece, propagated by sophists like Lyconphron and 
Thrasymachus, were that the law and state were not natural but products of convention, crafted to interfere with 
individuals’ freedom. The cynics also held that a wise person is self-sufficient and, hence, has no need to be a 
citizen of a country but should be a citizen of the world. These views are contrary to those of Aristotle who 
holds that the state is a natural phenomenon. 
 
19 This is contrary to Kant who insists that we should rationally work out moral rules, that our feeling should 
have no role in moral matters.  
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designed to suit/facilitate human flourishing. This implies that, unless the state provides the 
right background, laws and policies, humans will never be able to flourish (Trig 1999:29).  
To be able to exercise virtue and participate in activities that lead to human flourishing, we 
need the right community. This implies that, at times, the appropriate thing to do is to change 
communities and settle in a community that can provide you with an appropriate environment 
in which to flourish. It is not necessary to spend one’s whole productive life in a community 
that suffocates one’s potential. It may therefore be necessary to seek greener pastures, 
migrate abroad, change jobs, get divorced or change your game plan in order to flourish. 
With regard to this, we may draw a lesson from Aristotle’s life. After the death of Alexander 
the Great in 323B.C, Aristotle left Athens to save his own life from the Athenians who had 
accused him of impiety. Aristotle escaped to the Island of Chalsis, pointing out that he did not 
wish Athens, which had executed Socrates, to “sin twice against philosophy” (Kenny 2000: 
58).  
Since community is important for virtue and human flourishing, the implication of being 
excluded from participation in certain activities that are equally crucial for both virtue and 
human flourishing can therefore be damaging to individuals. Aristotle’s ethics and politics 
are not innocent as regards discrimination against other people. For example, women, slaves 
and foreigners are excluded from the polis (Aristotle Politics 1253b29-32). The exclusion is 
justified on the very wrong assumption that the nature of aristocratic born males is different 
and superior to that of foreigners, women and slaves. Today, we know that Aristotle was 
mistaken and that gender, race, skin colour, class, country of origin and religion do not 
determine human nature. Despite such differences, human nature is the same in all people. 
What may be different is the content of people’s character, which is voluntary and based on 
choice.  
2.4.5 Virtue, knowledge and choice 
One important aspect of morality is that individuals should be held responsible for their 
conduct. This view assumes that moral agents are free agents. Aristotle asserts that moral 
virtue has two major characteristics: it is voluntary and based on choice. Thus, virtuous 
people must be knowledgeable, fully conscious and in control of their senses. They choose to 
act virtuously for no other reason than for virtue’s sake. Moreover, virtuous people must do 
so from a virtuous disposition, i.e. in respect of feelings and emotions (N.E. 1105b2). The 
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agent has the free will and power to act or not to act. If an action is voluntary and a matter of 
choice, the moral agent is morally responsible for his or her own actions (NE.1112a22-24).  
In the virtue framework, human actions are purposive and moral goodness is therefore the 
goal and aim of virtue. People perform moral actions because they intend to achieve two 
types of goods:  to shape their own character and, to do good for other people. Virtue is 
voluntary or a matter of choice. In this way, involuntary actions are not virtuous because they 
lack the element of choice. We can act involuntarily when under compulsion, through 
ignorance or if we are under the influence of drugs. Involuntary acts have an external source. 
They do not originate from the agent. In the case of voluntary actions, the instruments that 
bring about the action are within the agent. This implies that it is within our power to decide 
whether to be virtuous or not. 
Hence, the basic difference between a person of virtue and one without virtue is that the 
former acts from choice, while the latter acts solely from desire. This is for the simple reason 
that people who are not virtuous do not have the necessary capacity to deal with their 
irrational elements. Such people have no practical wisdom and, consequently, their desires 
are not enlightened ones. In such individuals, irrational elements are not habituated to operate 
under the command of reason. Therefore, they act from desire and not from choice. They are 
like beasts driven by desires; if they desire money, for instance, they can kill or harm other 
people to acquire money. 20  
This aspect of virtue seems quite relevant to business practice. Both vicious and virtuous 
persons can have certain desires and needs in common. For example, both of them have a 
need or desire for money. The difference between them is not at the level of desires but at the 
level of the means they will employ to satisfy their desires. Since the goal of virtue is to do 
good, which benefits both the agent and other people, a virtuous person will not resort to 
means that will harm the agent or other persons. In this sense, a virtuous person would not 
inter alia sell cocaine, pollute rivers, abuse children and commit fraud because such actions 
obviously harm other human beings. Thus, we can establish businesses that harm other 
                                                 
20 When one thinks of the crime rate in South Africa, where people are killed for a cell phone, a watch, a ring or 
a jacket, Aristotle has a point.  
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people but are beneficial to us. Alternatively, we can run businesses that benefit both clients 
and shareholders. 21  
Michael Slote (1992) accurately notices that moral virtues fall into two broad categories, 
namely self-regarding and other-regarding virtues: 
Justice, kindness, probity, and generosity are chiefly admired for what they lead those 
who possess these traits to do in their relations with other people, but prudence, 
sagacity, circumspection, equanimity, and fortitude are esteemed primarily under their 
self-regarding aspect, and still other traits – notably self-control, courage and wisdom 
in practical affairs are in substantial measure admired both for what they do for their 
possessors and for what they lead their possessors to do with regard to others people 
(Slote1992:9).  
This implies that a virtuous business will not only be self-interested, i.e. focus on the bottom 
line, but will also be other-regarding, i.e. take the well-being of its employees, environment, 
customers and community into moral consideration.  
This section has exposed Aristotle’s understanding of what constitutes virtue.  Virtues, which 
are dispositions of character, can be classified into two types: intellectual and moral virtues. 
The former is acquired through training while the latter is acquired through practice. Virtue is 
voluntary, which implies that moral character is self-made but influenced by context. 
Furthermore, moral virtue is both self-regarding as well as other-regarding and requires 
community. One cannot exercise virtue outside of the community. Lastly and most 
importantly, virtue is necessary for human flourishing. The following section examines 
Aristotle’s idea that contemplative life is the best form of human flourishing.   
2.5 Critique of Eudemonia in Terms of Human Capacities 
This section offers a brief critique of Aristotle’s argument that the best form of human 
flourishing is contemplation. In other words, an individual who has flourished has to spend 
his life in contemplation. This means that human life has only one goal i.e. it only has one 
value. And yet, human nature has many capacities. The implication of holding on to such a 
                                                 
21 The mining industry has done a lot of damage to the environment. Mining firms come into local communities, 
exploit minerals, and make money at the expense of the well-being of the locals and the environment.  
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monistic implies that the plurality of individuals’ capacities and aspirations must be sacrificed 
in favour of contemplation. Aristotle’s claim does not take into consideration that human 
beings are subjects of many capacities. And full human flourishing may require the 
actualisation of some, if not all, human capacities. Giving contemplation more attention by 
neglecting other capacities would lead to a very narrow myopic view of human nature. A 
community of such individuals would certainly be a boring impoverished community. The 
plurality of capacities prevalent in human nature is indicative of possible modes/forms of 
human flourishing. 
Aristotle (Metaphysics 1050b11-12) rightly observes and asserts that human beings are 
subjects of potentialities/capacities. These potentialities account for whatever we can become, 
or achieve or fail to achieve in life (Metaphysics 1069b15-16). Thus, individuals can only 
flourish within the limits of their capacities. For instance, a person who has green fingers may 
only flourish in this regard by performing activities related to plants because that is what 
brings out the best in that person. For those who are good at contemplation, abstract thought 
would be their rightful form of flourishing. However, to elevate contemplation as the ultimate 
goal of human flourishing is to be blind to the diversity and plurality of possible modes of 
flourishing that are congruent with different human capacities.  
The reality of human nature is that flourishing involves human capacities and individuals are 
subjects of many capacities. This indicates that there must be many forms or modes of human 
flourishing. Insisting that contemplation is the ultimate goal of human life implies that human 
flourishing can only be achieved by an exclusive club consisting of a few people with 
capacities for contemplation. Why should all our endeavours and capacities culminate in 
contemplation? There is absolutely no justification for sacrificing diversity apparent in 
human nature for the sake of harmony. While monism indeed achieves harmony by 
eliminating the possibility of conflicting values, conflict is also part of human nature. Human 
beings have many interests, which demand attention and resources.  
Aristotle and other Greek philosophers, including the Enlightenment philosophers, were 
preoccupied with looking for one principle that could account for the being and nature of 
things. In his attempt to understand the meaning and goal of human life, Aristotle, like his 
predecessors (e.g., Thales and Anaximander) subsumed that human life has one value. In this 
way, he was completely unaware that, to understand human life, one single event cannot 
constitute and account for the unity of human life. The unity of human life is not an episode 
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but a story with a beginning, middle and end. We cannot fully understand the meaning of 
human life if we neglect its social and historical context, since a story gets its meaning from 
its context (MacIntyre 2007:205).  
This does not mean that human beings cannot have a shared essence/purpose/goal in life. 
Being social animals, we as humans live our lives both individually and in our relationships 
with each other. Individual narratives involve other people’s lives. Therefore, individuals 
who share a common social and historical context can also have a common goal (MacIntyre 
2007:190). For instance, those with talent in medicine may attend medical school and 
eventually flourish as medical doctors. Those gifted at law may attend law school and realise 
their well-being as lawyers. In addition, those with a capacity for business may flourish as 
businesspersons.  
Thus, Aristotle’s claim that human flourishing only has one value does not make sense. The 
basic and most important insight we can draw from the idea of human flourishing, however, 
is that capacities/potentialities are the determining factors of human flourishing. Additionally, 
human flourishing is not just a goal to strive for; it also functions as a yardstick for measuring 
the consequences of human activities as regards human flourishing. A desirable activity 
would be one that facilitates human flourishing, and undesirable ones would be those that 
hinder or interfere with human flourishing. Thus, from the virtue framework, the measure of 
a good community, policy, educational institution or humanitarian intervention consist in to 
what extent it assists its members to actualise their capacities, allows its members to perform 
or participate in activities that will lead to flourishing, and hinders or prevents people from 
flourishing (Rasmussen and Uyl 2005). In this sense, human flourishing can inspire an 
evaluative tool.  
2.6 Conclusion  
This chapter set out to expose fundamental elements that make up virtue theory. Firstly, 
virtue theory is rooted in the realisation that human beings are rational, social and political 
animals. Secondly, central to virtue theory is the notion that the goal of human life is to 
flourish, which is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. Thirdly, human beings are 
social; hence, virtue and flourishing are rational activities that cannot be achieved outside of 
the community. Fourthly, moral virtue is voluntary. It does not consist in following rules or 
laws. It is a disposition of character cultivated through practice and focuses on being good 
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rather than doing good. Thus, these elements have to be considered when applying any form 
of virtue theory. This will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Virtue as a Meta-Theory of Business 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 presented the framework of virtue theory, drawing mainly on the works of 
Aristotle. This chapter discusses the implications of making virtue theory the meta-theory of 
business or, in other words, making virtue the philosophy of business.22 In Albuquerque’s 
words: 
The philosophy of business is a theory that discusses the fundamental principles of 
the existence of business and its actions. What constitutes business? What is its 
nature? How does it operate? Under what rules does it operate? Who are the people 
involved in business? What is their role in such an activity? (Albuquerque2010:60). 
Briefly stated, virtue theory is founded on the understanding that the goal of human life is 
flourishing, that morality is concerned with the cultivation of virtues/dispositions of 
character, and that both human flourishing and virtues can only be achieved in a community 
(Aristotle Politics 1253a25-35; Kenny 2006: 83).  
To achieve its aim, this chapter proceeds in the following format: Section 3.2 discusses the 
implications of the assertion that the ultimate goal of human life is to flourish; Section 3.3 
discusses the place of business in community; Section 3.4 focuses on business virtues; and 
Section 5 examines how the virtues can influence and also be influenced by the market.  
3.2 Definition of the Term “Business” 
This chapter makes extensive use of the term “business”. Hence its meaning and use in this 
study should also be defined and clarified from the onset. In this study, business refers to 
activities in which people engage with the motive and desire to make money (Carroll 
                                                 
22 Friedman, Drucker and Freeman are some of the prominent academics working in the field of business 
philosophy. Friedman is a rightist, conservative purist who claims that business only has one motive, namely 
profit maximisation. Business ethics and corporate social responsibility are considered sources of corruption of 
the essence of business.  On the other hand, Freeman and Drucker advocate a business world where moral 
values are at home; a business world in which business takes the interests of all stakeholders into consideration.  
 
As this paper illustrates, Friedman and Freeman – although they advocate different philosophies of business, one 
without morals and the other with morals – have one thing in common: They both advocate a capitalism that is 
liberal and individualistic. While Friedman considers the business owners’ interests paramount, Freeman 
regards all individual stakeholders’ freedom and interests as the business’s responsibility (Lutz 2009: 318). 
Therefore, capitalism built on virtue theory would be liberal and communitarian. 
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1996:5). Thus, a profit motive is the distinguishing characteristic of what we may consider 
business. This definition covers all private commercially oriented businesses, ranging in size 
from one-person proprietorships to corporate giants. Such an understanding of business 
obviously excludes a wide range of other activities in which human beings engage for 
motives other than profit.  
For example, activities, such as running a church, a public school, a public hospital or a 
political party, involve the use of money; however, they are not commercial ventures. This 
does not necessarily imply that profit is the sole purpose of a business organisation. 
Nevertheless, an organisation, is not worth calling a business if profit ceases to be its raison 
d'être. In this sense, “businesses are organisations that respond to the market”, i.e. to the 
needs, desires and wants of customers (Jones2005: 11). 
3.3 The Goal and Role of Business 
This section attempts to answer the question of what the goal of a business founded on the 
virtue framework would be. Before commencing the discussion, it is imperative that we 
contextualise our discussion by briefly exploring the dominant contemporary understanding 
of the nature and purpose of business.  
The dominant contemporary views of the goal of business are best expressed in what has 
come to be known as the “Friedman versus Freeman” debate or the “stockholder/shareholder 
versus stakeholder” debate. The proponents of the stockholder theory hold that business has 
only one goal, which is to make money for the owners of the business (Friedman 1970), 
which implies that ethical and business concerns are separate. This is what has come to be 
known as the separation thesis (Sanberg 2008:213-232). In response, the shareholder theorists 
argue that the separation thesis is impossible and unjustified, because business has the 
responsibility to create value for all stakeholders (Freeman1994; 2004), implying that 
business and moral concerns are intertwined.   
In his article “The social responsibility of business is to increase its profit” published in The 
New York Times Magazine, September 13, 1970, Milton Friedman defends the thesis that 
business has only one responsibility, which is to maximise its profits or to make money for its 
shareholders. Furthermore, in his book “Capitalism and Freedom”, Friedman argues that the 
idea that business, corporate officials and labour leaders have a social responsibility that goes 
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beyond serving the interest of their shareholders is absurd and out of place in a free market 
economy. He explains this as follows: 
In such a society, there is one and only one social responsibility of business –to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays 
within the rules of the game, which is to say, engage in open and free competition, 
without deception and fraud. And in such a case, the social responsibility of managers 
is to make as much money for their stockholders as possible (Friedman 1972:133).  
This claim presupposes that business cannot be driven by more than one value. This of course 
has two crucial implications. Firstly, it implies that profit maximisation is the sole guarding 
value of any business activity. Thus, profit alone influences and guides decisions, conduct, 
and choices in business. Secondly, if profit is the sole goal of a business, this implies that 
business actions are excluded from moral consideration (Sandberg 2008:214; Haris 
&Freeman 2008: 541). The outcome of actions in business is what matters.  
The consequences of singling out profit as the only goal of business have serious implications 
for the plight of human beings and the environment. This generates a framework where 
people are nothing but mere means for profit maximisation. In such a framework, it is 
inconsequential if human beings are exploited at work. Even if the rivers and lakes are 
polluted as a result of a business chasing profits, the business does not take moral 
responsibility for this. Thus, Friedman’s thesis subscribes to the worldview or belief that 
“[t]he end justifies the means”.23 And when the means are human beings, it raises issues of 
justice and human rights. 
Furthermore, the assertion that business’s only goal is to profit assumes that the values that 
inform business and social values are not congruent. This form of reasoning separates 
business concerns from other human or social concerns. It assumes that a firm should have 
separate standards of ethical behaviour that differ from those of the community in which the 
business is operating as if it is possible to do business in a vacuum. It locates business outside 
                                                 
23 Friedman’s thesis is rooted in the assumption that ends matter more than means. This argument has shades of   
utilitarian influence. According to a utilitarian approach to business, the means used to carry out an action are 
not taken into moral consideration. Hence, Milton Friedman’s thesis and utilitarianism have one moral 
dislocation in common: When the means for profit maximisation are left out because there is no material for 
moral consideration, it raises issues of justice and human rights.  
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the realm of human interest and welfare or the common good as if the common good is not 
the business’s concern.  
Additionally, Friedman’s thesis puts business before people as if business can have goals of 
its own outside of human communities (Morse1999:47; Solomon 1992:327; Arjoon 
2000:168). By insisting that the principle role of management is to make sure the business is 
profitable; Friedman’s thesis gives managers and business a very limited role. It assumes that 
the managers are only responsible for and answerable to their employers. Although business 
provides services and products, creates jobs and provides individuals with opportunities to 
realise their potential, these business responsibilities are not important according to 
Friedman. The only way to measure the competency of a manager is to examine how much 
profit a firm has made at the end of the business year. This picture of the goal of business is 
contrary to what a virtue-based business would be.  
According to the virtue framework, the ultimate goal of human life is to flourish. In order to 
do so, human beings need goods, i.e. shelter, food, and education (Aristotle 1252b12-14). 
Furthermore, human beings flourish by participating in activities that lead to the realisation of 
their capacities. In the virtue framework, business activities are human activities. In such a 
framework, business goals are also human goals and hence profit ceases to be the main and 
only goal of business. Moreover, in this framework, a business would have multiple roles of 
which profit-making would simply be one.  
A business driven by virtue has more than one value and is multipurpose. In such a business, 
profits are instrumental but not the sole purpose of a business. Businesses provide services, 
produce goods necessary for human flourishing and provide opportunities for individuals to 
exercise virtues and realise their capacities. Profit is the reward for providing such excellent 
service and goods. As MacIntyre rightly observes, (MacIntyre 2007: 194), business 
institutions house practices. In such institutions, individuals exercise their potentials, attain 
excellences, realise their capacities and hence flourish  
Furthermore, by subordinating economic value to human flourishing, the virtue framework 
assumes that human beings matter more than profit. More importantly, the virtue framework 
assumes that one of the major criterions for assessing whether business is progressing or not 
is the dignity of the human being. If profit is made at the expense of human dignity, the 
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business is not playing its rightful role in society.24 Additionally, virtue theory contributes 
two things to the business world. Firstly, it gives businesses a human face and character 
(Arjoon 2000:168) and, secondly, the virtue framework offers/provides a new business 
criterion.  
3.4 Business and Community 
One of the crucial cornerstones of virtue theory is the conviction that human beings are 
naturally rational, social and political animals. As such, human beings can only flourish 
within a community.  As Aristotle argues: 
Indeed, though later than the family in time, the state is prior by nature to its organic 
whole like the human body is prior to its organic parts like hands and feet. Without 
law and justice (which can only be achieved in state), man is the most savage of 
animals. Someone who cannot live in a state is a beast; someone who has no need of a 
state must be a god. The foundation of the state was the greatest of benefactions 
because only within a state can human beings fulfil their potential (Politics 
1.2.1253a25-35; Kenny 2006:83).  
The assumption of virtue theory is that human enterprises, i.e. businesses, cannot operate in a 
vacuum. This has major implications for entrepreneurs as well as individuals who wish to 
join a company or seek employment. From the virtue framework, when an entrepreneur sets 
up a firm, he or she brings people together (as employees) under the firm which hence makes 
up a community of workers. Thus, in such a framework, a corporation or company is part of 
the community in which it operates. And since a firm brings individuals together, it is a 
community within a bigger community25 (Solomon 1992:327).  
Thus, there is a symbiotic relationship between the firm and community. For a business to 
flourish, the community should also provide an environment conducive for the business to 
grow. Understood in this way, both firms and communities have responsibilities towards each 
                                                 
24 A firm won a tender to construct open toilets in the informal settlements of Khayelitsha. Such a firm is 
obviously mainly interested in making profit even if the product shows no respect for human dignity. In such a 
firm, self-regarding considerations took precedence over other-regarding considerations. A virtuous firm would 
have turned down such a tender due to other-regarding considerations.  
 
25 A community, which is defined as a network of human relations, constitutes a “social capital” without which 
business is impossible (Quddus 2000). In his book “Bowling Alone”, Putnam (2000) argues that a lack of social 
capital is related to the American apathy for politics. Fukuyama (1995), in his book “Trust:  The social Virtues 
and Creation of Prosperity”, argues that the success of a business is dependent on the type of community in 
which it is operating. High trust communities tend to support business better than low trust communities. 
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other. Of course, this has implication for those who wish to realise their capacities through 
employment. Since community is crucial for human flourishing, it is imperative for 
individuals who wish to flourish to join a good community, i.e. a community with all the 
necessary goods and opportunities for human flourishing. As Solomon comments:  
Whether we do well, whether we like ourselves, whether we lead happy productive 
lives depends to a large extent on the companies we choose to work for. As the 
Greeks used to say, “to live the good life one must live in a great city”. To my 
business students today, who are too prone to choose a job on the basis of salary and 
start-up bonuses alone, I always say, “To live a decent life choose the right company” 
(Solomon 1992:327).   
This argument is not only appropriate for students seeking employment; it is equally relevant 
to any individual planning to set up a business. If you want your business to succeed, set it up 
in an appropriate and conducive community. For instance, if you want to set up a butchery 
that sells pork, it would be suicidal to set it up in a community where the majority of the 
people are Seventh Day Adventists or Muslims, for neither group consumes pork.  
The insight that a good community is essential for human flourishing explains and justifies 
the principle motive behind quite a wide variety of human conduct. For instance, it explains 
and justifies the necessity for human beings to migrate or emigrate, change jobs, seek greener 
pastures and enter into new relationships. From the virtue framework, human beings migrate 
or emigrate because they are seeking an environment/community26 where they can achieve 
well-being.27  
                                                 
26 The wars in the Great Lakes Region (1990- to present), i.e. the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and 
Burundi, and the political instability in Zimbabwe and Somalia to mention but a few compel individuals to 
immigrate to South Africa in search of peace and better means of livelihood. This of course was marred by the 
xenophobia activities of 2008 and 2010. During these attacks, two Mozambicans were burnt to death. While 
many Malawians and Zimbabweans returned to their countries of origin because there was relative peace in 
these countries, Somalis were caught between two fires: running away from wars in their country of origin or 
facing rejection and violent xenophobia in a country where they are seeking refuge. The question of what such 
individuals’ prospects of attaining well-being are still remains to be answered.  
27 Since 1994, when the ANC implemented the affirmative action policy in South Africa, which reserves 80% of 
new jobs for black people (black, Chinese and coloured people), a large number of white people (about 800 000 
to 1000 000) have left the country in search of greener pastures overseas (USA, UK, Canada, Australia, Europe 
and the neighbouring countries, i.e. Namibia and Mozambique). However, due to the economic downturn of 
2008-2010, some are returning back to South Africa.  
The Irish too have a tradition of emigration. About 40 million people in the United States of America are of Irish 
descent.  
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This implies that businesses have two moral responsibilities: an internal and an external one. 
The first responsibility of a business is to produce goods that do not undermine human 
flourishing and put them on the market for the lager community.28 Secondly, for the company 
to flourish, it requires the right staff and environment. Thus, the firm should be organised and 
run in such a way that it provides resources and opportunities for individuals to realise their 
capacities (MacIntyre 2007; Solomon 1992:32). Obviously, such a business would not be 
inspired by the neo-Hobbesian view “It is every man for himself” or the Darwinian view “It’s 
a jungle out there” (Solomon 1992: 320). In this way, the virtue framework explains the 
origin of human responsibility as well as the source or foundation of human identity. This is 
the subject matter of the next subsection.  
3.5 Origin of Responsibility and Identities 
Virtues are acquired through practice (NE. 1103a3; Rachels 2007:175), through which 
individuals form their characters and also flourish. In this way, individuals become what they 
do and, in turn, what they do determines who they become. Thus, what we do is the first 
source of our identity. However, to be able to exercise virtues, an individual should belong to 
a community. This implies that individuals are not only identified by what they do, but also 
by where they live or the community to which they belong. To put it in Solomon’s words, 
“persons are socially constituted and socially situated” (Solomon 1992:326).  
The virtue framework explains how human beings can have multiple identities. The more 
things one does, the more identities one deserves. If you are involved in many activities and 
you are a member of several organisations, then you also acquire multiple identities. Thus, 
one person can be many things at once: an accountant, insurance broker, golfer, a singer, a 
member of a trade union and a member of a church, to mention but a few.  
The virtue framework identifies work and community as sources of meaning of human life.  
Community gives individuals a sense of belonging and allows them to flourish through the 
various activities they perform or do, for example their work. 29 Thus work has important 
value to human beings because, apart from being a source of income and livelihood, it also 
                                                 
28 In 2005, the Chinese firm, Sanlu Group, produced and sold infant formula contaminated with melamine which 
caused the death of one baby and kidney problems in at least 80 more (The New York Times, 12/09/2008 
www.nytimes.com/2008/09/12/12iht-13milk). 
 
29 Karl Marx asserts that work is very important for the realisation of human nature and individual potential, and 
is also a mode for self-expression (Velasquez 2000:164) 
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gives people a sense of who they are.30  This has serious implications for the homeless and 
unemployed, namely that if you are both unemployed and homeless, then you have a narrow 
(if not impoverished) sense of who you are. In this way, virtue theory articulates the gravity 
of downsizing, retrenchments and mergers31. Employment gives individuals a sense of place, 
sense of importance, usefulness, uniqueness and individuality. Thus losing your job 
obviously leads to losing a sense of what you are, for example a lecturer, a driver for a 
company, etc. The loss and suffering caused by unemployment raises the moral imperative of 
the role of business in providing employment to individuals. 
Briefly stated, the implication of applying virtue to business is that a firm rooted in virtue 
integrates business concerns into human concerns. In the virtue framework, businesses are 
positioned in a way that makes them part and parcel of human community. Being a member 
of a larger community implies that a firm has duties and responsibilities. Through their 
activities, businesses contribute to the common good by providing goods and opportunities 
for individuals to cultivate and practice virtues (Arjoon 2000:166). In this sense, virtue theory 
articulates the moral responsibility of business.  
3.6 Corporate Social Responsibility 
As regards corporate social responsibility (CSR), Friedman (1970) argues that a chief 
executive officer (CEO) is only answerable to his or her shareholders. The CEO’s principle 
responsibility as an employee is to make sure that the corporation is making a profit for the 
owners of the business. Furthermore, he argues: “A corporation is an artificial person and in 
this sense may have artificial responsibilities, but ‘business’ as a whole cannot be said to have 
responsibilities, even in this vague sense” (Friedman 1970). 
This argument implies that, although a firm benefits from operating in a community, it has no 
moral obligation to the community. Such reasoning assumes that the business world is like 
the Hobbesian state of nature where every form of conduct is acceptable. Thus, businesses 
                                                 
30 That occupation is diagnostic of human identity, is not necessarily unique to the virtue framework. Even in 
our world of market capitalism, individuals are identified by their occupation, for instance as a farmer, 
carpenter, fisherman, philosopher, poet, politician, soldier, pimp or vendor. However, work is not the only 
source of human identity. Race, ethnicity, country of origin, religion, etc. are also sources of human identity 
(Smedley 1998. “Race” and the Construction of Human Identity, American Anthropologist, New series, 
vol.100.No 3(sep., 1998), pp.690-702, Blackwell Publishing, http://www.jstor.org/stable/682047 Accessed: 
18/04/2009 15:43, downloaded on 03/06/2011 Stellenbosch University Library).  
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can do whatever is necessary to make profits and survive. According to Arjoon, “[e]thics in 
that case then becomes abstractionist, and fosters the separation of ethics and business either 
as being an oxymoron or the idea that there is good business practice and there is ethics” 
(Arjoon 2008: 160).  
In response, the advocates of the stakeholder theory argue that this is not a morally acceptable 
view of what the business world actually is or should be. After all, the business world is not a 
war zone in which only the fittest survive and the winner takes all. To the contrary, the 
business world is characterised by cooperation, where individuals work together to create 
value for both the owners of the businesses as well as for all the stakeholders (Freeman; 
Wicks; Parmer 2004:364). In this way, the stakeholder theory resonates very well with the 
assumptions and implications of a business infused with virtues.  
As this study has demonstrated above, in the virtue framework, each member of a community 
has responsibilities and duties. A firm viewed as a community driven by virtue, like each 
person in a community, has a responsibility/moral obligation towards others. If an individual 
benefits from a community, it simply makes moral sense that he or she behaves in such way 
that others benefit too. However, since firms are not legally bound to offer help to the 
community, CSR becomes an act of virtue, a social and moral concern for the well-being of 
others (Solomon 1993:335; Arjoon 2000:172). In this way, the virtue framework justifies 
corporate social responsibility on two accounts: Firstly, CSR is a matter of justice when it 
gives society what it is due; secondly, CSR is an act of mercy when a corporation gives out 
resources to the needy in the community.  
A business rooted in the virtue framework is aware that human beings are not solitary atoms 
wondering in the world. To flourish, human beings need each other. As such, those with 
resources have a responsibility to exercise the virtue of generosity by sharing their resources 
with the disadvantaged in the community. Through such benevolence, for instance helping 
orphanages or donating research funds to a university, a firm creates a bond with stakeholders 
and creates a network of human relationships, which Putnam (2000:19) calls “social capital”. 
By emphasising the benevolent responsiveness of a firm and creating a good human 
relationship with other stakeholders, virtue theory supplies ethical content for CSR 
(Weisband 2009:910).  
The virtue framework does not grant the CEO unlimited scope in which to exercise CSR. As 
regards the exercise of the virtue of charity and generosity, for instance, the right individual 
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to exercise these virtues is the owner of the goods to be given to charity. Since the resources 
of a corporation belong to the owners of the business, only the owners of the business have a 
right to give part of their resources to charity if they so wish. Since virtue is a disposition of 
character, it would not be virtuous of an employee to give away resources that are not his or 
her personal property. The virtue of generosity does not compel us to give to charity what is 
not ours.  
Imagine you are a child and your mother has sent you to a shop to buy her a packet of 
cigarettes. At the entrance to the shop is a beggar who is obviously in bad shape. Would it be 
prudent of you to give the money to the beggar instead of buying cigarettes for your mother?  
Imagine returning home to inform your mother that you have given her money to a beggar 
because you thought the beggar needed the money more than she needs cigarettes. As Ewin 
(1995) argues:  
It is the fact that somebody is acting in a representative function when acting as a 
manager of a corporation, acting for shareholders, that makes such notions as 
generosity inapplicable (p840).  
In similar manner, CSR can be an act of virtue if and only if the owners of the business have 
mandated the CEO to give away resources. In such a situation, it is not the CEO but the 
shareholders i.e. the owners of the resources – who are exercising the virtue of generosity and 
mercy.  
In sum, a business that is based on the virtue framework values the importance of community 
and human relationships more than individualism. It recognises human relationships’ crucial 
importance to the success of a business. A virtue-based business is rooted in the realisation 
that physical capital (e.g., money and property) is not enough for business. The success of a 
business depends on its social capital, i.e. its network of human relations. Since individuals 
exercise and acquire virtues through social intercourse, human relationships are sustained by 
virtues, and, in turn, the virtues are also sustained through human relationships. Moreover, 
trust is one of the key virtues that accounts for successful human relations as well as for 
economic success (Fukuyama 1995). 
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3.7 Business Virtues 
3.7.1 Virtue and self-regulation 
As discussed in Chapter 2, virtue is not about following rules but about cultivating virtuous 
dispositions and figuring out the right moral conduct. Practical wisdom is the master virtue 
that enables individuals to make the right moral judgements in each context.  And since virtue 
is crucial for morality and human flourishing, the application of virtue theory to business has 
implications for decision-making processes in the workplace, moral regulation and the role of 
management.  
Virtue, as a rational activity, implies that, when people come together in a firm (form a 
community), no one would be justified to have a monopoly on exercising rationality and 
discerning moral judgements. Thus, in the virtue framework, firms have to be run in such a 
way that employees have to be given opportunities to exercise their intelligence; otherwise, 
they will not flourish as human beings. This would mean that employees would have to 
participate in the firm’s virtue-based decision-making processes. Additionally, in such a firm, 
individuals would be self-directed.32 Armed with practical wisdom, individuals in the 
workplace would work with minimal supervision. 
Additionally, if individuals in the workplace can consider and make moral decisions on their 
own, they do not need management to direct and control their behaviour. Thus, if the 
                                                 
32 Thus, the idea of a free market is not necessarily a 17th century concept. Although Plato and Aristotle harbour 
negative views about commerce, arguing that the market corrupts character and proposing that only non-citizens 
should do commerce, the philosophy of a free market has already been presumed in virtue theory. Aristotle’s 
ancient Greek philosophy assumes that individuals must live in a society that grantees and accords their freedom 
and other goods to enable them to participate in activities of their choice in order to flourish. In such a society, 
those with capacities in business can focus on business activities. Such individuals can flourish as 
businesspeople. Flourishing would involve individuals’ voluntarily producing goods and services and 
exchanging them freely on the market. In such a market, people can acquire and own private property.  
 
 Additionally, the virtue framework provides a better understanding of the role of business in reducing and 
ending poverty in three ways: (1) the way societies are organised can hinder individuals from flourishing (i.e. 
structures that distribute goods in favour of one group by discriminating or exploiting or marginalising the other 
groups with regard to gender, race, etc.). For instance, virtue assumes that central planning is not good for 
human flourishing because it prevents individuals from voluntarily making choices on what activities to pursue 
in order to flourish. A centrally planned market would be very restrictive on individual creativity and 
innovation.  Such a market lacks the necessary freedom for individuals to voluntarily choose what to produce 
and put on the market. Instead, a government would decide on what people should produce and how people 
should flourish. In such a market, there is no room for self-determination (personal initiative) and hence 
individuals are not self-made and self-driven. (2) In the virtue framework, being successful at flourishing is 
dependent on virtue and this implies that vices would impede flourishing. In other words, the character of the 
individual can determine or hinder human flourishing (e.g., if the individual is lazy, hooked on drugs, a cheater, 
dishonest, etc.). (3) Virtue theory provides methods for businesses to reduce as well as end poverty (e.g., 
through CSR, work as well as creating and accumulating wealth). Virtuous business is the only moral way to 
end poverty and the only moral way to create wealth (i.e. wealth cannot be achieved by means of plundering, 
war or fraud).  
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workplace has to have managers, such individuals must have more developed virtues so that 
they can act as role models for other employees (Arjoon 2000: 172). The implication of 
locating virtue at the core of business is that businesses founded on virtue would not need 
managers but leaders, i.e. individuals who lead other employees by example. This means that 
a virtue-based business requires leadership rather than management.  
Management is about controlling resources and directing people according to established 
principles. In a firm founded on virtue, centralised methods of management become less 
necessary. And thus, such a firm does not need a larger number of middle managers and 
supervisors (Weisband 2009: 913). The contemporary virtue theorist MacIntyre (2007) 
argues that managers are manipulators since their major interest is efficiency and not human 
flourishing. The relationship between managers and workers in a firm is always legal and not 
moral (MacIntyre1 2007: 66).  
In the virtue framework, when appointing a new manager, character becomes the most 
important aspect of potential leaders. Apart from other professional qualifications, managers 
should thus be recruited based on their character. Consequently, we need to look into 
potential managers’ background and things they have done in life, i.e. actions that could 
inform us about their character. Since, according to virtue theory, individuals become what 
they do, and what they do determines what they become, their past records would provide 
valuable insight into their character.33  
Thus, the implication of applying virtue theory to business is that morality in the business 
world ceases to be about following rules but is rather about the cultivation of a virtuous 
character. Consequently, the character of the moral agent takes centre stage in a business 
ethics based on the virtue framework. This section therefore attempts to establish and 
examine the most desirable or appropriate character disposition that businessmen and women 
should cultivate.  
3.7.2 Entrepreneurial virtues 
A businessperson should have many virtues in order to own and run a business. Among 
others, creativity, innovation, capacity to plan and organise, the ability to take calculated risks 
and having ample resources are some of the basic and obvious entrepreneurial virtues 
                                                 
33 The financial scandals at the energy corporation Enron and at the American accounting firm Arthur Anderson 
were not due to a lack of laws and rules but to problems of character.  
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(Solomon 1992:35). In order to make the right decisions, an entrepreneur must have the 
capacity to come up with ideas, imagine things and see opportunities for his or her business. 
Such a person must obviously be self-confident, trust in his or her abilities and have the 
courage to try out things that other people have never tried before. Such a character cannot be 
a conformist, i.e. someone who is scared of breaking new ground because tradition says no to 
such ventures.  
As Solomon rightly asserts, entrepreneurs are restless, imaginative, non-conformists who are 
ready to take risks (Solomon1992:35; Kariv 2011:41). An entrepreneur must be creative and 
resourceful. The virtue of resourcefulness enables entrepreneurs to seek information and 
advice from those with appropriate experience. This also implies that entrepreneurs must be 
capable of building relations with other people, i.e. they must be able to build social capital 
and establish working relations with a network of people. In order to venture into business, an 
individual must have the virtue of hope and be positive about the future. Such hope can only 
be sustained if an individual is passionate, proactive, takes initiative, creates new 
opportunities and works diligently towards the intended goal.  
It is undeniable that entrepreneurs play a very important role in our society. Through their 
activities, entrepreneurs produce new things; they establish institutions that become cultural 
institutions. In this way, entrepreneurs influence culture and introduce new values into 
society; hence, they influence the character formation of individuals. The influence of 
musicians, fashion designers and sports personalities, for example, is undeniable.  
As Naughton and Cornwall (2009:8) argue: 
Entrepreneurs are not only a powerful force in our economy, but also our culture 
because they create trends, break moulds, and cause significant changes within 
society. Unless these cultural institutions take on the responsibility to be schools of 
virtue, we see little chance for good entrepreneurs and good companies to mature in 
free market economies in numbers significant enough to truly influence society. 
In this way, entrepreneurs are a double edged sword. They can be used as a force for good or 
evil. On the one hand, entrepreneurs created the computer industry, with which we cannot do 
without today; on the other hand, entrepreneurs are also responsible for the pornographic 
industry, violent video games, fraud of pension funds, investment scams, etc. However, this 
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does not necessarily mean that entrepreneurial virtues are inherently good or evil. As 
Naughton and Cornwall observe: 
On their own, these entrepreneurial virtues do not have value. Their value depends on 
how entrepreneurs exercise them. They can be exercised in new ways to fight cancer, 
in creating pornographic films or producing insightful historical documentaries. Such 
virtues, by themselves, do not determine whether wealth creation is good or not or 
whether the entrepreneur is good or not (2009: 3).34 
Thus, the moral implications of an entrepreneur’s activities would manifest the moral values 
that constitute his or her moral campus. Consequently, the fruits of an entrepreneur’s labour 
reveal his or her character and the moral principles he or she subscribes to. If a firm hires 
individuals based on their race or gender, such policies speak volumes about the character of 
the owners of such a business. A virtuous entrepreneur would pursue self-interest but also be 
mindful that, as a member of a community, it is his or her duty to contribute to the common 
good. On the contrary, a non-virtuous person, for instance someone who is greedy, would 
exercise creativity only for self-gain. 
3.7.3 Moral and social virtues 
A virtue-based business would therefore require entrepreneurs to exercise their creativity and 
innovation in such a way that they do well but also remain good persons. This individual 
would use entrepreneurship as an opportunity to exercise moral virtues, thereby building his 
or her character in the process. To be able to do so, the entrepreneur would need to cultivate 
virtues. While Solomon points out that the list of moral virtues relevant to business would be 
very long, he mentions the following: 
We have honesty, loyalty, sincerity, prudence, courage, justice, reliability, 
trustworthiness, benevolence, sensibility, helpfulness, cooperativeness, civility, 
decency, modesty, openness, cheerfulness amiability, tolerance, reasonableness, 
tactfulness, wittiness, gracefulness, liveliness, industriousness magnanimity, 
                                                 
34 Piracy is a form of entrepreneurship.  Piracy in Somalia is growing very fast and risks disrupting international 
trade. The funds derived from piracy feed the civil war that has run down the whole country. Many ship owners 
have paid huge ransoms to save the lives of their crew remembers and cargo (Middleton 2008. Piracy in 
Somalia: Threatening global trade, feeding local wars, London: www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/1223303-
1008piracysomakia.pdf, downloaded on 15/06/2011 14:49 hrs).  
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persistence, resourcefulness, cool-headedness, warmth and hospitality(Solomon1992: 
330).  
The virtues applicable to business include, inter alia, the four cardinal virtues (prudence, 
courage, justices and temperance) and congenial virtues (friendliness and wit). The following 
paragraphs examine how the cardinal virtues fit into business before the other virtues are 
investigated and discussed.  
Prudence is the master virtue on which the practising of the other virtues depends. 
Intellectual virtues (N.E.1141b16) involve the skill and ability to make balanced and 
appropriate judgements. Individuals in the business world have multiple roles and hence 
experience a conflict of duties. This implies that their good moral actions are dependent on 
good moral judgement. Thus, the virtue of practical wisdom is equally important for 
managers in business. 35 
The advantage of the virtue of practical wisdom is that its use is not only confined to a 
workplace but is applicable virtually anywhere and helpful in all moral situations. It is 
holistic and does not require serious psychological adjustment on the part of individuals. In 
other words, it does not lead to national schizophrenia and value incongruence. The same 
skills are applicable to business as well as to domestic moral dilemmas  
For instance, practical wisdom does not separate business or professional affairs from 
domestic moral concerns (Solomon 1992:322). It is the master virtue without which the 
practice of virtue in any situation would be impossible. This implies that the separation thesis, 
i.e. the idea that business and moral concerns are separate, is not congruent with a virtue-
based business framework. The two are incompatible. Separation would imply that practical 
wisdom in business is different from practical wisdom elsewhere.  
Virtue therefore requires an individual to cultivate the habits of thinking for him or herself 
and making moral judgements. In this way, people can be held responsible for their actions.36 
                                                 
35 For instance, during the 2008 and 2010 recession, many banks and companies that received bail outs from   
the Obama government wanted to pay bonuses to their CEOs. Such decisions attracted a lot public criticism, 
specifically because it was not a prudent thing to do. 
36 Kantian ethics, Christian ethics and utilitarian ethics confine the scope in which an individual can exercise his 
or her rationality when making moral judgements. These ethical systems limit how individuals would approach 
moral situations creatively and have prescribed principles as well as a predefined scope and focus. It is the ethics 
of intellectually lazy individuals who do not have to figure out for themselves what needs to be done. All they 
have to do in each moral situation is to consult the books as regards what the scriptures would recommend in 
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Practical wisdom or good judgement is not innate in human beings. It is acquired through 
training and practice; it is “a product of good upbringing and proper education” (Solomon 
1992:329). 
Courage is one of the four cardinal virtues. It is a mean between cowardice and recklessness 
as regards what should be feared and what should not be feared (N.E. 1116a10-11) and it is 
also associated with the virtues honour, discipline, loyalty, respect, integrity, duty and 
selflessness. According to Aristotle (Rhetoric 1.9.13366b11-13), courage is a virtue by which 
human beings achieve honourable exploits in the midst of danger. Although courage is a 
military or warrior virtue, there are versions of courage that are not military.  
Fortitude is a crucial virtue not only in the military but in all successful human endeavours. It 
refers to the basic characteristic required for an individual to survive during difficult times 
and in difficult situations. It requires a lot of courage to start a business with a future that is 
uncertain. Moreover, when the situation demands it, making difficult business decisions 
requires a lot of courage. Although this is not the same form of courage that is required of a 
soldier in combat, downsizing, mergers and hostile takeovers also require a great deal of 
courage. As Solomon argues: 
[O]ne of the most powerful but ignored arguments against hostile takeovers and 
unfriendly mergers is the desire on the part of the member of a corporate community 
to maintain that community and this is not the same as executives fighting to keep 
their jobs (Solomon 1992:331).  
At the heart of any successful venture is the trait of courage. For instance, Bill Gates gave up 
his studies at Harvard to start Microsoft, a venture that has made him one of the richest 
people on earth. Think of a Somali shop owner determined to run a business in the hostile 
black townships of South Africa, knowing very well that he risks being robbed, his shop 
being looted and, worse, being shot.  
Temperance is also one of the four cardinal virtues. It refers to an individual’s ability to have 
control over his or her desires, emotions, and other tendencies. Temperance is a mean with 
regards to excess and too little pleasure. Human beings take pleasure in many things, for 
instance food, drink and sex. A virtuous person is one who enjoys pleasure in moderation 
                                                                                                                                                        
such a situation. The boundaries are set as if Kant, Mill or Jesus had done all the ethical reasoning on our behalf. 
In this sense, virtue is more realistic, open to new demands and more respectful of individuals’ intelligence.  
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(N.E. 2.2.1104a25-27). For instance, in a workplace, individuals are supposed to be hard-
working by overcoming the tendency of sloth/laziness and being complacent (Arjoon 
2000:163). Setting up a business often demands a lot of perseverance, self-control and 
denying oneself certain pleasures in order to accumulate the capital to start it.  
Justice is the last cardinal virtue. It is a trait of human character concerned with giving 
individuals what they are due. As a trait of human character, justice is a social virtue because 
it affects human relations (N.E. 1137a30). According to Rawls, justice is also “the virtue of 
social institutions” (John Rawls 1971:3). The virtue of justice is applicable to both 
individuals and institutions. This means that, like individuals, institutions too can develop a 
reputation, depending on how they distribute goods and transact business.  The virtue of 
justice lies between selfishness and selflessness.  It is a habit that helps individuals abide by 
the law and be fair in their dealings with others.  
Thus justice takes many forms; it can be distributive, remedial, substantive, corrective, 
commutative and social. Distributive justice is concerned with the distribution of goods 
according to, inter alia, merit and needs.  Remedial justice is concerned with contracts that 
have been breached and repairing the damage done.  Substantive justice is closely associated 
with what individuals are entitled to and what they can rightly and justifiably demand from 
the state. Retributive justice is concerned with determining when and why punishment is 
justified. Corrective justice concerns the fairness of demands for civil damages. And 
commutative justice is concerned with how much an employer should pay his or her 
employees. In business, justice can be violated through fraud, billing, selling defective items, 
overcharging and cheating (Enron) (Audi1999:465). 
There are two types of moral virtues: self-regarding and other-regarding virtues. While the 
other-regarding virtues serve the interests and welfare of others, the self-regarding virtues are 
concerned with the interests or welfare of the agent. From a human rights perspective, self-
regarding virtues are concerned with having rights oneself and other-regarding virtues are 
concerned with recognising the rights of others (Solomon 1992:324). “Generosity, 
conscientiousness, honesty, veracity, and justice are examples of other-regarding virtues, 
while temperance, prudence, courage and industry are examples of self-regarding virtues” 
(Taylor &Wolfram 1968: 238).  
The virtue of generosity is the one that is associated with corporate social responsibility. This 
virtue is manifested mainly when people give each other things. For instance, when giving 
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money to other people, a virtuous person will do so in an appropriate manner. He or she will 
give the right amount to the right people and at the right time. In a similar way, a person who 
donates stolen items to the poor is not acting virtuously. Thus, a business that makes money 
through fraudulent means and uses such resources for CSR is not a virtuous firm. Art 
collector Brett Kebble, TUNZI and Sacer Church, for instance, would not qualify as virtuous 
entrepreneurs.  One cannot benefit from a vice and then use one’s gains to exercise/practice 
virtue. The virtue of generosity consists in maintaining the mean between wastefulness and 
stinginess. This implies that virtue does not compel us to sacrifice and give to charity in such 
a way that we become destitute.  
The social congenial virtues (charm, wit, friendliness and a good sense of humour) are also 
very important for business because they lubricate and build human relations (social capital), 
thereby contributing to harmony, peace and a relaxed atmosphere in the firm. While 
managers have to be tough and firm when dealing with their subjects, if they must also be 
role models and inspire human beings, they also have to be simple, modest and approachable 
(Solomon1992:333).  
While virtues are compatible with business, this does not imply that there is no potential 
conflict of interest among the virtues. For instance, giving the warrior virtues too much room 
and attention would present a corporation and the business world as a war zone. On the other 
hand, paying excessive attention to the congenial virtues (wit, friendliness and charm) would 
soften a firm, making it too friendly and hence less competitive. In addition, paying too much 
attention to the moral virtues at the expense of congenial virtues would lead to rigidity and 
hamper cooperativeness and teamwork (Solomon1992:335). Thus, virtue-based business 
ethics is quite a delicate exercise, which requires constantly balancing two negative extremes 
so that the moral scale does not tip too much on one side.  
In his book Trust: The Social Virtues and Creation of Prosperity, Fukuyama (1995) argues 
that, in order to succeed economically, economic life cannot be divorced from social or 
cultural life because cultures have elements that foster social and economic prosperity. Thus 
physical capital is as important as social capital. Focusing on physical capital and neglecting 
social capital have serious repercussions for business. For instance, if people are extremely 
individualistic and completely neglect virtue, their sense of community and their 
interconnectedness may not be good for business.  
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Consequently, the virtue framework seems to explain many social phenomena, including 
business conduct. For example, corporate scandals are not due to the absence of rules and 
government regulations. The business world is replete with moral rules, codes of ethics and 
laws regulating business conduct.  And yet, these provisions do not seem to be adequate to 
stop corruption, fraud, sex abuse, child labour, human trafficking and environmental 
degradation.  What the business world has neglected for a long time is to take the moral 
character of prospective employees into consideration. Even if an individual has a Harvard 
degree and is highly qualified and proficient in his or her field of expertise, this does not 
necessarily mean that he or she is also a good person. Professional credentials do not 
immunise individuals from moral corruption nor is moral corruption the result of the absence 
of good rules and laws. Instead, moral corruption is the absence of a good virtuous character.  
3.8 Virtues in the Free Market Economy 
This section examines and discusses how virtues influence the market and how the market 
influences virtues. The implication of establishing a virtue-based firm is that both the 
workplace and the market have to be schools of virtue. The arguments regarding the 
influence of commerce/the market on virtues fall into two campuses: those who argue that 
commerce has a favourable influence on virtues (doux-commerce thesis)37 and those who 
argue that the market has a negative impact on society and virtue (self-destructive theses)38 
(Hirschman 1982:1463-1467; Graafland 2009: 2).  
This study demonstrates that the doux-commerce thesis focuses too strongly on the capacity 
of markets to support and distribute goods to the community, while underestimating the 
market’s negative effects on virtue. In a similar manner, the self-destruction thesis over-
emphasises the negative effects of the market, but neglects that, through the market, people 
can learn and cultivate many skills as well as cultivate good character dispositions and 
flourish. The market is not inherently evil; the well-being of society depends on its activities. 
To argue that the market is evil is to throw the baby out with the bath water.  
                                                 
37 The proponents of the doux-commerce thesis include Montesquieu, David Hume, Adam Smith (Graafland 
2009) and McCloskey (2006), Florida (2002).  
 
38 The self-destructive thesis has a long list of proponents, for instance: Plato, Aristotle and Marx (Graafland 
2009). 
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3.8.1 Doux-commerce thesis 
The proponents of the doux-commerce thesis argue that commerce has a very positive effect 
on society and the character of individuals. The French called commerce a sweetener 
(McCloskey 2006: 30). For instance, Montesquieu argues that, where there is commerce, 
manners are gentle and, where manners are gentle, there is commerce, implying that there is a 
causal link between gentle manners and commerce (Montesquieu1749 as cited by Hirschman 
(1982: 1465). Furthermore, Samuel argues that: 
Commerce attaches one to another though mutual utility. Through commerce, the 
moral and physical passions are superseded by interest. Commerce has a special 
character which distinguishes it from all other professions. It affects the feelings of 
men so strongly that it makes him who was proud and haughty suddenly turn supple, 
bending and serviceable. Through commerce, man learns to deliberate, to acquire 
manners, to be prudent and reserved in both talk and action. Sensing the necessity to 
be wise and honest in order to succeed, he flees vice, or at least his demeanour 
exhibits decency (Samuel 1981 as cited by Hirschman 1982: 1465).   
David Hume and Adam Smith argue that commerce brings about the virtues of 
industriousness, assiduity, frugality, punctuality and probity (Rosenberg 1964:59-77 cited by 
Hirschman 1982: 1465), implying that the market is a moralising agent or rather that the 
market is also a school of virtue. In addition to being a moralising agent, the doux-commerce 
thesis holds that commerce is a vehicle that brings international social order. As Storr asserts, 
“Our market activities bring us into fellowship with people across the globe and across 
ethnicities and nationalities. The market makes it possible for diverse individuals to 
peacefully reconcile their plans and so create favourable conditions for feelings of friendship” 
(Storr 2009: 280).  
These arguments in support of the doux-commerce thesis subscribe to a crucial realisation 
that  the market is a social space where individuals come to interact, learn the virtues and 
flourish as human beings (Storr 2009: 279). This argument implies that commerce brings 
harmony and builds communities. Furthermore, the doux-commerce thesis would recommend 
that, since the market is beneficial to the society and human beings, it should be expanded 
and spread all over the world.  
Evidently, commerce provides opportunities for people to interact, get to know each other, 
form supportive relationships and exercise both entrepreneurial and social/moral virtues. 
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However, this only seems to be one side of the possible effects of commerce. For instance, 
when you have so many individuals trying to sell similar items to one customer, i.e. when 
supply exceeds demand or when demand exceeds supply, one wonders how manners can 
remain gentle and soft. It seems that the doux-commerce thesis holds when the competition 
between traders is low or when individuals participating in the market are docile, over-
focused and preoccupied with other-regarding concerns at the expense of self-interest.   
Competition is at the heart of commerce. When subjected to intense competition, would the 
doux-commerce thesis survive the pressure? When a good character is subjected to 
temptation in the form of kickbacks, harassment or torture, how many can stand the pressure 
and remain virtuous? The reality that even good people can sin suggests that morality based 
on character is fragile and unstable under certain conditions.  
The doux-commerce thesis explains how the market is responsible for economic prosperity 
and human flourishing. The market provides opportunities for individuals with 
entrepreneurial capacities to exercise entrepreneurial virtues and flourish. It also explains 
how the market distributes the goods necessary for human well-being. However, it does not 
explain how and why other individuals in society are poor and do not flourish and why some 
markets fail.  Moreover, the doux-commerce thesis does not seem to account for how the 
market can also be responsible for injustice, fraud and environmental degradation. The doux-
commerce thesis is too reductive; while it accounts for the success of a market, it does not 
provide a framework that explains the causes, for example, of the 2008 economic downturn 
or the phenomenon of market failure. The following paragraphs look into the arguments of 
the proponents of the self-destruction thesis.  
3.8.2 Self-destructive thesis 
The self-destructive thesis is the opposite of the doux-commerce thesis. It is more pessimistic 
about the moral effect of the market. Its basic argument is that, instead of promoting virtue, 
the market has a corrosive effect on social relations and virtue. Its proponents range from 
ancient Greek philosophers, Plato (427-347 B.C) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C), to the 
contemporary critics of capitalism, Hirsch (1977), Hirschman (1982) and Putnam (2000).  
Aristotle argues that commerce is necessary for human flourishing but that it should be 
limited to meeting domestic needs. He holds the opinion that business activities designed to 
meet the needs of the household do not endanger virtue. Such business is actually beneficial 
because it brings families together. However, business activities that are specifically meant 
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for making money pose a danger to virtue and human character.  While people must work to 
realise their capacities and flourish, they must also work to produce the goods necessary for 
their existence and provide for their family.39 Aristotle’s observation is that there are certain 
activities that foster virtues while other business activities corrupt human character or corrode 
virtues. For instance, taking part in charitable activities would lead to the acquisition of the 
generosity virtue, while working in the fire brigade would lead to the acquisition of the 
courage virtue. However, Aristotle argues that the activities of money-making or wealth 
creation can have a detrimental effect on virtue.  
Aristotle values the economic activities involved in the production of things we require for 
human well-being, such as food, clothes, etc. He considers such production processes natural 
and advises that such processes should observe the mean and that over or underproduction 
should be avoided. Society should produce enough to meet human needs. True wealth 
consists in the stock of useful things that a household needs (Aristotle Pol. 1256b30f-37). 
Thus, good trade means that households can barter goods in accordance with their needs. For 
instance, if one household has chickens but needs honey from other households, such a 
family can exchange a chicken for honey.  In such a business transaction, there is a limit, a 
mean between too much and too little. The limit is determined by the user value, need and 
consumption (Meikle 1996:140).   
However, this is not the case for activities to gain wealth, since money is used to make more 
money. Industries involved in such activities include the retail trade, usury business, and the 
finance industry.  In the virtue framework, money has instrumental value. However, in a 
scheme of using capital to make capital, money is positioned as an intrinsic value as a 
goal/end in itself. In such a scheme, human beings, virtues and the arts (like medicine, 
                                                 
39 Aristotle’s world was different from ours and hence some of his ideas are completely out of place in the 
contemporary world of business. In his society, men were accorded a superior position and status to rule 
women, children and slaves. He thought women were capable of little authority. Women’s place was at home 
taking care of children. Furthermore, in the Athens of Aristotle’s time, some human beings were not only 
considered inferior but were slaves and hence other people’s property.  Some men were born slaves, others were 
made slaves after being captured in battle.  This does not mean the war against the emancipation of women is 
completely won nor that slavery has been completely uprooted. Huge populations of women in the developing 
world still wear the shackles of tradition and customs. In certain traditions, men with resources can marry as 
many women as they want. For instance, in modern times, the King of Swaziland still has the liberty to marry a 
virgin every year; Jacob Zuma, the current president of South Africa, has more than four legal wives. Wal-Mart, 
an American retail corporation, still pays women, despite being the majority in the corporation, lower wages 
than their male colleagues of the same rank and qualification. The problem of human trafficking implies that 
human beings in certain parts of the world are still objects of commerce.  Therefore, Aristotle’s ideas remain a 
constant reminder that equality among human beings remains a work in progress.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
51 
 
teaching and philosophy) risk being used as means only for making money. Such a scheme 
can corrupt the arts as well as human character. As Meikle argues: 
Making money is a distinct end and art, but it is not a distinct activity. There is no 
activity of making money which can be conducted on its own independent of the 
conduct of another art or useful activity, except in the literal sense of coining or 
printing a legal tender. It is an end which can be pursued only by it being latched onto 
the conduct of some other art. This applies even to trade. Trade insofar as it is a useful 
service, is the art of getting things to where they are needed. That art is transformed 
into trade in the more familiar sense by being used as a way of making money 
(Meikle1996: 147). 
Aristotle was concerned that a scheme in which money is used to make more money can lead 
to a morally reprehensible character (N.E. 1133b14-15). For instance, in a business of money 
making, the necessary character trait would be acquisitiveness. The desire for food differs 
from the desire for money. While a desire for food can be moderated by the mean, desire for 
money is unlimited. The more money you make, the more your desire.  Like murder and 
adultery, retail trade and usury cannot be regulated by a mean. Greed and Pleonexia, i.e. the 
drive to have more and more, becomes one of the major characteristics of businesspersons 
(MacIntyre 1985: xiii). 
This is what led Aristotle to insist that members of the polis should avoid moral corruption 
and moral contamination by not getting involved in the business of using money to make 
money. His major insight is that, instead of being a school of virtue, the retail and usury 
trades, i.e. lending money at an interest or excessive interest, can generate an unquenchable 
desire for money.   
Although Aristotle was an ancient philosopher who lived in a social environment that was 
much different from ours, this does not necessarily imply that his ideas about business, trade 
and usury 40 are irrelevant to our contemporary world of business. We live and do business in 
                                                 
40 The critique of usury has a very long history. Even before and after the time of Aristotle, usury has been 
repeatedly condemned and prohibited both on philosophical, moral, religious and legal grounds.  For instance, 
the Old Testament condemns usury as immoral (Exodus 22.25, Leviticus 25:37, Deuteronomy 23:19-20 advises 
the faithful not to lend usury to their brothers but only to strangers). In Luke 6:35 in the New Testament, Jesus 
gives the following advice: “love your enemies, and do well, and lend hoping for nothing again; and your 
reward shall be great”. This suggests that wealth could be a potential hindrance to entering the Kingdom of 
Heaven (Luke 19:23, Matthew 25:23, Luke 19:22-23).   
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global economic systems that are more usurious or interest-based than ever before. For 
instance, IMF’s and World Bank’s business is lending money at interest. Moreover, at a local 
level, many banks and other moneylenders provide loan facilities and charge interest to make 
a profit. Since moneylenders charge interest, there is room for over or undercharging interest. 
Hence, there is room for fair and unfair interest changes even in our modern interest-based 
local and global economy. In this context, Aristotle’s moral concerns are relevant to our 
business world.   
This suggests that Aristotle’s conclusion that the retail trade is morally evil is wrong, because 
we can justify why it involves profit. A fair profit is justifiable in the retail as well as in the 
finance trade. Profit is justified on the productive value, utility value (the usefulness of a 
thing) as well as on the economic value of goods. Aristotle’s criticism is not levelled on these 
three sources of value.  His condemnation of the retail trade is targeted on the profit traders 
make by distributing the goods from the factory site to the shop and then to the consumers. In 
his opinion, the retailers have no justified reasons for making profit from the distributive 
services they offer.  
Being a man of his time, Aristotle was completely unaware of the importance of distributive 
value. Individuals, who buy goods and transport them to another site for sale, add value to 
such goods. Such a value is not productive value, utility value or economic value but 
distributive value.41 Hence, profit from retail trade is morally, economically and legally 
justified because the trader adds value to the goods he or she sells. The legitimate normative 
questions are: How much profit should retailers or bankers make from their services and what 
constitutes fair pricing?  
While Aristotle indeed overreacted in his criticism of trade and usury, his insight that certain 
activities have the capacity to ruin virtue still stands. Thus, whoever wishes to flourish 
through business activities ought to keep in mind that not all forms of art or practices to make 
                                                                                                                                                        
The Quran also states that God permits commerce but prohibits usury. It condemns those who charge interest on 
a loan as agents of the devil because they presuppose that usury is the same as commerce (Al-Baqarah 2:275).  
Thus a good Muslims should refrain from usury (Al-‘lmran 3:130). If they give out a loan, they should do so 
interest-free because God blesses charities.  
The Torah Hebrew Bible (1917 Jewish Publication Society translation) advises the faithful not to lend money at 
interest to their brother but can do so to a foreigner (Leviticus 25:35-37). 
St Thomas Aquinas, who was a prominent theologian of the Catholic Church, argued that usury is morally 
unacceptable because it amounts to double charging: “charging for money and charging for its use (spending)” 
(Wayne A.M.Visser and Alastair McIntosh (1998), Business and Financial History, 8:2, London: Routledge) 
http://www.che.ac.uk/publications/usury.htm 03/18/2011 03:52 PM.  
41 Value theory (axiology) is concerned with how, why and to what degree things should be valued (Audi 
1999:949).  
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money can strengthen virtue? Some activities have a corrosive effect on good character, for 
instance, piracy, trading drugs and waging wars in order to loot or plunder. Businesses that 
are only self-regarding and have no other-regarding elements are not virtue-based businesses. 
The moral implications of resorting to business activities that have a corrosive effect on 
virtues are that you not only damage other people but also ruin your own character in the 
process. 
3.8.3 Contemporary critics of business 
Modern criticism on business is focused on the moral demerits of capitalism. The self-
destruction thesis is the view that capitalism carries the seeds of its own destruction. Far from 
fostering douceur, gentle manners and virtues, capitalism has the tendency to undermine the 
moral foundations on which any society rests. Therefore, if we introduce capitalism into a 
society, we expect it to erode the moral foundation of that society (Hirschman 1982: 1465). 
The question that comes to mind is: How does capitalism erode virtues? 
In his book Social limits of Growth, Hirsch (1976) argues that the virtues of truth, trust, 
restraint and obligation play a central role in the functioning of an individualistic, contractual 
economy (1977: 141). In other words, capitalism as practiced in Western countries requires 
virtues. And yet, capitalism as practiced in the West is rooted in self-interest and 
individualism, which are both antithetical to virtue.   
Individualism only considers individuals to have basic rights. It is a moral or social stance 
that stresses the moral worth of individuals. Individualism is rooted in the conviction that 
individuals’ rights matter more than those of the community. When the interests of 
individuals are in conflict with those of the community, they take precedence over the 
community’s interests. The opposite is true for communitarianism. However: 
According to communitarians, individuals are constituted by the institutions and 
practices of which they are a part, and their rights and obligation derive from those 
same institutions and practices (Audi 1999:719).    
Understood in this way, individuals are not atoms moving randomly. Individuals are 
constituted by the community in which they live. Virtues are community norms that regulate 
human conduct in a community. Individualistic capitalism, as practiced in the West, is 
atomistic and hence corrosive of social cohesion. By undermining community, capitalism, as 
practiced in the West, undermines virtues. Thus, Western capitalism is self-destructive 
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because it erodes the foundation that supplies the values it desperately needs to function 
morally. This means that, in a world that is becoming increasingly individualistic and 
westernised, virtues and the social context/community that supplies them are also dwindling. 
This, according to Hirsch (1977), MacIntyre (1981) and Putnam (2000), is what has finally 
comes to pass in Western societies (MacIntyre 2007: 57), and possibly explains the major 
causes of the 2008 economic downturn.  
Hirsch argues that social morality, which in terms of market function has a legacy of being 
pre-capitalist and pre-industrial, has been eroded by the capitalistic overemphasis on self-
interest/individualism. Consequently, Putnam argues that many forms of community life have 
collapsed, resulting in increasing social disconnectedness.42 As MacIntyre puts it:   
In such societies, the moral language is in serious disorder and incomprehensible. 
What we possess, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts of which now lack 
those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of 
morality; we continue to use many of the key expressions. But we have – very largely, 
if not entirely – lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality 
(MacIntyre 2007:2).  
In these societies, secularisation and individualism have eroded the social structures that have 
supplied and supported the virtues. So what we are left with are fragments of the virtue 
scheme without their supporting social institutions.43 If virtue is so crucial for commerce, 
then we have no choice but to devise and practice capitalism that is not underpinned by 
individualism, i.e. a form of capitalism that values human interconnectedness and builds 
community, an economic system that “crowds in” rather than “crowds out” virtues.  
3.9 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to examine the implications of making virtue theory the meta-theory of 
business. It has demonstrated that, contrary to the separation thesis, a virtue-based business 
would have multiple goals, would not be regulated by rules but be self-regulated and would 
not need managers but leaders. Furthermore, a virtue-based market would be a free market 
                                                 
42 In the United States of America, the number of people who claim they have no one with whom they discuss 
important matters has tripled between 1985 and 2004 (McPherson et al 2006, cited by Graafland 2009:9). 
 
43 This could be one of the unintended consequences of democratisation.  As liberal democracy and free market 
capitalism take root in Africa, our societies may become more and more individualistic and hence also lose the 
social supportive structure of virtue. 
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economy with minimal or no government regulation and intervention. Such a market would 
have all the elements of free market minibus individualism because firms would be 
communities within a community. Firms would not simply be an aggregation of individuals 
(atoms) moving randomly, but would constitute a network of human relations, which, in turn, 
would form social capital. 
However, introducing virtue to the market has three possible consequences. The first possible 
outcome is that the market becomes a school of virtue in which individuals can practice their 
virtues and acquire new dispositions. Secondly, introducing the virtues raises a dilemma 
because virtue is a Trojan horse to the market. Its other-regarding elements can pose a danger 
to business, i.e. these elements would undermine competitiveness by making business too 
friendly and docile and hence a firm would lose its competitive edge. On the other hand, too 
much focus on the self-regarding virtues can make the market too competitive, forcing 
individuals into survival mode, which risks turning the market into a war zone in which only 
the fittest survive. Desperate to survive, individuals can resort to all sorts of unethical 
behaviour, and thus endanger virtue.  
Fourthly, proponents of virtue have to face and deal with the reality that free market 
capitalism, as practiced in the West, has an inevitable corrosive effect on the community and 
virtues. Thus, if we wish to make virtue ethics the meta-theory of business, we may have to 
devise a form of capitalism that does not undermine community and virtue. That form of 
capitalism would still have to recognise the importance of virtues and community without 
sacrificing the freedom of the individuals to exercise entrepreneurial virtues and hence 
achieve human flourishing. This is the major point of discussion of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Virtue-Based Capitalism 
4.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, we discussed the implications of applying the virtue framework to 
business. One of the implications is that the framework has to face the reality that free market 
capitalism, founded on individualism, has an inevitable corrosive effect on community and 
virtues. Since the virtues are very important for commerce, we may have to model a form of 
capitalism or devise an economic system that enforces rather than corrodes virtues; a system 
that values human interconnectedness and builds community; a form of capitalism founded 
on an Aristotelian virtue framework.  
In this chapter, we look at the advantages, disadvantages and limitations of virtue-based 
capitalism. To achieve this aim, Section 4.1 introduces and defines central approaches to 
capitalism. Subsequently, Section 4.2 discusses the problems of individualism and 
communitarianism and demonstrates that the virtue framework – although traditionally 
associated with communitarianism – allows for individuals to become self-actualised, 
whether through entrepreneurship or any other profession of his or her choice. Section 4.3 
demonstrates that the virtue framework is more compatible with forms of collective rather 
than individualistic capitalism. It also argues that the collective forms of capitalism are 
morally superior to and more balanced than economic individualism because they are rooted 
in a comprehensive understanding of human nature. Finally, Section 4.4 discusses the three 
features of capitalism (i.e. profit motive, competition and private property). 
4.2 Central Approaches to Capitalism  
There are many approaches to capitalism. However, before we discuss various approaches, it 
is imperatives that we spell out what constitutes capitalism44. This section defines capitalism, 
examines its origin, forms, varieties and culture prevalent in the world today.  
4.2.1 What is capitalism? 
Capitalism, over its long history, has always been characterised as the use of private means to 
produce surplus goods to sell at a profit. Thus: 
                                                 
44 Socialism is the opposite of capitalism. It can be defined as an economic system in which the means of 
productions are publically owned and the economy is centrally planned. 
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Capitalism is an economic system in which goods, labour, land, and financial services 
are transferred through relatively competitive markets and in which the means of 
production (land, factories or machinery) are privately owned by groups of 
individuals, rather than by a government (Pryor 2010:8).  
Capitalism is therefore characterised by a profit motive, private ownership of the means of 
productions and competitive markets. This implies that capitalism exists in societies or 
countries in which the private ownership of capital is predominant, where the economy is 
mainly operated according to a private profit motive, and where economic decisions are 
mostly made through the market mechanism rather than by a government (Donaldson & 
Pollins 1978:26; Watt 1929:40). 
Thus, a nation can only be considered capitalist if it is capable of producing a large tradable 
surplus. To do so, a country must have a good number of capitalists, i.e. individuals driven by 
self-interest. Likewise, capitalism is only possible if consumers are free to buy goods without 
any coercion. Markets in which individuals are free to produce, sell and buy goods are  
characterised by private ownership of the means of production, free competition and 
relatively few restrictions on consumers (Pryor 2010:15).45 
4.2.2 The origin of capitalism 
Capitalism started in the West following the end of feudalism in the 17th and 18th centuries. 
The Netherlands can probably be identified as the first fully capitalist country in the world 
with Amsterdam being the first city to offer full time stock exchange (Tawney 1948). The 
history of capitalism indicates that such an economic system began with the Dutch and then 
spread to the United Kingdom and the United States. The question that comes to mind is why 
capitalism originated in the West and not elsewhere.  
In his book, Capitalism Reassessed, Pryor argues that capitalism originated or developed in 
Western Europe because these societies had all the favourable conditions for capitalism to 
blossom. For example, by the year 1700, the richest nations in Europe, i.e. the United 
                                                 
45 This definition of capitalism is distinguished from syndicalism, which is an economic system in which 
ownership of the means of production is vested in those who use them. It is also distinguished from socialism 
where the means of production are publically owned. Additionally, it is distinguished from what Lenin calls the 
“highest phase of communism” where the means of production are vested in everybody (Watts 1929:40). 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
58 
 
Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands46, had accumulated enough capital to enable them to 
produce surplus goods for sale. Additionally, these nations had developed markets, banks, 
security of private property, high literacy levels, courts and police stations to enforce 
contracts. In addition, Capitalism in the West was spurred on by technological inventions47 
that made the production and transportation of goods very efficient (Pryor 2010:53). 
In short, Pryor argues that, for capitalism to develop, a government must provide law and 
order, protect private property, reduce internal trade barriers and build an infrastructure that 
enables buyers and sellers of goods and services to do business. In other words, the 
development of capitalism requires the following basic things: technology, favourable 
institutions, security of private property, a good education system and political freedom 
(Pryor 2010:53).  
In his response to why capitalism originated in the West and not elsewhere, the famous 
sociologist Marx Weber (1904-5), in his book The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of 
Capitalism, argues that cultural factors are also  partly responsible for the development of 
capitalism in the West. Moreover, capitalism in the West was spurred on by the emergence of 
the protestant spiritual and religious values, which encouraged the virtues of diligence, 
frugality, austerity and accumulation. Protestantism presents commerce and profit-making as 
honourable and acceptable in the eyes of God, so that good Christians would use their God-
given talents to do commerce.48 In such a case, as Heibroner comments: “Acquisitiveness 
becomes a recognised virtue – not immediately for one’s private enjoyment, but for the 
greatest glory of God” (Heibroner1992:33).  
The Protestant ethos presented entrepreneurship as a call, a vocation. As such, individuals felt 
that they were on a mission to use their capacities in order to work diligently, create wealth 
and overcome poverty. In this way, being rich is considered a blessing and not a curse or a 
                                                 
46By February 1637, the Dutch experienced the first recorded speculative bubble, which came to be known as 
“tulip mania”. During that period, contract prices for the tulip bulbs increased in value and thereafter suddenly 
collapsed (www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tulip mania).  
 
47 Examples of capitalistic inventions include: James Watt: the first reliable steam engine (1775); Eli Whitney: 
cotton gin and interchangeable parts for muskets (1793, 1798); Robert Fulton: the steamboat service on the 
Hudson River (1807); Samuel F.B.Morse: the telegraph (1836); Elias Howe: the sewing machine (1844); Cyrus 
Field: the transatlantic cable (1866); Alexander Graham Bell: the telephone (1876); Thomas Edison: the 
phonograph and incandescent light bulb (1877, 1879); Nikola Tesla: the induction electric motor (1888); Rudolf 
Diesel: the diesel engine (1892); Orville and Wilbur Wright: the first aeroplane (1903); and Henry Ford: the 
model T Ford and assembly line(1908, 1913) (Moyo 2011:106). 
 
48 Also, let’s not forget what the Bible says about money and riches: “Poor is he who works with a negligent 
hand, but the hand of the diligent makes rich” (Proverbs 10:4). 
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hindrance to salvation. In this framework, acquisitiveness becomes a virtue. Thus Protestant 
ethics provide a moral guidance, justification, as well as ethical principles that account for the 
prosperity of capitalism in the West.  
While indeed Protestant ethics encourage virtues that can lead to economic prosperity, this 
does not mean that such virtues are unique to the Protestant tradition; such moral values are 
also available in other European cultures that are not Protestant. As Tawney argues:  
There was plenty of “capitalist spirit” in the fifteenth-century Venice and Florence. Or 
in Southern Germany and Flanders, for the simple reason that these areas were the 
greatest commercial and financial centres of the ages though all were, at least 
nominally, Catholic. The development of capitalism in Holland and England in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was due, not to the fact that they were Protestant 
powers, but to large economic movements, in particular the discoveries and the results 
which flowed from them( Tawney1943: 321).  
This means that virtue and the protestant spirituality or value system alone is not enough to 
account for the origin of capitalism. The evolution of capitalism is not the result of a single 
factor but an interplay between factors of which morality and change of mind-set are 
prominent examples. Even if cultural factors are favourable for trade, without a good 
government in which to reinforce contracts and administer justice, and without a good 
transport infrastructure and banking service, commerce may not flourish. Nevertheless, the 
core of Weber’s argument, which is still valid, is that, inter alia, for capitalism to develop, a 
significant proportion of the population must change its mentality and embrace values that 
are compatible with capitalism. As Pryor (2010) points out:  
Certainly the climate for capitalism seems unfavourable in peasant societies, where 
collective solidarity is more valued than individualism, where magic and myths, 
rather than rational thought dominate the thinking about the world; where profit 
seeking is considered grubby and trade and manufacturing are held to be unworthy 
occupation for gentlemen; and leisure is more highly prized than ownership of fancy 
goods (Pryor 2010: 73). 
Thus, the contemporary relevance of Weber’s argument is that capitalism may fail or succeed 
to develop in a particular culture because of its dominant mind-set, beliefs, customs and 
cultural practises. And this could actually explain why rural black Africa is slow in 
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embracing capitalism as many Sub-Saharan African cultures are superstitious and associate 
acquisitiveness with magic and witchcraft49. They believe that one cannot become rich 
through one’s own effort and wits. Thus, to succeed economically, one needs the intercession 
of sorcery and ancestral spirits (Broodryk 2010:147).  
The world is full of practices that can hinder certain segments of society from benefiting from 
economic activities.50 Take the case of India’s caste system, for example, in which 
individuals are classified into a hierarchy of endogamous groups that individuals enter only 
by birth with no room for upward social mobility (Olcott 1944:648). Each of the five castes 
has specific duties. While the Brahmins are meant to be priests, scholars and philosophers, 
the Kashtriyas are meant to be warriors and rulers. Additionally, while the Vaishyas are 
meant to be traders, merchants and farmers, the Shudras, Pariah and Harijans (the lower 
castes) are the servants of the upper castes.  
While capitalism is rooted in the conviction that freedom and equality are the basic 
characteristics of human nature, the Indian caste system assumes that human beings are not 
equal and that the nature of man is not that of Homo Aequalis, but Homo Hierachicus 
(Dumont 1980). This is therefore an example of how belief or value systems can determine or 
dictate how individuals should conduct themselves economically. In these societies, manual 
labour, for instance the disposal of dead bodies, is considered undignified and is hence meant 
for or associated with the lower castes – the untouchables.  
In sum, capitalism is an economic system in which the means of production are largely or 
entirely in private hands and that operates for a profit. Moreover, in order for capitalism to 
develop, it requires the right institutions, infrastructure and a favourable culture. Thus, as 
capitalism spreads around the globe, it will shape local cultures. Conversely, since value 
systems are not always universal, this also implies that capitalism, as it spreads across the 
globe, will be shaped by local cultures. This subject is further discussed in sections below.  
                                                 
49 Many people in rural and urban Africa still believe in witchcraft and in the power of sorcery. They believe 
that, to get a job, it is not enough to work hard and acquire the right skills, but that one must also have a lucky 
charm. This is the reason why sangomas are still in business 
 
50In addition, certain social practices have negative impacts on economic activity, for instance, the caste 
distinction in India or the binding of women’s feet in China, both of which reduce the labour force available for 
particular work outside of the home (Pryor 2010: 73). 
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4.2.3 Forms of capitalism 
Libertarian thinkers believe that human beings are free and equal. As such, individual 
participation in the markets should be voluntary. The market should therefore be an arena in 
which the invisible hand and the law of demand and supply must strictly be allowed to work 
without any interference. Moreover, except for enforcing contracts and protecting property 
rights, the state should keep out of the markets (Adam Smith 1759, Hayek1948; Friedman 
1970). The type of capitalism that is compatible with these aspirations has become known as 
laissez-faire capitalism, which is characterised by strict limited government participation. In 
such an economic system, the role of the state is likened to that of a “night watchman” 
(Blackburn 2005: 210) whose basic responsibility is simply to protect its citizens from 
violence and fraud, maintain order and provide services that cannot be accommodated in free 
markets (Bremmer 2010: 27; Smith1937; Nozick 1974).   
The argument for laissez-faire capitalism assumes that the market is moral, autonomous, and 
without any biases, and that the outcome of the market is purely rational and unaffected by 
political and personal interests. It also assumes that, in such a market, there is no room for 
any conflict between individual and societal interests as well as that markets are inherently 
stable and perfect, and attributes market instability to government intervention (Mohr 2012: 
65). Furthermore, it believes that morality in commerce is simply a matter of pursuing 
personal interests or a matter of obeying one’s passions, in which case the role of reason is 
simply to work out the means of satisfying the passions and not interrogating the moral 
implications of such passions (Hayek1948:15).  
As the 2008 to 2010 financial crisis has taught us, the market does not always work perfectly. 
Markets are cyclical and characterised by booms, bubbles and busts (Keynes (1949). 
Therefore, any rupture in the market has serious social costs because it can result in a loss of 
business, savings and property and may require government intervention to save human lives. 
So, in reality, it is impossible to have pure capitalism in which the state is not involved in the 
economic activity (Chang2010:1). 
There are many factors that can account for market failure. At times, markets fail due to, inter 
alia, character flaws such as greed. As Moeletsi Mbeki (2009) notices, in a free market 
economy, there is a break, a gap between capitalists and managers who run corporations. In 
modern corporate culture, the managerial class is not accountable for the capitalist but only 
for other managers who are professionals but not necessarily capitalists. “The crisis of 
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accountability of the modern management class recently showed itself in the fraudulent 
accounting of such companies as Enron, Parmalat, Worldcom and Arthur Anderson to name 
just a few”(Mbeki 2009: 98). This suggests that some managers are wolves in sheep’s 
clothing. If managers can conspire to swindle a firm, expecting that the markets should 
regulate themselves is like putting foxes in charge of a chicken coop. As Bremmer 
acknowledges:  
Even in a society of extreme individualism like the United States, government is 
expected to referee the game to ensure that players observe the rules, to serve as 
lender and guarantor of last resorts, and to provide public goods like national defence 
and criminal justice systems, public education, environmental protection, health 
insurance for the elderly and poor, air traffic control, and disaster relief. These 
services are too important to social well-being to entrust them to private enterprises 
(Bremmer 2010:27).     
As government is required to referee capitalism, pure market economics or laissez-faire 
economics can be considered mere wishful thinking, impractical and unattainable. The idea 
of a laissez-faire capitalism is too extreme and amounts to what George Soros (1998: XX) 
labelled “market fundamentalism” or “untrimmed individualism”, i.e. “the strong unrelenting 
belief in the capacity of the market economy to solve economic and social problems”, which 
is very unsound and unsustainable.51  
Therefore, it is no surprise that most capitalist economies are mixed economies, made up of a 
combination of free market elements with limited government participation. A mixed 
economy is therefore a combination of free market (liberal capitalism) and state capitalism. In 
this form of capitalism, the state uses markets to create wealth, which can be used as the 
political officials see fit. In his book, The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War 
between States and Corporations? Bremmer (2010) notices that, weary of an uncontrolled 
free market, a number of authoritarian governments (Saudi Arabia, China and Russia) have 
implemented state capitalism. And yet, “[a]ll mixed capitalist systems share faith in the 
                                                 
51 This became the dominant ideology when Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Regan came to power around 1980. 
The free market philosophy has already been thoroughly tested – not in the West where the prescription was 
made, but in the developing countries – through IMF and World Bank Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (ESAP). These programmes advised the developing countries to liberalise their economies by 
transferring state-owned firms into private hands. The social costs of ESAP were severe to developing societies. 
And the “great irony, of course is that the US itself did not adhere to a number of these policies” (Mohr 
2012:66). 
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principle that only free markets can generate long-term prosperity and that government 
should never become the dominant player in an economy” (Bremmer 2010:27).  
Apart from greed, the 2008 financial crisis was caused, inter alia, by toxic derivatives, 
offering mortgages to individuals who were not credit worthy as well as government-backed 
mortgages provided through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In its attempt to resolve the crisis, 
the USA government pumped a lot of money into saving businesses, such as Ford 
Corporation and many other firms, from collapsing. This implies that the USA government is 
increasingly becoming a key player in US markets. Fortunately or unfortunately, state 
capitalism is on the rise. And since the free market has failed, the argument that the state 
should actually play a leading role in the national economic performance makes a lot of 
sense.  
Briefly stated, capitalism has evolved due to the role the state is expected to play in the 
economy. If the state exercises a hands-off approach, then we have laissez-fair capitalism. If 
the state plays an active economic role in the markets, the final outcome will be a mixed 
economy. However, if the state has a bigger stake in the markets, the final outcome will be 
state capitalism. So, there are many types of capitalism.  
Apart from the state’s role in defining capitalism, a study by Hall and Soskice (1980) 
demonstrates that capitalism is also shaped by the way in which business institutions are 
organised. Additionally, Hampden-Turner and Trompenaasrs’ (1993) study reveals that 
capitalism is also shaped by culture. These two studies have shown that, as capitalism has 
spread across the globe, it has evolved into liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated 
market economies (CMEs). These will be examined in the following sections.  
4.2.4 Varieties of capitalism 
Hall and Soskices (2001) argue that, with regard to capital and labour, institutional 
subsystems, for example, education, finance and religion, also mould models of capitalism. In 
their study of various business institutions in the economies of Europe, America and Asia, 
Hall and Soskice (2001:8) observe that capitalism has evolved into two models: one that is 
coordinated and another one that is liberal and less coordinated. 
The markets in the coordinated market economies (CMEs) are dependent on non-market 
relations. These markets are characterised by collaboration rather than competition, credible 
commitments, and deliberative calculations on the part of firms. These non-market modes of 
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coordination generally entail more extensive relational or contracting network monitoring 
based on the exchange of private information and inside networks. In addition, firms in the 
CME category build their competences through reliance on collaboration rather than through 
competition alone (Hall & Soskice 2001:8). Firms in this category are characterised by long-
term employment, strategic rule-bound behaviour, the sharing of information and durable ties 
with other firms. Moreover, the economic equilibrium of such markets is the outcome of 
strategic interactions among firms and other actors. Germany, Japan and Sweden, for 
example, have coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001).  
Since the CMEs’ major characteristics are permanent employment, incremental innovations 
and collaboration among firms, it can be assumed that such markets are interested in long-
term rather than short-term goals. Additionally, these characteristics also imply that the 
CMEs are interested in market stability and the solidarity of market players. The market can 
facilitate the formation of long-term relationships among firms as well as the development of 
friendships among employees. In such a business, it is not just profit that matters. The CMEs 
assume that, apart from the bottom line, there are other things of superior value that can also 
be achieved through economic activities. 
On the other hand, liberal market economies (LMEs) are the opposite of CMEs. These 
markets are dependent on market relations, characterised by arm’s length business 
transactions, competitive relations, a fluid labour market and formal contracting. 
Additionally, these markets operate on the principle of demand and supply; they are 
responsive to price signalling. In these markets, firms coordinate their activities primarily via 
hierarchies and competitive market arrangements. Market relations are characterised by an 
arm’s length exchange of goods or services in a context of competition with regard to formal 
contracting (Hall & Soskice 2001: 8). In LMEs, jobs are on contract and firms are purely 
motivated by profit. Because firms in these markets are short-term focused, they are 
characterised by radical innovation. These markets have taken a lead in, inter alia, bio-
technology software. The United Kingdom and the United States of America are good 
examples of liberal market economies. 
Taking the major characteristics of liberal market economies into consideration (i.e. short-
term goals, fluid labour markets, jobs on contract and rivalry among firms), it is quite obvious 
that these markets are ill-equipped for the training of apprentices. Additionally, firms in such 
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markets cannot collaborate and share knowledge because they are competitive. Regarding 
this type of business world, Adam Smith states the following:  
People of the same trade seldom meet together, but when they do meet, their 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some diversion to raise 
prices (Smith 1776:26). 
Briefly stated, the studies by Hall and Soskice reveal that while, in some markets, business 
institutions coordinate and collaborate, there is rivalry among institutions in other markets. 
Owing to such rivalry, these markets are characterised by radical innovations. However, the 
authors admit that this classification is not fitting for all the markets in Europe and Asia. For 
example, the French, Italian and Spanish economies have characteristics that are not very 
fitting in either of these two categories. Additionally, this study’s focus is limited as it only 
investigates how business institutions relate to each other but does not examine these 
markets’ value assumptions.  
Of course, there are value assumptions that underlie both CMEs and LMEs. Since the value 
system determines or influences the choices one makes in life, it is not coincidental that 
certain countries have developed liberal market economies while others have developed 
coordinated market economies. If Hall and Soskice had taken the culture of the institutions 
into account, they may also have found out that there are more varieties of capitalism in the 
world. Turner and Trompenaars (1993) undertook such a study; the next section will examine 
their findings.  
4.2.5 Cultures of capitalism  
Instead of focusing on the institutions and how they relate to each other, in their book, The 
Seven Cultures of Capitalism, Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (1993) sought to 
understand the value systems that account for the economic success of the United States of 
America, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Sweden and the Netherlands. This 
study was motivated by the assumption that values are the guiding principles that influence 
the attitudes and manner in which human beings conduct themselves. So to understand the 
economic success of the Germans, Japanese and the Chinese, it is also necessary to study 
their value systems so that we can establish what motivates them to do what they do. As 
Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars put it:  
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Myth told us the Germans were particularly good at building infrastructure and that 
Americans excelled at invention (dreaming up new products), whereas the Japanese 
excelled at innovation (getting those new products to the market). Why should such 
skills correspond to nationality? Wasn’t wealth creation the dry stuff of science not 
the mysterious province of culture? (Hampden-Turner &Trompenaars1993:3). 
This study reveals that, although these countries are capitalist, they do not practice capitalism 
in similar ways. While all of them subscribe to the philosophy of capitalism, their economic 
success has been underpinned by different cultures. As Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars 
explain: 
In our survey of 15 000 executives we found that culture of origin is the most 
important determinant of values. This means that culture, a deep structure of belief is 
the invisible hand that regulates economic activity. This implies that culture is the 
bedrock of national identity and the source of economic strengths and weakness 
(Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars1993:4). 
In short, Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars’s study demonstrates that the economies of the 
seven countries involved in the study operate according to two different value systems. While 
the German, Japanese, French and Swedish markets are coordinated, collaborative and, 
hence, more collective, the markets of the United States of America, United Kingdom and 
Holland are liberal, adversarial, less coordinated and, hence, more individualistic. “For 
example, in the United States, the scale is weighted heavily on the side of individualism. In 
Japan the scale tips in the opposite direction, favouring communitarianism” (Hampden-
Turner & Trompenaars1993:8). 
Empirical studies in the fields of sociology and psychology have revealed that individualistic 
and collectivistic value systems are the two dominant value systems in the world. These 
studies indicate that the West is more individualistic than the rest of the world. As Triandis 
(1995: 13) observes: “The majority of the world, roughly 70 per cent of the population is 
collectivist” (Triandis 1995:13). And this implies that only 30 per cent of the world 
population is individualistic.  
Hofstede’s (2001) study also suggests that the United States of America is the highest 
individualistic country in the world with an individualistic index value (IDV) of 90, followed 
by Australia, Great Britain, Canada and the Netherlands. Guatemala has an IDV of 6. South 
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Africa has an IDV of 65 due to the country having both individualistic and collectivistic 
value systems. The black population is predominantly collectivistic while the white 
population is predominantly individualistic (Hofstede 2001:215).     
There are several lessons we can draw from these studies. Firstly, since capitalism has 
triumphed over socialism, contemporary competition is no longer between capitalism and 
socialism, but between rival cultures of capitalism. This implies that, in a competitive global 
market, the economic success of each country depends on how well it comprehends and 
learns from the deepest motivation of its trading partners.  
The second lesson relates to the importance of culture in economic development. Since the 
values that drive wealth creation stem from culture, and since cultures differ from place to 
place, the values that should inform commerce are not necessarily universal. While Western 
European capitalism is engendered by puritan ethics from which Protestant sects discerned 
their mission on earth, capitalism in other societies is shaped by different values. This means 
that the world is not yet a global village running on one set of values. 
Thirdly, while Adam Smith (1776) suggests that self-interest is the main invisible hand that 
regulates the market, the work of Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars (1993) suggests that 
there are other invisible hands that regulate the market. This is reflected in the manner in 
which institutions relate to each other in the markets. While, in some markets, institutions are 
adversarial and individualistic; they share information, collaborate and coordinate their 
activities in other markets.  
Fourthly, another very crucial lesson we can draw from China’s, Germany’s and Japan’s 
economic history is that liberal values are not the only values that guarantee economic 
success. As previously argued, the type or form of capitalism being practiced in, for instance, 
the United States of America and Britain is individualistic, Germany, Japan, and Asia 
practice collective/communitarian capitalism. This suggests that individualism is not the only 
value system that leads to economic success. A combination of both liberal and collective 
values can also lead to economic prosperity. 
The fifth lesson we can draw from these studies is that economic systems are not culturally 
neutral. Markets are embedded in culture and they should, as a result, reflect certain values 
and commitments. Since culture is a human product, markets are not autonomous and 
objective. If markets were autonomous, they would not be susceptible to the influence of 
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cultures. As a result, the spread of capitalism around the world has two implications. As it 
spreads around the globe, the local cultures will shape capitalism, while, in turn, capitalism 
will shape the local cultures as well. For instance, cultures that do not regard self-interest and 
acquisitiveness as moral values will have to rethink and adopt self-interest as a value.  
In summary, when the government does not intervene in markets, we have laissez-faire 
capitalism. However, when governments provide services as well as their own means of 
production, we have a mixed economy; i.e. a mixture of state and private capitalism. When 
the state has an upper hand in the economy, we have what is called state capitalism. 
Furthermore, as capitalism spreads across the world, it influences local cultures, while local 
cultures, in turn, shape capitalism. Since cultures are either individualistic or collective, it is 
important to examine the implications of setting up virtue-based capitalism in both contexts.  
4.3 Problems of Individualism and Communitarianism 
Owing to its emphasis on community, virtue theory is generally associated with 
communitarianism (i.e. the idea that community is the basic unit of society), rather than 
individualism (i.e. the doctrine that an individual is the basic unit of society). However, 
because of its emphasis and focus on individual interests, individualism seems to provide 
better scope for individuals to self-actualise than communitarianism. This section therefore 
endeavours to show that, although the virtue framework is associated with 
communitarianism, it provides ample scope for individuals to exercise individuality and self-
actualisation. This is possible because the virtue framework is made up of the positive 
elements of individualism and communitarianism. Moreover, it avoids the negative extremes 
of both individualism (which ignores the importance of community) and communitarianism 
(which suffocates individuality).  
4.3.1 Individualism  
Individualism has a very long history. It is associated with Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Bentham 
and Spencer as well as Lord Acton, Alesis de Tocqueville, Bernard Mandaville, Adam Smith 
and Mill (Hayek 1948:5). It puts emphasis on individual autonomy, the universality of values 
as well as the natural rights and neutrality of government concerning rival claims of what 
constitutes a good life (Daly 1994:X). It is a liberal doctrine or stance that is rooted in the 
conviction that the core unit of society is the individual. In its extreme form, individualism 
can be committed to atomism, holding that an individual is “a complete atomistic entity with 
absolute autonomy and freedom” (Arjoon 2005: 461; Audi 1999: 719).  
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For example, according to John Rawls (1971), the individual is the only “self-originating 
source of a value claim”. And when individual interests are in conflict with community 
interests, the individual’s interests should take precedence. This implies that society exists to 
promote the well-being of individuals and individuals do not live to promote the well-being 
of society. Ethically, it implies that individuals have no other moral responsibilities apart 
from pursuing self-interest (Lukes1973: 99). As such, self-interest can easily degenerate into 
selfishness or greed.  
Socially, individualism considers society and other persons to pose a threat to the freedom of 
the individual. Therefore, an individualistic social world is one in which the individual is 
sovereign, atomistic and focused on self-interest and has regard for anyone else. In such a 
world, social virtues and human relationships are merely for transactional purposes. 
Economically, individualism could lead to laissez-faire economics, extreme economic 
individualism or unregulated capitalism with minimal state intervention a doctrine that has 
been defended by classical liberalists such as Mises (1881-1973), Friedman (1970) and 
Hayek (1899-1992). As Lukes points out:  
Thus Friedman doubts that governments can manage their economies successfully and 
is critical of most social services as economically inefficient: instead he advocates a 
negative income tax and giving money to the poor. Additionally, Hayek advocates the 
abandonment of economic planning, the severe curbing of trade union powers, the 
dismantling of progressive taxation, the dropping of planning and rent controls, the 
withering away of the direct provision of education by the state, the restoration of 
wealth as a criterion for entry into higher education and the cessation of government 
conservationists (Lukes 1973:93).  
Of course, individualism has several advantages and disadvantages. The basic advantage of 
individualism is that it recognises the importance for individuals to exercise self-
determination by pursuing self-interest. In this way, it promotes independence and self-
reliance, i.e. the idea that all people should stand on their own two feet and take care of 
themselves. Furthermore, individualism recognises and encourages individuality and 
uniqueness. It rightly assumes that individuals are not just faceless members of a group but 
are independent and unique. This implies that it is not always right to conform to group 
whims because conformity can kill individuality, personal initiative and creativity. Therefore, 
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individualism provides a well-founded justification of why society should tolerate an 
individual’s pursuit of self-interest, whether in the arts or entrepreneurship.  
The pursuit of self-interest is congruent with the virtue framework, which asserts that the 
exercise of virtues and human flourishing is voluntary. Thus, virtue is also partly 
individualistic because the cultivation of virtues and human flourishing are both self-
interested. However, people do not only exercise virtue in the pursuit of self-interest; virtue is 
also other-regarding (Solomon 1990). 
From other perspectives, individualism can also be quite destructive. For instance; by 
promoting individual interests, individualism does not emphasise people’s responsibilities 
towards the community to which they belong and the duties they must perform to uphold 
their community. And yet, every person is a member of a certain community. Membership 
goes along with certain rights as well as duties. By focusing too much on self-interest, 
individualism risks promoting selfishness. In this way, individualism can be hostile towards 
the community and undermines the cultivation of virtues.   
Another weakness of individualism is that it disregards the common good (Wing 1992). 
Individualism does not make provisions for civil society, trade unions, family, clan, labour 
unions, alumina associations or religions. It ignores the importance of culture or shared 
values and traditions. As a result, it leads to the weakening of family ties and undermines 
associations and communities, which alone can nurture human flourishing (Kymlicka 
1988:181). Worse still, by promoting self-interest, individualism does not take into 
consideration the plight of those in our society who cannot look after themselves. As a result, 
it undervalues and denigrates the societal position of children, the disabled, the unemployed, 
and all the people whose well-being is dependent on charity (Wing 1993:301).  
As a social and economic system, individualistic capitalism is therefore toxic to virtues. On 
the one hand, individualistic capitalism needs virtues and yet, on the other hand, it has no 
capacity for nurturing and supplying virtues. If a business ethics is founded on individualism, 
it would have strong self-regarding aspects but quite weak other-regarding aspects. Such a 
business ethics would certainly put society in the direction of “every man for himself”, where 
the motto of “dog eat dog” would be at home (Newman 1997:634). Moreover, this form of 
capitalism would not prescribe to the conviction that firms have a corporate social 
responsibility to their stakeholders (Freeman 1994:409). 
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In summary, individualism promotes individual autonomy and brings forward the importance 
of individual identity. However, this is achieved by ignoring the importance of community. 
Consequently, individualism undermines the responsibility a person has to family, friends 
and various other groups in society (Daly 1994: XVii). Moreover, a firm that is founded on 
individualism would only be interested in promoting the interests of its owners (Friedman 
1970).   
4.3.2 Virtue and communitarianism 
Communitarianism is the polar opposite of individualism. It is the social/political/moral 
doctrine that the basic unit of society is not an individual but a community because 
individuals are socially constituted and situated (Blackburn 1999:68). Although not all 
philosophers identify themselves as communitarian, those who have framed their ideas in 
opposition to liberal individualism have been labelled communitarian. The notable 
proponents of communitarianism are Aristotle, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandels, Charles 
Taylor, Michael Watzer and Amitai Etzioni (Newman &De Zoysa 1997:623). They are all 
united in the conviction that ‘‘liberalism does not sufficiently take into account the 
importance of community for personal identity, moral and political thinking, and judgements 
about our well-being in the contemporary world” (Bell 1995:4). They also believe that, under 
the influence of a revitalised community, human beings would be able to live more fulfilling 
personal lives than is now possible under the dominance of the individualistic ideal 
(1994:xiv).  
Communitarianism is a post-liberal philosophy designed to rectify the damage caused by 
liberal individualism. It is rooted in the conviction that human beings are social animals and 
that each person is a member of a community or wired to a network of social relations from 
birth (Aristotle 1280b10). As a result, we humans are inclined to think of ourselves “as 
members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers of this history, as sons 
or daughters of that revolution, as citizen of this republic” (Sandels 1981:179).  
As such, communitarians hold that community is the basic social unit. This implies or 
assumes that individuals are not separate entities. The basic advantage of communitarianism 
is that it promotes cooperation, teamwork, and productivity. Since, in communitarianism, 
individuals are interdependent, each one’s well-being depends on that of the other; 
communitarianism thus promotes feelings of group unity and harmony. However, this 
communal system may achieve harmony/peace and cooperation at the expense of justice. By 
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insisting on group identity, communitarianism can suffocate individuality, individual 
initiative, self-determination and creativity, which are necessary for entrepreneurship (Wing 
1992:304). In this way, communitarianism provides opportunity for the majority to stifle 
individuality because, when individual interest is in conflict with community interests, it is 
bound to be sacrificed for the common good. As Wing (1992) rightly notices:  
It can result in forcible inclusion of individuals by coercing their compliance into one 
model of community. If the powerful are authoritarian, fascist, or fundamentalist, they 
can stifle or prohibit the development of other individual or group perspectives within 
the community. For example, the majoritarian view in some societies dictates that all 
women must wear long dresses and head scarves in public, regardless of each 
individual woman’s wishes (1992:304). 
In extreme cases, therefore, communitarianism that is over-focused on the common good can 
degenerate into authoritarianism and central planning. Economically, communitarianism can 
lead to socialism and central planning, dictating to individuals what they can and cannot do 
economically, thus diminishing the scope for free will, which is necessary for 
entrepreneurship. In its extreme form, therefore, communitarianism is quite antagonistic and 
destructive. The virtue framework avoids such extremes.  
4.3.3 Virtue is both individualistic and communitarian  
The virtue framework is neither extremely atomistic nor extremely collective. It is made up 
of the positive aspects of both individualism and communitarianism. It constitutes a balance 
between extreme individualism and extreme communitarianism. As Worthen notices:  
At the extreme of each ideology, the other begins to lose all meaning. At the extreme 
of individualism, where personal autonomy reigns as the supreme virtue, one 
encounters anarchy – a system that embraces no community values. At the extreme of 
communitarianism, where community values are the only determinant of acceptable 
behaviour, one encounters totalitarianism – a system that rejects individual 
differences. Neither extreme is attractive. Yet properly balanced, the two ideologies 
can produce a consistently shifting but ultimately enriching, social milieu (Worthen 
1993:475). 
Community and human flourishing are part and parcel of the virtue framework. In this 
framework, an individual cannot exercise virtue and flourish outside of the community 
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because it is rooted in the conviction that an individual is both socially constituted and 
socially situated. Additionally, human flourishing and virtue are voluntary, which implies that 
virtue is partly both individualistic as well as communitarian. It is individualistic because 
human flourishing is self-interested; and it is communitarian because it is founded on the 
conviction that one cannot exercise virtues and flourish outside of the community. In this 
way, the type of community in which the individuals can exercise virtues and flourish is one 
where individuals can exercise individuality and manage their affairs.  
The virtue framework constitutes a solid and balanced moral foundation for capitalism. It 
takes into moral consideration the interests of both individuals and community. Thus, it takes 
care of the entrepreneur’s as well as his or her customers’ interests. It is both self-regarding 
and other-regarding (Solomon 1992). In this way, the virtue framework builds and integrates 
the strengths of individualism as well as communitarianism. One could thus argue that it 
opposes both extreme individualism and extreme communitarianism.  
As we have already demonstrated in the paragraph above, in an extreme form, both 
individualism and communitarianism can corrode virtue. If individualism is overly 
preoccupied with self-interest, it can promote egoism and greed. On the other hand, if 
communitarianism is too focused on the common good and harmony in society, it can 
suppress individuality and sacrifice individual autonomy for the common good. Thus, the 
advantages or strength of the virtue framework is its incompatibility with both extreme 
communitarianism and extreme individualism. In this way, virtue is limited in its 
applicability. It does not provide moral guidance on extreme individualism or extreme 
collectivism. 
However, because it represents a mean between two extremes, the virtue framework is not 
extremely individualistic or extremely communitarian. Instead, it has elements of both. Thus, 
the virtue framework provides a foundation for an economic system and business ethics that 
synthesise both liberal individualism and communitarianism, and are thus both self-regarding 
and other-regarding. Consequently, virtues will thrive in markets that are not extremely 
individualistic or extremely communitarian/collective. In such markets, virtues will provide 
steady, reliable moral guidance because, in such cultures, individuality is not suppressed. As 
we demonstrate in the following section, the virtue framework is more compatible with forms 
of collective rather than individualistic capitalism.  
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4.4 Forms of Capitalism Compatible with the Virtue Framework 
The whole world is now capitalist: liberal capitalism in the USA and UK, welfare capitalism 
in the EU and Japan, and a mix of state and private capitalism in China and Saudi Arabia 
(Van Beek 2012:20). This section examines the LMEs and CMEs, and demonstrates that, 
while the CMEs reinforce virtues, the LMEs erode them. Hence, the CMEs and not LMEs 
operate according to superior business ethics because they nurture and crowd in virtues, 
thereby building human relations and communities.  
4.4.1 Virtue in liberal market economies (LME) 
The basic characteristic of a liberal market economy (LME) is that it is individualistic, 
competitive, has a footloose labour force and is interested in short-term gains. However, a 
footloose labour force cannot stay in one place for long enough to be an effective role model 
to novices or to cultivate long-term relationships with other workers. The suitable labour 
force for such markets is experienced professionals rather than novices or apprentices. Thus, 
the LMEs are not conducive to nurturing virtues. 
Furthermore, in traditional business management, in the liberal market economies, the goal of 
a business enterprise is not to achieve a virtuous life but rather economic efficiency 
(Friedman 1970). In such a scheme, capital, entrepreneurial virtues (tradesmen, farmers and 
labourers) are mere means for achieving the bottom line. In such a scheme, virtue thus loses 
its intrinsic value. When business practices focus on profit (external goods) and neglect 
virtues (internal goods), “virtues might suffer first attrition and then perhaps something near 
total effacement” (MacIntyre 2007:196).  
However, this does not imply that economic activity cannot be a vehicle for nurturing and 
promoting virtues. Since markets bring people together, economic activity has the capacity to 
nurture and promote virtue. However, virtue can only be nurtured under appropriate market 
conditions. Whether business nurtures or corrodes virtue depends on the culture of the firm or 
the way the firm operates (Gibson 2007:47).  
In a world where unemployment is on the rise and the labour market is fluid, the chances of 
the youth acquiring virtues through business practice are slim. Furthermore, in a world that is 
becoming increasingly individualistic and, hence, hostile to virtue, commerce cannot only 
depend on society to mould a virtuous character. Since commerce is impossible without 
virtues, it is necessary that business institutions take a proactive approach to establishing 
virtue by developing business cultures that nurture and reinforce it. In this way, markets will 
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also be schools of virtue. The assumption of the virtue framework is that “market outcomes 
are not natural phenomena. They can be changed” (Chang 2010:258).  
4.4.2 Virtue in coordinated markets economies (CMEs) 
Coordinated market economies (CMES) have the necessary structures for nurturing and 
reinforcing virtues. These markets are collaborative, coordinated and, hence, bring people 
together. They offer permanent, stable jobs, which is conducive to vocational programmes for 
apprentices who can learn from experienced role models. Since they are, by their very nature, 
collaborative and cooperative, such cultures have the potential to enforce virtues. Thus, in 
societies where such markets are predominant, virtue is being nurtured, which stimulates 
economic activity and crowds in virtue.  
Cooperative and collaborative activities are therefore very necessary for virtue (MacIntyre 
2007:187). Since virtue requires practice, it can only be acquired in a social context where 
people are connected, i.e. where individuals can exercise individuality as well as cultivate 
relationships and bond with others through exercising virtues. Thus, to ensure a successful 
application of virtue, a business must be viewed as a practice that is concerned with, inter 
alia, cultivating virtues. Thus, in such markets, businesses practices can indeed be considered 
schools of virtue. 
For instance, the German labour market is characterised by long-term secure employment 
opportunities and it also has a dual system of vocational training “which combines classroom 
instructions with work experience” (The Economist April 14-20). This provides a social and 
economic environment that is conducive for the training of novices. As the Economist 
(2012:16) reports, despite the world financial crisis, the “German system of apprenticeship 
and vocational training, divided into some 350 trades, has helped keep youth unemployment 
in Germany lower than elsewhere in Europe” (The Economist 2012:16). 
The virtue framework is rooted in a balanced understanding of human nature, which rightly 
assumes that human beings are rational and social animals: individuals who can think and do 
things for themselves (autonomous), but who can also do so in collaboration with others 
(Trigg R. 1999:23). Such an individual has a dual responsibility: to the self and to the 
community. As Tom (1997:2) fittingly remarks: “We are living on an interdependent planet, 
and corporate systems are always subsystems of that interdependence, and they require 
collaboration and partnership”. This interdependency should therefore be factored into the 
way in which we run and manage economies. 
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In sum, the virtue framework is made up of positive elements from both individualism and 
communitarianism on which we can build a form of capitalism and business ethics that is 
socially and morally balanced (Bremmer 2010:25). However, such an economic system will 
still be congruent with the principle features of capitalism. Thus, even if the cultures of the 
world may vary from place to place, capitalism retains the following features: profit motives, 
competition and private property. Let’s examine how these features impact virtue and how 
virtue, in turn, impacts them. 
4.5 The Features of Capitalism  
As already stated above, even though approaches to capitalism vary from one culture to 
another, whatever form it may take, it still retains three distinct features: a profit motive, 
competition and private property. In this section, we discuss how these features and virtues 
affect each other. 
4.5.1 Competition 
As capitalism is an economic system in which individuals voluntarily participate in the 
market and are free to produce and sell their goods, and because each entrepreneur would be 
striving for a greater share of the market in the pursuit of self-interest, firms are bound to 
collide with others with similar interests. Rivalry in such a market is inevitable. Competition 
is therefore one of the paramount features of capitalism. It stems from each entrepreneur 
wanting to sell as much as he or she can. To get customers, a businessperson has to create and 
offer better goods or services at lower prices than his or her rivals. Such rivalry among 
businesspeople can be at the level of the price of goods, means of production and sources of 
supply of material (Schumpter 1957:82-85).  
According to Smith, free competition is the regulator that keeps a community activated only 
by self-interest from degenerating into a mob of ruthless profiteers. When traditional 
restraints are removed from the sale of goods and from wages and when all individuals have 
equal access to raw material and markets, everyone is free to pursue his or her own interests. 
In pursuing their own interests, people enter into direct competition with others who are 
similarly motivated. If either party allows blind self-interest to dictate its actions – for 
example, by price gouging or employee exploitation – it will quickly find itself beaten out by 
a competitor who, for instance, charges less and pays a better wage. Competition thus 
regulates individual economic activity (Shaw 2008:127). 
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In a similar manner, the price of commodities is also regulated by the law of supply and 
demand. When the supply of goods is high and the demand is low, the prices of goods fall. In 
such a case, as Shaw (2008:127) comments, “inefficient manufacturers start dropping like 
flies. As the competition thins out, the demand for goods slowly balances with the supply, 
and the price regulates itself. Ultimately, equilibrium is reached between supply and demand, 
and the price of goods yields a normal profit to the efficient producer”. 
Therefore, competition is beneficial to both producers and consumers. By demanding a 
specific product, consumers place producers in competition with one another to meet the 
level of demand. In modern capitalist economies, competition boosts innovation and 
productivity:  
The first is through incentives: encouraging improvements in technology, organisation 
and effort on the part of existing establishments and firms. The second is through 
selection: replacing less productive with more productive establishments and firms, 
whether smoothly via the transfer of market shares from less to more productive 
firms, or roughly through the exit of some firms and the entry of others (Carlin et al 
2001:67).  
Competition therefore provides incentives for firms to produce quality goods and services. In 
order to produce such goods and services, they have to be well organised, work hard and be 
more creative/innovative. Competition therefore determines how entrepreneurs will behave, 
the quality of products that will be sold on the market and the means of production required 
for a firm to remain competitive. In short, competition affects productivity and innovation. 
Competition can therefore trigger a turbulent process, of “creative destruction”, a term coined 
by the Joseph Schumpter in 1942 (Kariv 2011:300).  
Furthermore, competition calls for certain character attributes without which an individual 
cannot succeed in a capitalist system. As competition intensifies for instance, success in 
business will demand diligence, creativity, inventiveness, courage, determination and 
prudence. Competition spurs virtues, which in turn lead to higher productivity and economic 
growth. This means that a country cannot have economic growth without the virtues of hard 
work and high productivity. However, this is only one side of the story.  
Competition does not stimulate creativity and innovation at all levels. Entrepreneurs 
operating in markets that are characterised by low competition, for example; are not under 
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pressure to produce and provide good quality products in order to remain in business. This 
means that low levels of competition have a negative effect on virtue and productivity. This 
also suggests that policies that dampen competition – for instance, monopolies, cartel, 
subsidies, affirmative action and social welfare – can corrode virtue. Such policies can thus 
induce laziness and complacency. 
While vigorous competition spurs and enforces virtues, moderate to high levels of 
competition generate or induce productive behaviour in entrepreneurs – behaviours that can 
be virtuous or vicious. In his paper “Doux-Commerce and Self-Destruction in a Curvilinear 
Relation between Competition and Virtues”, Graafland (2009) demonstrates that, while 
competition is crucial in capitalist markets, situations of low as well as intense competition 
can have an adverse effect on virtue. For example; a situation of low competition does not 
call for the virtues of courage, truthfulness, prudence or diligence. Since virtue depends on 
practice, it means that, in a context of low competition, individuals cannot exercise these 
virtues. Graafland rightly argues that:  
Beyond a certain degree of competition, self-destructive forces set in, forces that 
“crowd out” virtues. For instance, if competition becomes very fierce, courage will 
turn to fearfulness and recklessness, satisfaction to dissatisfaction, honesty to 
opportunisms and diligence to overzealous behaviour with accumulating distortions of 
other virtues such as temperance and prudence (Graafland 2009:1). 
When competition is fierce and when survival is at stake, individuals are desperate; there is 
very little room for morality. This means that, in situations of very high competition, virtue 
may not lead to efficiency. In such situations, entrepreneurs may be compelled to substitute 
virtue with vice in order to gain an economic advantage. Thus, the virtues are in a curvilinear 
relationship with competition, i.e. situations of both low and fierce competition will corrode 
virtue. Thus, the doux-commerce thesis (Hirschman 1982:1465) (i.e. the idea that commerce 
is moralising), may hold in situations of high competition, while the self-destruction thesis 
(i.e. the idea that commerce is morally destructive) may be realised in situations of fierce 
competition.  
This also implies that individuals raised in competitive markets are very likely to have virtues 
that cannot be acquired in a non-competitive environment. Individuals operating in markets 
with low competition do not have to distinguish themselves as hard working, creative, 
innovative, prudent and honest in order to retain customers. Since virtue is enforced through 
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practice, a lack of practice due to a lack of competition certainly weakens or corrodes virtue. 
This also implies that individuals raised in less competitive markets would find it difficult to 
operate in markets that are very competitive because they lack the necessary and appropriate 
moral dispositions. 
The disadvantage of the virtue framework is that it is not stable enough to guarantee moral 
guidance in situations of both low and fierce competition. The effectiveness of the virtue 
framework is limited to specific contexts: contexts of moderate to high rather than intense to 
fierce competition. Thus, if not regulated and managed, competition can be very destructive 
to virtues.  
This also indicates that, in virtue-based markets, competition cannot be an entirely self-
sustaining process. It is a process that must be protected, encouraged and, at certain times, 
stimulated. By protecting competition from human conduct, such as cartels, monopolies, and 
encouraging competition by stimulating a weakening economy, governments would also be 
protecting and boosting virtues.  
In the same way that competition can have a positive or negative effect on virtue, virtuous 
activities can have a negative or positive effect on competition. For example, if an 
entrepreneur or the owners of business is too preoccupied with other-regarding concerns, 
such a business could eventually lose its competitive advantage. For example, as Thomas 
Gilmore comments: “To build a smokeless factory when no competitors are incurring the 
costs is individual firm suicide. Not only do good guys finish last but they might not finish.” 
(1993:31).  
This suggests that a virtue-based business can only survive in the context of likeminded 
virtuous entrepreneurs, among individuals who subscribe to similar moral values. In 
situations where non-virtuous and virtuous businesses coexist, the non-virtuous firms will 
have a free ride and have an economic advantage over the virtuous firms. In this sense, again, 
the effective applicability of virtue is limited. It is only effective among likeminded virtuous 
entrepreneurs.  
In summary, competition determines the behaviour of entrepreneurs. If competition is 
regulated to the appropriate levels, it can trigger initiative, efficiency and economic growth. 
However, if it is unregulated, it could degenerate into fierce conflict that can undermine 
virtue. For example; low and fierce competition due to cartels, subsidies and corruption 
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undermines virtues. Thus, there is a need to regulate competition to levels that encourage and 
nurture virtues and avoid levels of competition that corrode virtues. As a result, a virtue-
based market is not self-sustaining because it may require government intervention to 
regulate competition. Thus, the benefits of both virtues and competition in the business world 
can only be realised when competitive efforts are regulated or restrained (Carlton 1949:253).  
Now let us examine the role of the profit motive in business and how it affects virtues.  
4.5.2 Profit motive 
The profit motive is one of the crucial features of capitalism. It is the desire for gain, which 
drives individuals to participate in economic activities. As Adam Smith noted:  
It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to 
their humanity but to their self-love and never talk to them of our necessities but of 
their advantages (Smith 1957:37:14). 
Understood in this way, from a managerial perspective, the goal of a business enterprise is 
not a virtuous life but profit. 
This understanding of the goal of business is rooted in the assumption that “a human being is 
by nature an acquisitive creature and when left to his or her own devices, will pursue profit 
with all the instinctual vigour of a cat chasing a mouse” (Shaw 2008:126). This implies that 
human nature is only self-interested, i.e. that the nature of man is that of homo economicus 
(Shaw 2011:137). When profit becomes the primary goal of business, employees and firms’ 
owners become mere instruments for the bottom line. This understanding of business 
assumes or presents firms as autonomous profit-making machines, as if firms are self-made 
and self-regulating like natural organisms. Moreover, this implies that business goals are 
independent from human goals.  
Brown (2010) argues that this is an incorrect interpretation of the nature and purpose of 
business. This interpretation originated from Adam Smith (1776), who focuses too strongly 
on the economics of property.  By focusing too strongly on profit or property, Smith manages 
to obscure the sets of human relationships responsible for making a profit. Brown proposes 
that we need to change the way we think about the role of the economy from the 
Enlightenment economics of property to economics of provision.   
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According to the virtue framework, a firm is an artefact, a product of human effort. As such, 
it cannot have goals that are independent from those of the owners who set up that business. 
In the virtue framework, individuals set up businesses to realise their entrepreneurial 
capacities. Therefore, the goal of a virtue-based business is to provide goods and services 
necessary for human flourishing. In this scheme, profit becomes a means rather than an end 
of business.  As Shaw argues: 
Wealth maximisation is not the mega-virtue of the professionals or managers. In fact, 
wealth maximisation is not a virtue at all. Virtue cannot be reduced to physical 
outputs. They are character habits or learned propensities that foster excellence. These 
propensities are the products of a lifetime of training and conditioning to excel in 
one’s undertakings, whether it be chess, painting, medicine, accounting or other 
business-related professions, or business management. Profit maximisation may 
indeed be a by-product of such excellence, but it is not the raison d`être of 
corporations led by men and women of virtuous character (Shaw 1995:854). 
The virtue framework business model has many advantages that make it possible to 
understand entrepreneurs’ motivation. Firstly, the major goal of a virtue-based economic 
system is to provide means of and opportunities for human flourishing. In such a system, 
entrepreneurs realise their capacities by setting up and operating businesses. Moreover, an 
entrepreneur seeks profit not for the fun of it, but as a means to actualise his or her own 
capacities and those of his or her business. Since markets are artefacts, they do not operate 
like a natural organism, i.e. they are not autonomous/self-directed. Markets cannot be 
dependent on human economic activity and, at the same time, be autonomous profit-making 
machines.  
Unlike Smith’s invisible hand concept, the basic advantage of the virtue framework is that it 
does not obscure the human hand at work in the markets. Economic activities are human 
activities. Consequently, the players in the markets have rights as well as duties. As a result, 
individuals should be responsible for both the desirable and undesirable outcomes of markets.  
In this sense, the virtue framework is rooted in a more balanced view of human nature than 
implied in the homo economicus model. A balanced human life is one that harmonises the 
tensions and demands of being a rational, social, political and an economic creature. To have 
a fully balanced human existence is to lead a life that does not privilege one element of 
human nature by neglecting or deliberately omitting other equally important elements. Doing 
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so will certainly disfigure or deform human nature and lead to what Eric Voeglin (1990) 
termed “pneumopathology”, i.e. “disease” or a “disorder of the spirit”. As a result of such 
deformity, homo economicus, without being conscious of his or her social and political 
nature, has no basis for recognising that profit can only have instrumental value.  
In a scheme where profit is regarded as having an intrinsic value, homo economicus is a slave 
to his or her own desires. Instead of homo economicus controlling his or her desire for 
money, the desire for money controls homo economicus. Such a scheme has serious 
implication for human well-being. A good driver should be able to control his or her car, but 
if that driver loses control the driver, something nasty will happen. In a similar way, human 
beings are not meant to serve money but money is meant to serve human beings. In such a 
framework, profit cannot be the sole goal of business but rather the means necessary to 
sustain the business, pay wages and earn capital for further investments so that the firm can 
serve more people (Solomon 1992). This implies that human conduct in the markets should 
be regulated so that the markets can serve their intended purpose (Brown 2010).  
In this way, the virtue framework makes it possible to talk about the morality and injustice of 
an economic system. Adam Smith presents markets as if they are autonomous and self-
regulating and as if they are a natural organism, subject to the laws of nature. Such an 
understanding of markets makes it difficult to talk about human moral responsibility when 
the market collapses or fails due to human misconduct. The strength of the virtue framework 
rests on the realisation that an economic system does not run itself. It is a human artefact and 
is hence perpetually dependent on human economic activity. In this way, the virtue 
framework holds human beings responsible for the efficiency as well as inefficiencies of 
markets. And when entrepreneurs mess up the markets, as they often do, they should also 
play an active role in its rehabilitation so that they can continue to serve the community and 
promote human well-being. 
Furthermore, the virtue framework offers a more clear and concise articulation of the nature 
and role of human beings in business. Running a successful business requires more than just 
having a desire for money/wealth. First of all, a person must have the necessary 
entrepreneurial capacities so that the success of his or her business is also the realisation of 
his or her capacities. From the perspective of the virtue framework, a business firm is not a 
natural organism but a product of human creative endeavours. In the competitive world of 
business, therefore, profit is a reward for providing excellent goods and services. 
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Entrepreneurs or firms that do not provide marketable goods and services will not get such a 
reward (Solomon 1990).  
Briefly stated, traditionally, making profit for the owners is considered the goal of a business. 
This view regards profit as having an intrinsic value. As such it assumes that businesses and 
economic systems are autonomous and self-regulating natural organisms. Thus, the virtue 
framework provides a better way of thinking about business, economic systems and profit. 
For example, in the virtue framework, firms are artefacts designed to serve human interests. 
In the virtue framework, the goal of business institutions is to provide goods that individuals 
need to flourish. Understood in this way, profit is a provision for sustaining a firm. In the 
competitive world of business, profit is a reward to the entrepreneurs for providing goods and 
services to society. Accordingly, in her book Economics for Humans, Julie A. Nelson argues 
that “the purpose of the economy is about the provisioning of goods and services to meet our 
material need the way we manage our time and money so that we can obtain groceries and 
shelter and thus keep body and soul together” (2006:1). 
4.5.3 Private property 
Capitalism, in addition to competition and profit motives, is also characterised by private 
ownership of the means of production (Shaw 2011:138). Private property is distinguished 
from public property, collective property and common property, which refer to assets owned 
by the state or community rather than by individuals (Waldron1985). The institution of 
private property involves ownership, control, and the ability to dispose of and bequeath land, 
capital and other forms of property that individuals own (Macpherson 1987:79). It also 
involves the right to exclude others from interfering with an individual’s personal property.  
This section discusses the role of private property in the capitalist system and also argues that 
a virtue framework provides a more solid moral defence and justification for the institution of 
private property than the neoliberal framework advocated by Locke (1976) and Nozick 
(1974).  
4.5.3.1 Forms of property 
The institution of private property is at the heart of capitalism. Capitalism involves the 
production of goods and services, as well as the transfer of such goods from one person to 
another. In order to produce goods, entrepreneurs use capital or property. Capital comprises 
all manufactured resources, such as machines, tools and building equipment, that are used in 
the production of goods and services. In contrast, consumer goods are things or items on store 
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shelves, for instance food, clothing and soap, which people purchase for consumption 
purposes rather than investment. Capital goods are used to produce other goods. The 
production of capital goods may involve sacrificing present consumption in order to 
accumulate capital and generate future rewards (Mohr 2010:9).  
In the capitalist system, the term “property” covers a wide range of possessions or items. 
Before the abolition of slavery, human beings were considered property. During that time, 
people could be bought or sold. The abolition of slavery meant that human beings could no 
longer be the property of other human beings (Shaw 2008: 128). In a similar way, ideas, for 
example, were not something to own because knowledge was considered a gift from God. 
(Carruthers 2004: 24). While, in the past, objects of property were restricted to physical 
things, such as land, livestock and buildings, property nowadays includes intangible assets, 
for example bonds, shares, trademarks and patents (Carruthers & Ariovich 2004:25). In 
liberal society, “[t]he common defence of capitalism is the argument that people have a 
fundamental moral right to property and that our capitalist system is simply the outcome of 
this natural right” (Shaw 2008:129). While, in a socialist system, individuals are not allowed 
to own means of production, in a capitalist system, individuals are at liberty to own private 
property.  
The question that comes to mind is: What is the moral justification for the institution of 
private property? Why should individuals own property? 
4.5.3.2 Locke’s labour theory of value 
The moral justification for property can be based on rights or on needs. The most dominant 
liberal justifications for private property is based on the “self-ownership thesis” and “labour 
theory of value” advocated by Locke (1976) and Nozick (1974). In Chapter 5 of his book, 
The Second Treatise on Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration, John Locke 
(1976:15) presents the following argument:  
Every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself. 
The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. 
Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, 
he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby 
makes it his property.  
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The self-ownership thesis is rooted in the belief or understanding that human beings are 
rational and have the capacity to choose rationally. Secondly, it is rooted in the belief that 
human beings have natural rights, which are absolute and inalienable; hence, they cannot be 
surrendered, sold or transferred to someone else (Andrew 1985:529). Locke regards natural 
rights as God-given. He argues that, if an individual has a natural (absolute) right to self-
ownership, such a person must also have an absolute right to the fruits of his or her labour 
(Locke 1976:15). As Sheldon (1983:29) put it: “It appears to come as a first principle of his 
very being, he clings to the work of his hands almost as he clings to life itself”.  
The idea of self-ownership implies that people own their talents, capacities, skills and 
character. According to Sheldon (1893:30), “[w]hat we make or do is a part of the self which 
makes it. It comes of my being; it receives the stamp of my mind. It is the offspring of my 
energy; it is mine. Labour makes property and so, it is argued, labour justifies private 
property”.  
Furthermore, the self-ownership thesis assumes that individuals are self-made; hence, they 
have no moral obligation to anyone who has helped them achieve what they have attained. 
However, one might argue that a person is a product of other people’s endeavours, for 
example parents and teachers, who have made great sacrificed for his or her welfare. How, 
then, can one claim self-ownership? This does not mean that children, for example, are the 
property of their parents. What it implies is that the self-ownership thesis is based on flawed 
logic and, therefore, constitutes a weak justification for natural rights to property.  
The claim that human rights are natural rights or God-given contradicts the principle of self-
ownership. The absolute right of self-ownership would only be justified if individuals were 
also self-made. Sheldon (1983:30) poses the following question: “As a man looks in the face 
of those parents, can he ever say with perfect assurance of any object, ‘this is absolutely mine 
because I alone have made it, and I own no man anything’?” MacIntyre identifies this as a 
lack of the acknowledged dependence virtue, which stems from the realisation that human 
beings are dependent rational animals (MacIntyre 1999:119). If human rights are God-given, 
it would imply that human beings do not own themselves but that they are the property of 
God.  
Nozick builds on the Locke’s argument of self-ownership and the Kantian principle of means 
and end to show that individuals who own themselves have a right to produce, own, sell, keep 
and bequeath (Exdell 1977:142; Nozick 1974:30-33). Nozick adapts his understanding of 
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human rights to the second Kantian formulation of the categorical imperative: “Act in such a 
way that you always treat humanity never simply as a means, but always at the same time as 
an end”.  Subsequently, he argues that human beings have natural rights to self-ownership 
and that they should not be treated as mere means but as an end as well. And, since 
individuals own themselves, they cannot be treated as means but must be treated as an end. 
From this, he concludes that taxation as a form of distributive justice is a violation of 
individuals’ rights to property (Nozick 1974:177). He argues that just distribution can only be 
achieved through the market and with limited government intervention. People own 
themselves and should be free to choose what they want to do with themselves, even if they 
want to sell themselves into slavery. As Nozick asserts, “The comparable question about an 
individual is whether a free system will allow him to sell himself into slavery. I believe that it 
would” (Nozick 1974:331). 
By insisting that human rights are natural rights, and also that individuals have absolute 
property rights implies that selling one’s labour and goods is a violation of property rights. As 
Andrew argues, “[i]f rights are inalienable, they are not private property or freely disposable 
at the will of the right holder” (Andrew 1995:529). This means that trade and economic 
activities are a violation of human rights because such activities require individuals to 
surrender or relinquish their property rights. If you have an absolute right to your life, this 
also implies that you are not allowed to take away your own life, which means that you do 
not have absolute jurisdiction over your life. In this way, your self-ownership is limited as 
well. 
Consequently, Locke and Nozick’s position is not congruent with the role of private property 
in a capitalist system of business. Capitalism is about exchanging goods and services through 
markets. The Kantian argument that no man should not be dealt with merely as a means, does 
not necessarily imply that such a person has absolute rights to the fruits of his labour (Exdell 
1977:143).  
4.5.3.3 Status of private property: means or end?  
Is private property a means and/or an end in itself?  Macpherson (1979:7) suggests that the 
answer to this question depends on where one starts. If we base our justification on rights, as 
Locke and Nozick (1974) and Friedman (1970) do, then we are very likely to arrive at the 
conclusion that the right to private property is absolute; hence, private property has intrinsic 
value. This means that it can be pursued for its own sake. However, if, like Aristotle, we base 
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our justification of private property on the human needs theory, we are very likely to 
conclude that private property is a means rather than an end in itself. Our take is that the latter 
rather than the former understanding of private property better justifies and articulates the 
role of property in a capitalist system.  
What are human needs?  Needs are all the things that one requires in order to remain human 
or without which, a person will be harmed; without needs, an individual would be impaired 
(Doyal & Gouch 1991:35). Famous psychologist Abraham Maslow (1970) identifies five 
needs, which were organised into a hierarchy: physiological needs, safety needs, belonging 
and love needs, esteem needs, the need for self-actualisation/human flourishing/human well-
being (Maslow 1970: 35-58; Doyal & Gough 1991:35). He also argues that, once their human 
needs are satisfied, people move on to satisfying their wants. Both needs and wants require 
private property.    
Private property is morally justified because it satisfies human needs. Human flourishing is a 
human need without which individuals could be seriously impaired. The virtue framework 
better articulates the nature of capitalism. It also better articulates the motivation for labour, 
i.e. why individuals seek employment, open up businesses, etc. Business or commerce/trade 
involves the transfer of goods from one person to another. If individuals have 
absolute/inalienable rights to private property, trade would be a violation of such rights. 
Trade assumes that individuals have alienable rights to goods that they put on the market.  
Labour is a means that individuals use to exercise virtue. It is also a means that individuals 
use to source the goods necessary for human flourishing.  In this way, labour as private 
property has no intrinsic value. It can be used, be sold, be exercised, and help individuals 
flourish. Labour has a market value and is subject to the market forces of demand and supply. 
In such a world, therefore, one can exchange labour for a fixed wage.  
In capitalism, the institution of private property is not an end but a means.  What can become 
an end is the process of property accumulation.  The major concern of the virtue framework, 
as regards private property, is the impact that wealth has on human character. A certain use of 
wealth as well as certain modes of acquisition can undermine virtue. For instance, inheritance 
and gift giving are forms of property acquisition that could have a negative impact on the 
character of the beneficiaries. While property acquired through personal initiative and 
creativity reinforces virtues, we live in a world where some individuals do not have to work 
or think creatively to live comfortable lives.  
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In a similar manner, when property accumulation – an incessant desire for more wealth – 
becomes one’s life goal, Aristotle suggests that it could also lead to vices of greed. In a 
similar way, it could also be a symptom of psychopathology.  
4.5.3.4 How does the institution of private property impact virtues? 
According to Aristotle, private property is necessary for human flourishing. It provides 
individuals with the necessary resources to exercise virtues. Private property allows people to 
meet domestic needs and to join practices where they can exercise virtues and actualise their 
capacities. Certain virtues require individuals to own resources in order to exercise their 
abilities. The virtue of generosity, for instance, can only be exercised by individuals who own 
resources. If one has to be charitable, one certainly must have something to give to charity. 
Thus, private property facilitates the cultivation of a virtuous character by furnishing 
individuals with the opportunity to practise benevolence and philanthropy, i.e. to exercise 
virtues. It is therefore necessary to have the right to private property in order to exercise 
virtues (Macpherson 1987:77).   
Additionally, Aristotle argued that private property is more conducive to human flourishing 
than any form of common ownership, since people bestow more attention upon the 
management of private than public property. Furthermore, private ownership is a source of 
pleasure, which is conducive to the cultivation of a virtuous character 
Developing oneself and exercising one’s capacities is dependent on material property. Thus, 
not all forms of private property spur virtues. For instance, property acquired through 
inheritance can stand in the way of virtue. Acquiring private property can consequently 
induce the habit of dependency and engender laziness, which can inhibit the need for work.  
Some ways of acquiring property, even if they are legal, can thus discourage activities that 
can reinforce the development and cultivation of virtues.  
This brings us to what De Soto, in his book The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism 
Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, calls “dead capital”. De Soto argues that 
capital outside of the formal market or in informal markets has limited potential because the 
owner cannot use it to tap into national or global financial markets (De Soto 2000:4). He 
argues: 
But they hold these resources in defective forms: houses built on land whose 
ownership rights are not adequately recorded, unincorporated business with undefined 
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liability, industries located where financiers and investors cannot see them. Because 
the right to the rights to these  possessions are not adequately documented, these 
assets cannot readily be turned into capital, cannot be traded outside of narrow local 
circles where people know and trust each other, cannot be used as collateral for a 
loan, and cannot be used as a share against an investment (De Soto2000:6).  
This implies that individuals who operate in formal markets and who have legal titles to 
property have a better chance of exercising virtue using their assets than individuals who 
operate in informal markets and do not hold titles to their assets. For example, individuals 
living in informal settlements cannot use their property as collateral to get loans from banks. 
As a result, such property is not productive property because it cannot be used to create more 
wealth.  
Private property acquired through subsidies and affirmative action, could have a similar 
effect on character. Instead of stimulating action and productivity, such policies could induce 
inaction and reinforce dependency and passivity. The South African economist, Philip Mohr 
(2010) wrote: 
More than 25% of the South African population receives social grants, mainly child 
support grants, old age pension and disability grants, and more than 3.5% of GDP is 
spent on these grants. Apart from helping the recipient to survive, the grants also have 
important indirect or multiplier effects, for example, informal, small and other 
businesses make a living by catering for the demand created by recipients of the 
grants, particularly in rural communities. But welfare policy also has drawbacks. The 
child support grant, for example, could inadvertently give young women an incentive 
to become pregnant to claim the grant. (Mohr 2010: 167). 
Inheritance is another form of property transfer that can undermine virtues. The protestant 
ethics exonerates the virtues of diligence and frugality as responsible for the success of 
capitalism. While the virtues of diligence and frugality are associated with wealth 
accumulation, some individuals do not have to work in order to be rich because they have 
inherited wealth.  
One can become a millionaire overnight by simply being a beneficiary of a deceased’s estate. 
However, being a property owner does not make one a virtuous person. While inheritance can 
transform our material status from being poor to being rich, it does not transform our 
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character from being lazy to being diligent. Inheritance offers one an opportunity to meet 
one’s needs in life; for example, it could provide a person with opportunities to attend school 
or acquire capital, which one can invest and use to exercise one’s entrepreneurial virtues.   
In summary, individuals need goods or property to exercise virtues and flourish. However, 
property in the form of aid, subsidies, affirmative policies and inheritance can undermine 
virtues because it prevents individuals from using their creativity, personal initiative and self-
determination, which are necessary for building a virtuous character. Thus, exercising virtue 
in business is limited to those who have private property. Individuals without property cannot 
exercise virtues. The effectiveness of the virtue framework is limited to situations in which 
people have inter alia property and opportunities for employment.   
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter set out to discuss the various advantages and disadvantages of making the virtue 
framework a meta-theory of business. The advantage of a virtue framework is that it 
recognises that business plays many roles in society. Businesses provide goods and services 
that human beings need to flourish. Profit is simply one of the many goods that businesses 
generate. Furthermore, the virtue framework recognises that, in order to succeed in business, 
individuals need to exercise virtues and own property.  
Thus, virtues are responsible for economic efficiency and economic growth. Additionally, the 
virtue framework recognises that private property is crucial for exercising virtues. However, 
property in the form of aid, subsidies or inheritance is a double-edged sword that can have a 
positive or negative impact on virtue depending on how a beneficiary puts it to use. The 
possible negative effect of aid and inheritance is that they have the capacity to induce laziness 
and complacency.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
Over the past twenty years, virtue theory has steadily gained prominence in business ethics. 
This study set out to investigate and establish the implications, advantages and disadvantages 
of making virtue theory a meta-theory of business. To achieve this aim, Chapter 2 exposed 
the basic elements and characteristics of the Aristotelian virtue framework. Chapter 3 
discussed the implications of using virtue theory as a meta-theory of business. Finally, 
Chapter 4 examined the advantages, disadvantages and limitations of virtue-based capitalism. 
The virtue framework is rooted in the idea that human life is purposive. The goal of human 
life is to flourish/achieve well-being or realise its potentials (NE1097b22). Human flourishing 
consists in having good health and having the necessary provisions in life as well as prospects 
of achieving full human maturity. To be able to flourish, an individual must practice virtues 
(Politics 1328a37-38). However, this does not imply that practicing virtue and flourishing are 
compulsory. Individuals who wish to flourish should freely choose to participate in activities 
that would lead to the realisation of their capacities. However, to flourish, individuals require 
a moderate amount of external goods, for instance, food, shelter, clothing, money to pay 
school fees, etc. (Aristotle 1099a31-1099b7). Consequently, those who lack such goods, or 
who live in deprivation, cannot achieve well-being. 
Firstly, virtue theory is rooted in the conviction that human beings are rational, emotional, 
social and political animals. Secondly, central to virtue theory is the notion that the goal of 
human life is to flourish, which is a rational activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. 
Thus, human flourishing can only be achieved by exercising both intellectual and moral 
virtues. It consists in living well and doing well. Intellectual virtues guide a person to perform 
appropriate actions, while moral virtues help an individual to live well by him or herself and 
among other people.   
Virtue is a character trait cultivated through practice; it is not a moral principle (NE1103a3). 
While intellectual virtues are acquired through teaching and training, moral virtues, which are 
a habit or disposition of character, are acquired through practice. This implies that a human 
being is not born with virtues.  We are only born with the capacity to acquire them. 
Therefore, we can learn to be courageous, self-controlled, prudent and wise.  
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Human flourishing consists in the realisation of one’s capacities. Those who are good at 
teaching will end up as teachers; those gifted in football will flourish as footballers; those 
who have a scientific mind can only flourish by participating in scientific activities; and those 
with entrepreneurial virtues can only flourish by establishing and running businesses. This 
suggests that Aristotle’s theory – that the best and only way to flourish is to spend one’s life 
in contemplation – is too narrow and reductive and, worse still, that it contradicts and fails to 
articulate the plurality and diversity of options of well-being available to human beings.   
Since human flourishing consists in the actualization of individual potentials, and since 
human capacities differ from one person to another, there cannot be only one mode/form/way 
of human flourishing. Thus, any attempt to apply a virtue framework to business has to take 
all these elements into account. The question is: What are the implications of making virtue a 
meta-theory of business? Chapter 3 provides an answer to this question.  
Chapter 3 discussed and demonstrated the implications of making the virtue framework a 
meta-theory of business. Firstly, virtue theory holds that human flourishing is the ultimate 
goal of human life, which implies that the goal of a business founded on virtue must be 
instrumental to achieving human flourishing. In other words, a business founded on virtue 
cannot have only one goal that is independent from human goals. Therefore, businesses that 
are virtue-based can have multiple goals.  
This is contrary to the neoliberal thesis, which claims that a business has only one 
responsibility: to generate wealth for its shareholders (Friedman 1970). This, of course, has 
several negative implications. It means that profit is the sole guiding value of business 
activities. It also implies that business actions are excluded from moral consideration and 
separates business concerns from human concerns (Sanberg 2008:214). Consequently, this 
theory generates a framework in which people can be treated merely as means for the bottom-
line, which unfortunately raises issues of justice and human rights. 
In short, Friedman’s stockholder theory is too reductive. It fails to recognise that businesses 
produce goods and services that satisfy human needs and wants: goods that are necessary for 
human flourishing (Aristotle 1252b12-14).  The advantage of the virtue framework is that it 
recognises business activities as human activities. And, as such, business goals are also 
human goals. Thus, the virtue framework gives business a human face (Arjoon 2000:168). In 
such a framework, business would have multiple goals of which the bottom-line is simply 
one.  
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Furthermore, the virtue framework assumes that businesses cannot operate in a vacuum 
because they involve human beings and human beings are social animals. Thus, firms are part 
of a bigger community. This also implies that firms have a moral responsibility beyond profit 
maximisation. They should not pollute and should not be conducted in a way that undermines 
human well-being. Thus, a virtue-based firm has a broader understanding of its cooperate 
social responsibilities.   
Virtue theory is concerned with cultivating a virtuous character. This implies that, in the 
business world which is virtue-based, morality is not just about following rules and laws but a 
matter of cultivating virtuous moral dispositions. Thus, the virtue framework brings to the 
fore the importance of good character in business. The character of the individual becomes a 
key criterion, for instance, for hiring and firing individuals. Individuals’ character is revealed 
in their career history, i.e. the things they have done or failed to do.         
The other significant implication of virtue-based business practice regards the role of 
mangers in the workplace. The virtue of practical wisdom requires individuals to cultivate the 
habit of conceiving and finding moral solutions by themselves. Thus, a virtue-based 
workplace would not need managers, but leaders who can be role models for the other 
employees. This also implies that managers must be more advanced in terms of virtues than 
the people they lead. 
The other very crucial implication of applying the virtue theory to business is that the 
workplace and market arena have to be schools of virtue. This is only possible if the values of 
the workplace and the markets are compatible with the values of the community in which the 
firm is operating. The advantage of the virtue theory is that it is not schizophrenic because 
virtues guiding one’s private life are the same as those one exercises in one’s professional 
life.   
However, some philosophers, for instance, David Hume and Adam Smith (Graafland 2009), 
who subscribe to the doux-commerce thesis, have stated that commerce has a favourable 
influence on virtues because it provides opportunities for people to come together, to interact, 
get to know each other and exercise virtues. In this way, these philosophers overemphasise 
the benefits of the markets but they do not explain why some people are poor and why, at 
times, the markets fail, why there is fraud or why there is environmental degradation. As we 
saw in the 2008 economic downturn, when markets fail, people can lose their savings, fail to 
repay their mortgage and become destitute.  This shows that the doux-commerce thesis has 
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very limited explanatory power. 
The other group of philosophers who contributed to the self-destructions thesis (the idea that 
the market has a negative impact on society), for instance Plato and Aristotle (Graafland 
2009), argue that, instead of promoting virtues, the market has a corrosive effect on virtue 
and social relations. While admitting that commerce is necessary for human flourishing, 
Aristotle argues that it should be limited to providing for domestic needs only. According to 
him, businesses, for example the retail and financial trades, which make a profit by charging 
interest and commission on their services, can lead to greed and a pathology or a personality 
disorder, called ‘pleonexia’ i.e. an insatiable appetite for more money.  
Even though such economic activities can lead to greed and personality disorders, such as 
materialism, this does not mean that such businesses are not justified in charging interest and 
commission for their services. One should remember that Aristotle had a very limited 
understanding of commerce. He never thought that retailers, by bringing goods from the 
producer to the consumer, add a distributive value to the goods they sell. It only makes sense 
that such a value must be factored into the price of the goods on the shelf.  
Contemporary proponents of the self-destructive thesis argue that capitalism carries the seed 
of its own destruction, because it has a tendency to undermine the moral foundations on 
which it rests (Hirsch 1976: 141). For instance, the virtues of trust, truth, and diligence are 
very crucial to the functioning of individualistic capitalism. Nevertheless, individualism that 
is only self-interested is certainly antithetical to virtue (Hirsch 1976:141). Thus, 
individualistic capitalism – because it promotes the interests of the individual and neglects 
the interests of the community – corrodes social relationships which are necessary for 
nurturing and supplying the virtues. As Putman (2000) argues, individualistic capitalism is 
responsible for the disintegration of social life in the West, where many forms of community 
life have collapsed. In these societies, therefore, individualism has eroded the social 
structures that have nurtured and supplied the virtues.  
Since virtue is crucial for commerce, we have no other alternative but to devise an economic 
system, i.e. a form of capitalism, that is not toxic to virtues, that is not undermined by 
individualism, that values human interconnectedness and that builds community: a type of 
capitalism founded on the Aristotelian virtue framework. This is what the final chapter 
attempted to achieve.    
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Chapter 4 discussed the advantages, disadvantages and limitations of virtue-based capitalism. 
Capitalism is an economic system where goods and services are transferred via competitive 
markets, in which the means of production are predominantly in private hands. It is 
characterised by a profit motive, private ownership of the means of production and 
competition or rivalry in the markets (Donaldson &Pollins 1978:26). This economic system 
originated in the West between the 17th and 18th centuries (Tawney 1948) due to favourable 
conditions. For instance, by the year 1700, countries, such as the United Kingdom, Belgium 
and the Netherlands, had accumulated enough capital to enable them to produce surplus 
goods to sell. They had also developed, markets, banks, high literacy levels, courts, police 
services, security of private property and technological inventions that made the production 
and distribution  of goods very efficient (Pryor 2010:53). 
According to Max Weber, capitalism developed in the West due to the emergence of the 
protestant spiritual and religious values that encourage the virtues of diligence, frugality, 
austerity and accumulation (Herbroner 1992:33). Furthermore, protestant spirituality spurred 
the development of capitalism because it presented wealth accumulation and entrepreneurship 
as a vocation, and wealth as a blessing, not an impediment to salvation. However, this does 
not imply that virtues were only available in protestant cultures because the spirit of 
capitalism was already present in catholic cultures, including Venice, Florence and Southern 
Germany. A single factor is not enough to explain the evolution of capitalism. In other words, 
a set of factors accounted for the development of capitalism.  
Be that as it may, Weber argues that, for a society to be capitalist, a significant proportion of 
its population must change its mind-set and subscribe to the values compatible with 
capitalism. For a country to be capitalist, a large proportion of its citizens must be 
entrepreneurs. Additionally, a capitalist country must develop the relevant supportive 
institutions, build the appropriate infrastructure and have a favourable culture.   
Since cultures are not universal, differing from one society to another, capitalism will shape 
cultures as it spreads over the globe, and, in turn, local cultures will shape capitalism. 
Therefore, the values that will be the bedrock for business transactions in India may not be 
the same values that guide business in France. The end result is that there will be many 
varieties of capitalism. The question that comes to mind is: Which variety of capitalism is 
compatible with the virtue framework?  
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Those who subscribe to liberal values, argue for laissez-fair capitalism, with limited 
government involvement in the markets (Adam Smith 1759, Hayek 1948, Friedman 1962). 
They suggest that the role of the state should be that of a “night watchman” whose 
responsibility is simply to protect its citizens from violence, fraud and maintain order and 
provide services that cannot be accommodated in the free market (Bremmer 2010:27). 
The argument for a laissez-faire capitalism is erroneously premised on the assumption that 
the markets are moral, autonomous, without biases and unaffected by political and personal 
interest. It also assumes that markets are just, inherently stable and perfect, and that 
government intervention will destabilise the markets. And yet, as Keynes (1949) observes, 
markets are cyclical. They are characterised by booms, bubbles and busts. Such ruptures in 
the markets have serious social costs because they can result in the loss of business and 
property, which may require government intervention to save human lives. It is therefore 
impossible to have pure capitalism, in which the state has a hands-off approach (Chang 
2010:1).  
Thus, where the state exercises a hands-off approach, we have pure capitalism or laissez-fair 
capitalism. If the state is involved, we have a mixed economy. If the state has an upper hand 
in the market, we have state capitalism. The reality is that there are many types of capitalism. 
Hall and Soskice’s (2001) study shows that capitalism has evolved into two models: a liberal 
market economy (LME) and coordinated market economy (CME). A LME is liberal, 
adversarial, less coordinated and individualistic, offering jobs on a contract-basis. An LME 
has a footloose/fluid labour force and is motivated purely by profit. A CME, on the other 
hand, is coordinated, collaborative and offers long-term employment. Since the practice of 
virtue requires collective and collaborative activities, a CME rather than an LME is more 
suitable for the virtue framework.  
The lesson is that, since capitalism has triumphed over socialism, the competition is no longer 
between capitalism and socialism but between different capitalistic cultures. The statistics 
suggest that 70% of the world’s population is collective, while only 30% is individualistic 
(Triandis1995). The virtue framework is a hybrid of individualistic and collective cultures. It 
is therefore more compatible with the coordinated market economies than the liberal market 
economies.  
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The economies of Germany, Japan and China are collective and yet highly successful. On the 
other hand, the economies of the United States of America and United Kingdom are 
individualistic and successful too.  This indicates that the liberal values are not the only ones 
that can lead to economic prosperity. It is therefore not necessary to embrace extreme 
individualism, which ignores the importance of community and disparages human 
connectedness, nor is it necessary to embrace extreme communitarianism, which suffocates 
individuality and can sacrifice individual interest for the common good. The virtue 
framework is the midway between the extremes of individualism and communitarianism. The 
virtue framework integrates the best elements of the two cultures. 
The advantage of the virtue framework is that it is not only self-regarding like extreme 
individualism, or only other-regarding like extreme communitarianism. It is both self-
regarding and other-regarding. Its limitation is that it cannot provide moral guidance in 
markets that are extremely individualist or extremely collectivist.  
One crucial advantage of the virtue framework is that it avoids the pathologies that result 
from holding extreme moral views, because, as a theory, it is neither extremely individualistic 
nor extremely collectivist. As a result, the virtue framework is not opposed to all forms of 
capitalism; it is only opposed to economic systems that are founded on extreme 
individualistic and extreme collectivist value systems. In this regard, the advantage of the 
virtue framework is that it is an infusion/integration of moderate individualism and moderate 
collectivism. Subsequently, it manages to maintain a healthy and well-integrated conception 
of human nature. 
Furthermore, since it recognises the importance of context in morality, the virtue theory 
explains and justifies the moral foundations of many varieties of capitalism apparent in the 
world. It points out the reality that, as capitalism spreads across the globe, the final result will 
not be one homogeneous market founded on one value system. To the contrary, such a 
process will result in many varieties of capitalism, reflecting various shades of virtue as 
conceived by different local cultures. For example, capitalism in Asia, Brazil, China and 
Russia will not be the same as capitalism in the United States of America, Canada and Japan, 
because these societies subscribe to different value systems.  
The debate about the market is centred on markets being considered civilising and moralising 
(doux-commerce thesis) on the one hand and feeble or self-destructive on the other (self-
destructive thesis). However, the debate does not specify under what conditions markets are 
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moralising, feeble or morally destructive. With this analysis, we are now in a position to 
specify what cultural conditions in the markets are corrosive to virtue. Therefore, while the 
virtue framework has many advantages, it seems that it is also fragile because it cannot 
endure the corrosive effect of individualistic markets (Sonnet 1998). Moralising markets are 
therefore not corrosive to virtue, while those markets that do not support virtues are 
destructive to morality. Hence, the effective applicability of virtue to business practice is 
limited to contexts of likeminded virtuous firms.   
Individualism assumes that the best way to proceed economically is to have a laissez-faire 
capitalism that is self-regulated (Bremmer 2010: 27). Since virtue is voluntary, it is not easy 
to completely filter out greedy individuals in the markets. While the virtuous will not need 
rules or laws to guide them, those who are not perfect will still need a moral compass or 
moral beacons that are not necessarily modelled on virtue but that can guide them on the path 
to virtue.  
The danger of living in a society with dwindling virtues is very obvious. We should expect 
frequent corporate scandals and economic crises due to corruption. We may also have to 
build more prisons as a result. We have no choice, therefore, but to craft codes of ethics and 
create laws to guide those who are not perfectly virtuous to prevent them from acts that are 
damaging to others and create social instability (Aquinas Summa Theologica, 1a-2ae).  
Property is at the heart of capitalism. The dominant justification of property rights is that the 
libertarian justification is based on the self-ownership thesis: the idea that each human being 
has property in himself or herself. As such, each person has absolute rights to the fruits of his 
or her labour.  For example; when such a person mixes his or her labour with nature, let’s say 
land, that is part of nature also belongs to him or her. The labour theory of value is thus the 
belief that the value of things stems from the labour exerted on them.  
This study has argued that the self-ownership thesis is not a solid foundation for the 
justification of property rights because its logic is flawed. It is extremely individualistic and 
ignores the social aspects of human nature. The self-ownership thesis would only be true if 
human beings are self-made. Unfortunately, this cannot be true because human beings are a 
product of many hands: many people play roles that contribute to what an individual 
becomes. As MacIntyre (1999) asserts, such a claim suffers from a lack of “virtues of 
acknowledged dependence”, i.e. the idea that human beings are dependent rational animals. 
The virtue of humility is required to accept that human beings are not self-made.  
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However, the claim that that a human being is not self-made does not necessarily implies that 
a person cannot own things. It also does not imply that a person does not own his or her 
talents and capacities. For individuals to flourish and realise their capacities, they require 
many things. Without external goods or property, an individual cannot flourish. 
Human flourishing is a basic need for if a person cannot flourish, he or she is impaired. 
Private property can therefore be considered the basis of human flourishing. This also 
explains the motivation for a lot of human activities. As a basic need, human well-being 
motivates human behaviour to seek satisfiers and private property in order to satisfy the need 
to flourish. In this way, the human need to flourish justifies the institution of private property. 
However, certain forms of private property have the capacity to undermine virtues because 
such forms of property inhibit the need to practice virtues. This has serious implications, for 
instance, for the role of competition in the market, since certain levels of competition can 
undermine virtues. Tough competition or a complete lack thereof has a very negative impact 
on virtue.  In similar way, inheritance can also undermine virtues because it can induce sloth 
by taking away the need for work, which is necessary for practicing virtues. These forms of 
private property can only be tolerated if they are intended to help people start off. 
In markets with little or no competition, entrepreneurs have no incentive to work hard. On the 
other hand, when competition is fierce, people may resort to unethical conduct in order to 
gain an advantage. This suggests that virtue is only effective when competition is high, not 
too low or too fierce. Consequently, competition must be regulated to levels that stimulate 
creativity, innovation and productivity, and should avoid levels that can hinder or undermine 
virtues. It also means that programmes, like subsidy programmes and monopolistic policies, 
which kill competition, should be excluded from the virtue framework. Furthermore, this 
means that the virtue framework is far from a free market system that is self-regulated. A 
virtue-based economic system must be regulated to minimise the corrosion of virtue and 
safeguard human flourishing.   
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
100 
 
Bibliography 
Albuquerque, D. 2010. Business Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Andrew, E.985. Inalienable Right, Alienable Property and freedom of choice: Locke, Nozick 
and Marx on the Alienability of Labour. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 18(3):529-
550). Available: www.jstor.org/stable/3227745. [2012, September 27]. 
Albuquerque, D. 2010. Business Ethics: Principles and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Anscombe, G.E.M.1958. Modern Moral Philosophy. Philosophy, 33(124).  
Arjoon, S. 2000. Virtue Theory as a Dynamic Theory of Business. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 28(2):159-178 
Athanassoulis, N. 2005. Common-Sense Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck. Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice, 8(3):265-276. Available: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27504352[2011, 
September 20]. 
Aristotle, 1976. Ethics. Trans. J.A.K. Thomson, London: Penguin.  
Audi, R. 1999. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 2nded. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Baldine, J. 1997. Is human identity an Art fact? How some Conception of the Asian and 
Western self-fare During Technological and legal Development. Society for Philosophy and 
Technology, 3(2):1-7.  
Barnes, J. 1976. Aristotle Ethics. London: Penguin. 
Beauchamp, T.L. 1982. Philosophical Ethics: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Beauchamp, T.L. 2003. The Nature of Applied Ethics. In Frey, R.G and Wellman, C.H. (Eds) 
A Companion to Applied Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell  
Bell, D. 1976. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. New York: Basic Books. 
Bell, D. 1995. Communitarianism and Its Critics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
101 
 
Bennis, W.G. & O’Toole, J. 2005. How Business Schools Lost Their Way. Harvard Business 
Review, 85(5):96-99. 
Berlin, I. 1969. Four essays on Liberty. London: Oxford University Press. 
Blackburn, S. 1999. Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning. Oxford: Clarendon. 
Bootle, R. 2009. The Trouble with the Markets: Saving Capitalism from Itself. London: 
Nicholas Brealey. 
Bowie, N. 1999. Business Ethics: A Kantian Perspective. Oxford: Blackwell.  
Bremmer, I. 2010. The End of the Free Market: Who wins the war between States and 
Corporations? New York: Portfolio. 
Brockhaus, Robert H. 1982. The Psychology of the Entrepreneur. Kent, C. Sexton, D & 
Vesper, K. (Eds) Encyclopaedia of Entrepreneurship, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall.pp 
Broodryk, J. 2010. Understanding South Africa: The Ubuntu Way of Living. Waterkloof: 
Cape Town. 
Brown, M.T. 2010. Civilizing the Economy: A New Economics of Provision. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Carlin, W; Fries, S; Schafter, M & Seabright, P. 2001.Competition and Enterprise 
Performance in transition Economies: Evidence from a cross-country Survey, EBRD working 
paper no 63  
Carlton, F.T. 1949. Capitalism and Competition. American Journal of Economics and 
Sociology, 8(3):251. Available: http:www.jstor.org/stable/34841477[2012, July 24]. 
Carrol, A.B. 1996. Business and Society. Cincinnati: South Western College Publishing. 
Carr, A.1995. Is Business Bluffing Ethical? DesJardin and MacCall(Ed), Contemporary 
Issues in Business Ethics. Belmont: Wadworth, 21-35. 
Carruthers, B. G. and Ariovich, L. 2004. The Sociology of Property Rights. Annual Review of 
Sociology 30: 23-46. Available: http:www.jstor.org/stable/29737683 [2012, October 25]. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
102 
 
Chang, H. 2009. Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of 
Capitalism. New York: Bloomsbury. 
Chang, H. 2010. 23 Things they Don’t Tell you about Capitalism. New York: Bloomsbury.  
Childress, J. 1986. Applied Ethics. Macquarrie & Childress, J (Eds), A New Dictionary of 
Christian Ethics. London: The Westminster Press. 
Daly, M. 1994. Communitarianism, A New Public Ethics. California: Wadsworth. 
Choi, D.Y and Gray, E.R. 2011. Values Centred Entrepreneurs and their Companies. New 
York: Routledge.  
De George, R. 2012. A History of Applied Business Ethics. Markkula Center for Applied 
Ethics. Available: http://www.scu.edu/ethics[2012, August, 13]. 
Des Jardins, J.R.1995. Virtue and Business Ethics. In R. Desjardins, & MacCall  (Eds) 
Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics Belmont: Wadworth, 54-59. 
De Soto, H. 2000. The Mystery of Capital: Why capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails 
Everywhere Else, New York: Basic Books 
Dobson, J.2007. Applying Virtue Ethics to Business: The Agent Based Approach. EJBO 
12(2). Available: http://ejbo.jyu.f1/articles/0901_3.html[2010, April 13]. 
Doyal, L and Gough, I. 1991. A Theory of Human Needs. London: Macmillan 
Dumont, L.1980. Homo Hierarchicus: The Caste System and Its Implications. Chicago: 
University Press.  
Exdell, J. 1997. Distributive Justice: Nozick on Property and Rights, Ethics, 87(2): 142-149 
Ewin, R.E. 1995. The Virtues Appropriate to Business, Business Ethics Quarterly, 5(4):833-
842. Available: http://www.Jstor.org/stable/3857418, [2011, May 05]. 
Freeman, E.R. 1994. The Politics of Stakeholder Theory. Business Ethics Quartly.4 (4):409-
421. 
Freeman, E.R.et al.  2004. Stakeholder Theory and “The corporate objective Revisited,” in 
Organization Science,15 (3):364-369 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
103 
 
Friedman, M. 1970. The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profit. DesJardin 
and MacCall (Eds).Contemporary Issues in Business Ethics Belmont: Wadworth, 1995, pp8-
20. 
Friedman, M.1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 
Fuller, M. 1998. Making Sense of MacIntyre. Vermont: Ashgate 
Fukuyama, F. 1995. Trust: The Social Virtues and The creation of prosperity. New York: 
The Free Press. 
Gilson, K. 2007. Ethics and Business: An Introduction. New York: Cambridge University 
Press 
Gilmore, J.T.1986. A Framework for Responsible Business Behaviour. Business and Society 
Review, 58:31-44.http:www.web.ebschost.ez.sun.ac.za, Accessed: [2012, October 04] 
Graafland, J. J 2009. Do Markets Crowd Out virtues? An Aristotelian Framework.  Journal of 
Business Ethics, 91:1-19.  
Hall, P.A & Soskice D. 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundation of 
Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hampden-Turner, C.  & Trompenaars, A. 1993. The Seven cultures of Capitalism: Value 
Systems for Creating Wealth in the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Sweden, 
and the Netherlands. New York: Doubleday. 
Harris, J.D; and Freeman, E.R. 2008. The Impossibility of the Separation Thesis. Business 
Ethics Quarterly, l18 (4):541-548. 
Haslett, D.W 1994. Capitalism with Morality. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Haworth, A.2004. Understanding the Political Philosophers: From Ancient to Modern times. 
London: Routledge. 
Hayek, F.A 1948. Individualism and Economic Order. London: Routledge. 
Hayek, F.A. 2001. The Road to Serfdom. London: Routledge. 
Heibroner, R.C. 1992. The Worldly Philosophers. New York: Touchstone Books. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
104 
 
Hirsch, F. 1997. Social Limits of Growth. London: Routledge.  
Hirschman, A.O.1982. Rival Interpretation of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, or 
Feeble. Economic Literature, 20(4):1463-1484.  Availbale: http:jstor.org/stable/2724829 
[2011, May 30]. 
Hobbes, T. 1981(1651). Leviathan. London: Penguin. 
Hofstede, G.H.2001. Culture’s Consequences: Comparing values, Behaviours, Institutions, 
and organisations Across Nations. 2nd ed. California: Sage Publications  
Hughes, G. J. 2001. Aristotle on Ethics. London: Routledge. 
Hunt, E.K. 2003. Property and Prophets: The Evolution of Economic Institutions and 
Ideologies. New York: M.E.Sharpe. 
ILO, 2011. Global Employment Trends 2011: The Challenge of a Jobs Recovery, Geneva: 
ILO.  Available: www.ILO.org/down [2011, September 26] 
Jacobs, J. 2004. Aristotle’s Virtues: Nature, Knowledge and Human Good. New York: Peter 
Lang. 
Jones, C. 2008. For Business Ethics. London: Routledge. 
Jung. W.1991. Social Market Economy: An Economy: An Economic System for Developing 
Countries. Saint Agustin: KAF. 
Kant, I. 1948. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. In H.J.Paton, The Moral Law, 
London: Hutchinson 
Kariv, D. 2011. Entrepreneurship: An International Introduction. New York: Routledge. 
Kenny, A. 2000. A Brief History of Western Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Kenny, A. 2006. Ancient Philosophy: A New history of Western Philosophy, Vol. 1. Oxford: 
Clarendon. 
Keynes, J.M. 1933. The Means to Prosperity. London: Macmillan. 
Keynes, J.M.1949. The General Theory: Employment, Interest and Money. London: 
MacMillan. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
105 
 
Kiernan, T. 1962. Aristotle Dictionary. London: Peter Owen Ltd. 
Kirzner, I. 1978. Entrepreneurship, Entitlement and Economic Justice. In J. Paul, (Ed), 
Reading Nozick, Otawa: J. Rowman & Littlefield, 383–411. 
Kolenda, K. Ed 1988. Organisation and Ethical Individualism. New York: Praeger. 
Koslowski, P. 1996. The Ethics of Capitalism and critique of Socio-biology. Hannover: 
Springer.   
Kraut, R. 2002. Aristotle: Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Kraut, R. 2006. The Blackwell guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishing.  
Kymlicka, W. 1988. Liberalism and Communitarianism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 
18(2):181-204. Available: www.jstor.org/stable/40231605[2012, June 26]. 
Lara, M. 2008. Virtue Theory and Moral Facts. The Journal of Value Inquiry, 42:331-352 
Locke, J 1976. The Second Treatise of Government and a letter concerning Toleration.  In 
J.W.Gouch (Ed). Oxford: Blackwell 
Lukes, S. 1973. Individualism. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lutz, D. 2009. African Ubuntu Philosophy and Global Management. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 84; 313-328. 
MacIntyre, A. 1995. Marxism and Christianity. London: Duckworth. 
MacIntyre, A. 1998. A Short History of Ethics (2nd Edition). London: Routledge. 
MacIntyre, A.1999. Dependent Rational Animals: Why Humans need the Virtues. Chicago: 
Open Court. 
MacIntyre, A. 2003. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame 
MacIntyre, A. 2007. After Virtue (3rdedition). London: Duckworth.   
MacPherson, C.B. 1987. The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice and other Essays. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
106 
 
MacPherson, C.B; Parel, A and Flanagan, T. 1979. Theories of property: Aristotle to the 
Present. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University.  
Maitland, I. 1997. Virtuous Markets: The Market as School of the Virtues. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 7(1):17-31. Available: www.jstor.org/stable/385723 [2011, November 21]. 
Maslow, A.1970. Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper 
Mbeki, M. 2009. Architects of Poverty: Why African Capitalism Needs Changing. 
Johannesburg: Picador Africa. 
McCloskey, D.2006. The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for an Age of Commerce. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Meikle, S. 1996. Aristotle on Business. The Classical Quarterly New Series, 46(1):138-151. 
Available: www.jstor.org/stable/639568[2011, November 11]. 
Mielants, E.H.2008. The Origins of Capitalism and the Rise of the West. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press. 
Miller, D. 2001. Principles of Social Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,  
McHugh, F. 1991. Ethics in Business Now. London: Macmillan. 
Mohr, P. 2010. Understanding the Economy: Everything you always wanted to know about 
the Economy but thought you would not understand. Cape Town: Van Schalk. 
Morishima, M. 1982. Why has Japan Succeeded, Western Technologies and Japanese Ethos, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Morse, J. 1999. The Missing Link between Virtue Theory and Business Ethics. Journal of 
Applied Philosophy, 16(1):47-58. 
Moyo, D. 2009. Dead Aid: Why Aid is not working and How There is Another Way for 
Africa. London: Penguin. 
Moyo, D. 2011. How the West was Lost: Fifty Years of Economic Folly and the Stark 
Choices a Head. London: Penguin. 
Moore, G. 2011. The Virtue of Governance, the Governance of Virtue. Durham: Durham 
Business School.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
107 
 
Morris, Michael H. & Pamela S. Lewis. 1991. Entrepreneurship as a significant factor in 
social quality of life. Journal of Business Research, 23(1): 21-36. 
.Myers, D.G. (1999). Close relationships and quality of life. In D.Kahneman, & E. Diener 
(Eds.), Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology. New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 374 – 391. 
Naughton, M. & Cornwall, J.R. 2009. Culture as the Basis of the Good Entrepreneur. Journal 
of Religion and Business Ethics, 1(1):2.  Available: www.stthomas.edu/cathstudies/cst/[2011, 
Sept 9]. 
Nelson, J.A. 2006.Economics for Humans. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press 
Newman, O. & De Zoysa.1997. R. Communitarianism: The New Panacea? Sociological 
Perspective, 40(4):623-638. Available: www.jstor.prg/stable/1394966[2012, June 9]. 
Norman, R. 1998. The Moral Philosophers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Novak, M. 1991. The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism. London: IEA. 
Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy State and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. 
Olcott, M. 1994. The Caste System of India. American Sociological Review, 9(6):648-657. 
Available: www.jstor.org/stable/2085128[2012, June 26]. 
Oyserman, D; S.W.S. Lee. 2008. Does culture Influence what and how we Think, Effects of 
Priming Individualism and Collectivism. Psychological Bulletin, 1349(2):311-343 
Plato, 1894, The Republic. Trans Jowett, London: Penguin  
Pryor, L.F.2010. Capitalism Reassessed. New York: Cambridge. 
Putnam, R. 2000. Bowling alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New 
York: Simon & Schuster. 
Rasmussen, D. B.; Den Uyl, D. J 2005. Norms of Liberty: A Perfectionist Basis for Non-
Perfectionist Politics. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Rachels, J. 2007. The Elements of Philosophy. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
108 
 
Reinert, E. 2007. How Rich Countries Got Rich and why Poor Countries Stay Poor. London: 
Constable.  
Roncaglia, A.2005. The Wealth of Ideas: A History of Economic Thought. Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ross, D. 1977. Aristotle. London: Methuen. 
Quddu, M; Goldsby M; Farooque M. 2000. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of 
Prosperity- a Review Article, in Eastern Economic Journal, 26(1):87-98, Available: 
www.jstor.org/stable/403235970[2011, June 8]. 
Sandberg J. 2008. Understanding the Separation Thesis. Business Ethics Quarterly, 
18(2):213-232. 
Sandel, M. 1981. Liberalism and the limits of Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
press. 
Satz, D. 2010. Why Some Things Should Not Be For Sale: The Limits of Markets. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Samuelsson, K. 1961. Religion and Economic Action. London: Scandinavian University 
books. 
Schuman, M. 2012. “How to Save Capitalism”, Times, 179(4). 
Schumpeter, J.A. 1957. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: George Allan and 
Unwin Ltd. 
Scott, L. 2008. The Meaning of “Work”: An Ethical Perspective. Unpublished master’s 
thesis. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University. 
Seabrook, T. 1990. The Myth of the Market: Promise and Illusions. Bideford: Green Books. 
Sennett, R., & Cobb, J. 1972. The Hidden Injuries of Class. New York: Vintage Books. 
Sennet, R.1998. The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences in the New 
Capitalism. New York: Norton.  
Shaw, B.1995. Virtues for a Postmodern World. Business Ethics Quarterly, 5(4):43-863 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
109 
 
Shaw, W. 2008. Business Ethics, Boston: Thomson Wadsworth 
Shaw, W.  H. 2011. Business Ethics, 7th Ed, Boston: Wadworth. 
Sheldon, W.L. 1893. What Justifies Private Property? International Journal of Ethics, 
4(1):17-40. Available: www.jstor.org/stable/2375709, [2012, Sept 10]. 
Smith, A. 1953.  An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes and the Wealth of Nations. London: 
William Benton. 
Smith, A .1976. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. New York: 
Random House.   
Smith, A. 1937. The Wealth of Nations. New York: Random House. 
Slote, M. 1992. From morality to Virtue. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Slote, M.  2001. Three Methods of Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Snoeyenbos, M & Humber, J. 2003, Utilitarianism and Business Ethics. In R. Fredrick, R. A 
Companion to Business Ethics London: Blackwell. 
Solomon, R.C.1991. Business Ethics. In Peter Singer(Ed), A Companion to Ethic. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell. 
Solomon, R.C. 1992. Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: an Aristotelian Approach to 
Business Ethics. Business Ethics Quarterly, 2(3):0317-0339. 
Solomon, R.C. 2003. Victims of Circumstances: A Defence of Virtue Ethics in Business. 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 13(1):43-62. Available: wwww.jstor.org/stable/3857858, [2011, 
May 5]. 
Solomon, R.C.1993. Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach to 
Business Ethics. Applied Ethics: A Reader, Earl R.Winkler and Jerrold R.Coombs(ed), 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Solomon. R & Higgins, K.M. 1996. A Short History of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Solomon, R. 2003. Victims of Circumstances? A defence of Virtue Ethics. Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 13(1):43-62. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
110 
 
Soros, G. 1998. The Crisis of Global Capitalism. London: Public Affairs. 
Storr, V.H. 2009. Why the Market? Market as Social and Moral Space. Journal of Market 
and Morality, 12(2):277-296. Available:www.acton.org/sites/v4.acton.org/files/pdf/5.pdf  
Taylor, G &Wolfram, S. 1968. The Self-Regarding and Other-Regarding Virtue. In 
Philosophical Quarterly, 18(72):238-248. Available: www.jstor.org/stable/2218561 [2011, 
June 27]. 
Tawney, R.H. 1943. Religion and the Rise of Capitalism: A Historical Study. London: John 
Murray. 
Titmuss, R. 1971. The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy. New York: 
Pantheon. 
Tom, M. 1997. The Soul of Business. Carlsband: Hay House. 
Trigg, R. 1999. Ideas of Human Nature: An Historical Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell 
Velasquez, M. 2006. Business Ethics-Concepts and Cases. Pearson Prentice Hall: New 
Jessey  
Triandis, H. 1995. Individualism and Collectivism. Boulder: Westview 
Van Beek,U. E. and Wnuk-Lipinskie, E, 2012. Democracy under Stress: The Global Crisis 
and Beyond. Opladen: Barbara Budrich Publishers. 
Vella, J.A. 2008. Aristotle: A Guide for the Perplexed. New York: Continuum. 
Voegelin, E. 2000.The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, (Vol.11) Ed by Ellis Sandoz, 
University of Missouri Press. 
Waldron, J. 1985. What is private Property, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies? 5(3) 
Wallich, H.C. 1960. The cost of Freedom: A New Look at Capitalism. New York: Harper and 
Brothers. 
Watt, L. 1992. Capitalism and Morality. London: Cassel and Company Ltd. 
Weber M, 1992. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Trans. Talcott Parsons, 
London: Rutledge. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
111 
 
Weisband, E. 2009. The Virtues of Virtue: Social Capital, Network Governance and 
corporate Social Responsibility. American Behavioural Scientist, 52(6):905-918. Available: 
http://abs.sage pub.com/content/52/6/905[2001, August 08].  
Whetstone, J. T. 2001.How Virtue Fits within Business Ethics. Journal of business Ethics, 
33: 101-114. 
Williams, B.1981. Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Wing, A. K. 1992. Communitarianism vs. Individualism: Constitutionalism in Namibia and 
South Africa, Wisconsin International Law Journal. 295. Available: http:www.heinonline.org 
[2011, October 29]. 
Wolff, J.1991. Robert Nozick, Property Justice and Minimal State. New York: Cambridge. 
Worthen, K.J. 1993. The role of local Government in Striking the Proper Balance between 
Individualism and Communitarianism: Lesson for and From America. BYU L. Rev, 475: 475-
496. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
112 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
